Don't Look Up: The West seen the movie, but failed to learn its lesson

However, this thesis once again reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of the Kremlin's strategic objectives. Moscow's ambitions do not lie in the four occupied regions and Crimea. Even if the modern world were to view the historical surrender of the Sudetenland to Hitler as an exception rather than a rule.

Moscow’s goal is to increase its geopolitical influence (“Russia will no longer be humiliated”) and create a gray, buffer zone between itself and Western civilization (ideally, a return to a bipolar world where Russia regains its former greatness).

This buffer zone should not necessarily run through Ukraine, but, say, through countries like Poland, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia. As for the latter two, this zone is already clearly “hybridized.” There is no need to elaborate further. Such a framework would align with Putin’s interests in much of the European Union, resembling a “Warsaw Pact 2,” where Russia sees itself as the “guiding and leading force.”

This is why the so-called “quick fix” for Ukraine, a topic discussed by nearly every Western outlet, essentially serves as a disclaimer — an attempt to absolve responsibility for the potential consequences of certain actions. It must be emphasized that the current inclination to revert to the situation of 2022 outweighs any rational understanding of the dangers posed by rewarding, rather than punishing, the Putin regime.

No matter how much Ukrainian analysts, politicians, and journalists write and speak about this, it seems as though we are trying to get Western societies and their elites to “look up.” They’ve seen the movie, yet failed to draw any conclusions. They believe the problem is overstated and that Putin will not risk going further. This is naive.

So in 2025, our options for pushing forward are limited. I can imagine how reluctant the current [Ukraine's President's] Office is to take certain actions (for example, look into Trump's eyes). But other methods — appeals, ultimatums, coercion — are no longer effective. It's encouraging that the Office has begun to recognize this. Therefore, we will need to become both wiser and more cunning. Ultimately, we must start formulating our own strategy — defining the future we envision for Ukraine and determining the steps necessary to make it a reality.

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About the author. Viktor Shlinchak, Chairman of the Board of the Institute of World Policy

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