We'll handle it with diplomacy and strength: Ukraine's strategy for reclaiming occupied territories

Ukraine and the world are about to enter a period of significant turbulence lasting 60-90 days, until the Donald Trump administration settles into office. It is clear that Putin's main strategy is to escalate the situation to its highest point. The worst of Putin's actions may unfold in the coming months. While I could be mistaken about his plan, what can you say about the current period of dramatic turbulence?

In fact, the Trump team has already begun to "take shape," and they are doing so quite rapidly. While there are some clarifications—such as the prosecutor's candidacy not making it to the presidential office—overall, the names of key officials are already known.

Since we’re discussing Ukraine, the name of Trump's main adviser on Ukraine and Russia—specifically regarding our war—has also been revealed. This is a well-known figure to Trump: a seasoned career military man, not young at 80 years old, but someone who has spent considerable time in Ukraine.

Interestingly, Ukrainian analysts categorize several key figures in Trump's circle into two phases. At one point, they were strongly pro-Ukrainian, but as the elections approached, they either refrained from voting in favor of helping Ukraine in Congress or the Senate, or shifted their rhetoric. I remain quite skeptical about this, as it seems like "going with the flow," a practice that is all too common in Ukraine.

It’s safe to say that the core of Trump's team is composed of "hawks"—individuals who are confrontational, opposed to dictatorships, and view China as their primary enemy, with some also focusing on Iran and North Korea.

The main criticism of this team was that they, including the adviser on Russia and Ukraine, were making their own publications. I believe I saw on CNN that nearly all of the nominees for key positions in the Trump administration have published two to three books, or more, so you can read about their positions.

However, it’s now becoming clear that the preliminary analyses we made—regarding how Trump might view the end of the war just days after taking office—have already proven to be incorrect. Previously, we based our assumptions on these publications and thought that some of these advisers might not secure a place in the team.

What will the Trump administration do now? Will it wait, or will it attempt to enter into negotiations with Russia, perhaps through third-country intermediaries? Putin is determined to inflict the most significant and dramatic damage on Ukraine over the next 60-100 days.

This is the test we are undergoing. We see what Putin’s system is. He is not launching this offensive alone—the [North] Koreans, weapons from China, Iran, and Korea, as well as his own “Oreshniks,” have emerged. They are truly advancing like a bulldozer. But Trump promised that when he came to power, the world would change, there would be no more wars, and there would be a just peace. The biggest challenge, of course, will be defining what a "just peace" means and who, among us, understands it in that way.

I am sure that contacts with Moscow are already underway, I think they have even started earlier.

Trump and members of his team likely have their own lines of communication. It’s probable they haven’t lost contact with Moscow. In fact, Trump spoke with Putin after losing the presidency, as has been made known. So, I have no doubt that they are maintaining these communications through various channels—business ties, lobbyists, some agents of influence, and official diplomatic channels.

In this context, an interview with an American official who served as the U.S. ambassador to Moscow for several years, including during Putin’s full-scale aggression, was particularly revealing. The essence of the ambassador’s point was that it is neither worthwhile nor realistic to imagine negotiating with Putin in the traditional sense. You simply can’t reach an agreement with him.

I believe the Trump team understands this, which is why there is a formula I find compelling—one that Zelenskyy has also reiterated: coercion to peace. This concept, akin to what the Russians once employed in Georgia, emphasizes achieving peace from a position of strength. But this raises critical questions: what will such coercion look like? 

And who will ultimately be coerced? There’s also a troubling scenario to consider—one where peace is "forced" by withholding timely assistance in sufficient quantities. This could involve delays in providing specific missile systems or withholding additional approvals. In such a case, Russia could exploit the situation on the battlefield, amassing manpower and sending North Koreans or other recruits into the "meat grinder.”

The key figures now appointed as National Security Advisor and Special Advisor for Russia and Ukraine have been outspoken critics of the Biden administration, accusing it of failing to deliver weapons in a timely manner, delaying actions, and not doing enough to counter Putin. This is not very logical. On one hand, Biden and his team are scrambling to make up for lost time—a stressful situation given the delays. Now, they face logistical challenges in delivering the promised $6 billion in aid, or whatever remains, to Ukraine before the transition of power.

