Putin is trying to find scapegoats for failures of Russian defense industrial base - ISW

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) shared its analysis in a new report.

“Russian President Vladimir Putin likely seeks scapegoats for the Russian defense industrial base’s struggle to address equipment and technological shortages,” the report says.

At a Cabinet meeting on January 11, Putin publicly criticized Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov for the failure of aviation industry enterprises to fulfill state orders. He said that some enterprises have not yet received state orders for 2023, are not hiring additional staff and are not preparing to increase production for potential orders in the future.

Putin interrupted Manturov's explanation that the ministry had already prepared draft orders for the civilian and military industries, as a result of which the minister admitted that Russia had not released some documents for aircraft manufacturers that would approve state funding for their projects.

The Russian president claimed that the enterprise directors told him that they did not receive state orders under the "current conditions" in Russia, and urged Manturov not to “play a fool.” He tried to soften the demand, saying the ministry will “try to do anything possible," but the Kremlin chief said he should not try his best but instead complete the task within a month. His spokesman Dmitry Peskov later downplayed the spat, calling it a "normal workflow."

Analysts believe the incident is likely part of the Kremlin's ongoing information campaign to boost Putin's image as a wartime leader.

“The Kremlin could have cut out the disagreement from its official transcript (as it often does for most of Putin’s meetings, which are heavily edited and stage managed), but chose to publicize Putin’s harsh response, possibly to identify other officials within the Kremlin as the culprits for Russian defense industrial base’s challenges and possibly to threaten other officials,” ISW experts say.

Putin began to make more public appearances, including visits to defense industry enterprises, in December and January, despite previously restricting his activities throughout the war against Ukraine, the Institute noted.

It is believed that Putin is also trying to mitigate criticism from Russian military bloggers about the lack of advanced military equipment and Russia's inability to task its defense industrial base with supporting the war effort. Some private arms producers have also criticized the Kremlin for failing to award any government contracts to their firms, backing up their criticism with bloggers' discourse.

Also, the deputy head of the Main Operational Directorate of the Ukrainian General Staff, Brigadier General Oleksiy Hromov, said on January 12 that the Russian military leadership plans to increase the number of army personnel to 1.5 million (compared to about 1.35 million in September 2022) and form at least 20 new military units in 2023. According to Ukrainian intelligence, this indicates the Kremlin's intentions to start a long-term confrontation and preparation for large-scale hostilities.

He noted Russia's significant losses in personnel, weapons and equipment, pointed to the effects of international sanctions and noted that the structural shortcomings of the Russian military apparatus have reduced Russia's ability to build up its armed forces and, ultimately, raised doubts as to whether they will be able to implement these reforms within the undisclosed timeframe.

Hromov's statements came a day after the Russian Ministry of Defense announced a major restructuring of the top command structure for its operations in Ukraine, and suggest that the Russian military apparatus as a whole is engaged in a concerted campaign to reform and restructure numerous tactical, operational and strategic aspects.

ISW previously reported that Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu proposed to increase the size of the armed forces and form 17 new maneuver divisions.

“It is unclear what additional 3 divisions Hromov is referring to. ISW assessed that the Russian MoD has been steadily reversing the 2008 Serdyukov reforms (which sought to streamline the Russian ground forces and move to a brigade-based structure) by restoring maneuver divisions across Russian military districts since 2013, but that the Kremlin is unlikely to implement these reforms on a timeline that is relevant for Russia’s war on Ukraine. Restructuring of senior command structures, coupled with efforts to expand the military base in 2023, suggest that Russia is setting conditions for a long-term, concerted effort in Ukraine. The Russian MoD may also hold highly unrealistic expectations of its own ability to quickly restructure its ground forces,” the ISW adds.