We have already heard such accusations, particularly from Sullivan, a ‘favorite’ among Ukrainian experts, who has suggested lowering the conscription age. This approach seems astonishing, i.e. "We won’t provide additional weapons, but let’s send more unarmed people to confront Russia.”

t’s important for Trump’s team to capitalize on their opposition strategy by addressing the criticisms they’ve leveled at Biden—such as the lack of a clear end goal, insufficient weapon supplies, poor timing, and similar shortcomings. The real challenge will come when Trump is required to make formal decisions, as much of this discussion remains speculative and akin to guesswork.

Those familiar with Trump understand that he operates as his own strategist, with opinions that can be formed in the morning and shifted by the evening. This means he tends to curate and adapt his strategies based on what he sees as the most compelling narratives or solutions at any given moment.

However, as an elected president, president-elect, or even as a candidate awaiting office, Trump would still receive intelligence briefings, providing him with a full picture of the situation. It likely doesn’t seem as straightforward to Trump now to "lock up one side and lock up the other" to resolve the issue within 24 hours. This much is evident. Trump will likely continue analyzing the proposals being presented to him while closely monitoring ongoing developments.

One thing is clear to me—imagine if this irrational Putin were to actually deploy his so-called "miracle weapon," which he claims travels at an immeasurable speed and carries explosives designed to strike decision-making centers. Putin himself has boasted that this weapon has effects comparable to nuclear weapons, only "better" because it lacks radiation. Yet, it obliterates everything within the target area, reducing it to ash.

Of course, this is a huge challenge to the position held by the democratic world. There is no point in using such weapons, there is no way to use them only on military targets. And what does it mean by decision-making centers? On the government quarter? The fact is that these weapons are very inaccurate. Instead of hitting a government building, for example, it can hit a completely different place, residential neighbourhoods. Against this backdrop, more and more European countries are realising that Putin is something unpredictable, and American officials say that he understands only the language of force, so to allow such an escalation now is simply strange.

And this is happening against the backdrop of constant attempts not to irritate or provoke Russia, which is raising the bar without any provocation.

I have a feeling that Putin, who understands the psychology of many Americans, is actually using these threats to scare them.

And the biggest problem that NATO member states have in the European Union right now is the Article 5 test.

Experts are simply modelling a situation where Russia will simultaneously stand up to defend the Russian-speaking population in one of the neighbouring NATO countries, and there will be some kind of local operation with "little green men." We have long said that Putin's goal is to destroy this sense of security and solidarity.

In the current situation, Putin's threats of thermonuclear war may work in some weak Western European minds. But we in Ukraine have nowhere to retreat. And this story with "Oreshnik" is about Putin's alleged readiness to use thermonuclear weapons, even if it is only against Ukraine. What would be the response? Putin is aware that it is unlikely that anyone would fire nuclear tomahawks at his bunker. And he knows, he plays on this, because he understands that there will be a response, or perhaps there will not be a direct response. And after that, Putin is going to finish the job on the ground.

This is reminiscent of the situation when Obama told the Syrian dictator Assad that if you use chemical weapons, God forbid, you will not be able to get away with it. He did use chemical weapons, and more than once.

There have been several similar instances of threats of escalation in the past. For example, Biden once warned Putin that if he pursued aggression in Ukraine, he would end up searching for a fifth corner in his bunker. That approach didn’t deter him either. On the flip side, Putin succeeded in intimidating many into hesitating to help Ukraine by threatening to grind them to dust.

As for the use of tactical nuclear weapons, China plays a role here, as it is categorically against it.

NATO has modeled a scenario in which, if Russia were to use nuclear weapons—whether local or tactical—against Ukraine, the response would be swift and overwhelming. NATO forces would reportedly use conventional precision weapons to instantly destroy Russia's armed forces, its Black Sea Fleet, and all known Russian facilities in occupied Ukraine and Crimea within minutes.

This is precisely the message delivered to Putin: if tactical nuclear weapons are used, he stands to lose everything—Crimea, the navy, and the troops stationed in Ukraine's occupied territories.

There was such a conversation, but the question arises again: How serious is this and is NATO ready to act like this? Because it will be NATO's joint forces that will carry out such strikes. This is very realistic, because if you calculate the capability of the missile carriers that the Allies can put into the air and the Americans can use from their fleets, this is a very, very realistic scenario.

But the situation is shaky, and there are fears that Ukraine may be forced to do something. I mean, of course, no one will voice this, but we just remember how Hitler and Stalin conducted their operations against Poland, so to speak. And the Poles were not happy about it.

Everyone is talking about this. Obviously, these scenarios are constantly being discussed by experts at various platforms. But the point is that Trump did not just promise to end all wars, he actually promised that the world would be in order again, because, unlike the weak Biden, Trump is a strong politician and he will not give a slack, and Putin cannot behave under him as he did under Biden, and he will deal with other dictators very quickly.

Trump has a huge challenge here, he needs to preserve his image or get the laurels of, perhaps, Reagan, whom Americans adore because he is the politician who destroyed the evil empire (the USSR). The key expectation of Americans is that they have a president who can make the bad guys behave better. And we are already seeing examples of this - Europeans are already buying American-made liquid gas, Hamas has gone quiet, and there are serious possibilities for ‘extinguishing’ the Middle East. We see that everything is fading away before our eyes.

That's why Trump is now, at the time of his coronation, left with this Russian-Ukrainian war. And he definitely cannot solve these problems the way we pretend to. He has to show that he has forced Putin to make serious concessions.

And here we have a favorable scenario for Putin to initially stick his neck out and say that Russia is ‘great’ and refuse. That would be a great topic. Because if both Ukraine and Russia start separately, Putin can sell as concessions what is not really concessions for him. After all, the issues of sanctions, borders, guarantees, and NATO will be on the table.

The thesis of all these advisers about 10 years of not joining NATO is very stupid, because the issue is not NATO.

Let me remind you that the Vatican is not a NATO member, but it has sufficient guarantees, apart from the Heavenly ones.

But for Putin, NATO or not NATO is a threat. Putin needs Ukraine to not be successful, to simply disappear. He can only be knocked out of this mould by something very powerful. He cannot be persuaded at the negotiating table that this is a democratic country, that its people should decide their own fate, how to live and with whom to live.

Two months pass, let's say it's the end of January, and Trump is inaugurated, and Keith Kellogg, the commissioner for the Russian-Ukrainian war, meets, for example, with Naryshkin, the Russian intelligence chief, or Medvedev, or Putin, and they tell him that their appetites require more. Now, this scenario is also possible.

I would welcome such a scenario, because it immediately creates a problem for Putin. Because if Ukraine is the first to say that we can't, for example, because of public opinion or something else, although now public opinion in Ukraine is increasingly supporting the freezing of this conflict.

Of course, people are getting tired. And as for the coming months, analysts around the world will also be tracking this.

And Zelenskyy's rhetoric has changed, meaning that Ukraine is saying that it understands and is ready to negotiate, but it is setting certain preconditions. The essence of Ukraine's position is what are the security guarantees on the border or within the borders we have agreed on? Will Russia stand there and not attack again? In addition, it is out of the question and no one in Ukraine will agree that we recognise the occupied territories in Russia.

We can accept the formula that we will resolve the issue diplomatically.

But if we have a sufficient army, and the Croatian scenario is very appealing to Ukrainians, we can solve this problem with a good word and a Colt later, after Putin has died in agony. That is why this path is interesting and understandable for Ukraine.

And if Ukraine has such a position, and Putin accepts the terms that Trump has already said at the debate that this position is unacceptable. It was about four regions and NATO. I don't understand why they are taking this NATO issue, because it seems like they seriously believe that Putin is concerned about Ukraine's membership in NATO.  No, Putin is concerned about Ukraine's ability to fulfil itself and be successful, so that Russians can look at it and say: "Those guys are doing well there, everything is fine." After all, Russia is in a terrible economic situation right now.

Therefore, if Russia does what you say, Ukraine will declare its readiness for diplomatic negotiations on the basis that, as the Russians say, "realities," but we do not recognise the territory as occupied, there are other things. And if Russia says that this is not enough, then this simply forces Trump to direct all his pressure potential towards Russia, not towards Ukraine.