Russian elite still has a choice, but Putin does not - Feygin

The tireless doomsday clock is ticking down to the beginning of Armageddon, and the events in the Middle East have shown how serious it is. At the same time, the United States has become extremely involved in deterring Iran, at least by using air defence systems on its aircraft carrier group. How can this situation affect the Russian-Ukrainian war? We understand that Iran, on the one hand, is an ally of Russia, and on the other hand, Israel has extremely tense relations with Iran, but communicates quite calmly with Russia or the DPRK. In your opinion, how can the threat of a major apocalyptic war in the Middle East affect the situation with the Russian-Ukrainian war, particularly when we are talking about the supply of everything we need?

I still believe that the conflict in the Middle East will not transform into a more global world war, it will not have that much impact. But this does not mean that the events there do not affect the situation in Ukraine. And I would say that from a military point of view, they can have a very positive impact.

This is a simple linear scheme, according to which - if Israel strikes back in the coming days on the territory of Iran, and it could be military facilities or energy infrastructure facilities, oil facilities, and so on. And among these facilities may be those that produce weapons supplied to Russia. These are ballistic missiles, drones, and components that kill Ukrainians. Therefore, it is very beneficial for Ukraine to see this strike take place, for Israel to bring it to this point and destroy at least part of Iran's military industrial infrastructure. Well, this is obvious.

Politically, this is definitely a loss in this theatre for Russia. And Russia is directly involved, and Moscow is involved in the events in the Middle East - this is quite obvious. Its direct military allies are fighting - Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, and partly related to this is Syria, where Russian troops are stationed, and the Iranian IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps).

Undoubtedly, a loss in one of the geopolitical theatres will affect the situation in Ukraine. This means that Moscow, although directly involved in the war, may lose somewhere. And perhaps its interests, to put it mildly, may be infringed upon. As its allies lose, sooner or later the main one, represented by Moscow, will lose. This is also a fairly straightforward logic.

Israel does maintain this contact with Moscow. The logic here is simple: we have 100 Hamas people as hostages.

Tel Aviv believes that Moscow is also holding back Iran and other players in the Middle East from crossing a line in the war with Israel.

Basically, as I understand it, we are talking only about Iran and, in one way or another, Hamas. Hezbollah is, after all, a direct proxy of Tehran, so Moscow, if it has any influence, is not decisive. Iran is much more important. Moreover, let's say that in its current state, given the deaths of all its leadership members, Hezbollah does not pose a threat anymore. Rather, it is a threat from activists, the weapons they have, and the accumulation of large amounts of money. By the way, they get a huge income from drug trafficking.

Few people talk about it, but Hezbollah is a huge organiser of drug trafficking in this region. But it doesn't matter. In general, Hezbollah does not have the strength to confront Israel now, so the operation in southern Lebanon will be successful.

I think that, as a result of what will happen, relations between Jerusalem and Kyiv, both militarily and in other ways, will become closer.

This is objective. And this will happen if Moscow's role and influence in the region decreases, not increases, but decreases, I mean in the Middle East. Then Israel will have nothing to fear, it will be able to support Ukraine more openly at the request of its common allies, especially Washington, to share military supplies, intelligence information and other means with Ukraine, to help Ukraine in its confrontation with this eastern despot, Moscow.

The Netanyahu government is now seen as an obstacle, as opposition forces are discussing changes in relations with Moscow. Moscow is considered responsible for many events this year, particularly starting with October 7, when Hamas—directly controlled by Moscow among other entities—attacked southern Israel, resulting in the deaths of more than a thousand people. Clearly, Moscow did not prevent this attack.

Could it have or not? In my opinion, it could have. Apparently, in the opinion of the Israeli leadership, it could have. However, maintaining communication with Moscow appears illusory for Israel, as if it offers an opportunity to influence the situation from within among its enemies. I believe this is not the case, but it's a matter of diplomacy and larger political dynamics.

Perhaps the outcome of this war and the escalation will bring clarity, though there may be aspects we are unaware of.

And this is an extremely correct and useful form to try to outline the current disposition, because we don't know a lot.

For example, does Iran have nuclear weapons or not? Who can say for sure 100%?

Coming back to Washington's policy, we understand that there was an extremely important visit of the Ukrainian delegation, including President Zelenskyy, which was dedicated to two super important cases. One is the permission to launch missiles at Russian military facilities beyond the Urals. The second is the Victory Plan, but here we are on the thin ice of secrets and conspiracy, because everything remains confidential. As for the strikes on Russian territory, in particular on military facilities, there was an immediate hysterical reaction from Putin, who changed the Russian nuclear strategy, in particular with regard to the use of strategic and tactical means. This means that Putin started to get hysterical in order to stop this decision.

Yes, and of course he wanted to influence the West, which decides to give Ukraine the right to use long-range weapons that are transferred by the West, transferred by Washington to Ukraine to strike deep into Russia. Certainly the West, because Ukraine is not impressed by this. Nuclear threats coming from Moscow, of course, will probably not have the same effect against the backdrop of two and a half years of war and hundreds of thousands of victims.

In addition, everyone understands that Putin is certainly aware that the use of nuclear weapons and the threat of their use are different things.

He is trying to achieve the maximum effect, to maximise this effect primarily from rhetoric, from threats, not from the use itself. Because rhetoric is reciprocal, you can always play it back, as Peskov did after Putin's speech. It got to the point where even drones could be seen as a reason why nuclear weapons could be used. Then it started: ЄNo, no. There is no need to exaggerate. They misunderstood,Є and so on. This means that verbal rhetoric itself is a weapon.

But the use of nuclear weapons is irreversible, you can't take it back. How can you do it? That's why those experts who believe that this is only a tool to put pressure on public opinion, on the West, on the establishment and elites of the West, and that it does not necessarily cross the bridge to use, are most likely right.

Putin is not ready to use nuclear weapons because the consequences of such use would be irreversible.

The question is whether these threats and this nuclear blackmail are having an effect on the West. If they have not given the opportunity to strike deep into Russia, then it must have some effect. It certainly plays a role in the decision-making process of Washington and its allies.

Another issue is that the domestic political situation in the United States itself is superimposed here, as there is an election campaign going on, with Democrats fighting Republicans, and candidates like Trump and Kamala Harris fighting. And the advantage, if any, that Harris has, for example, is very shaky and has yet to be realised. Therefore, until November 5, the election day, until the results of the U.S. elections, this factor will probably be decisive in the issue of granting Ukraine the right to use Western means to strike deep into Russian territory.

Why is this happening? Because they are concerned about a built-in situation and fear that Trump may return to power. It’s not just that the Democrats could lose to Trump; the overall strategy would shift. We understand this now. The strategy on supporting Ukraine would change. Despite all the criticism and complaints against them, particularly regarding the Biden administration's indecision, the Democrats still provide institutionalized and declared support, implemented as best they can. However, under Trump, this dynamic will change, which is evident from his public statements.

What else should it be based on? What criteria should we use to determine Trump's program? This was the core of the dispute and discussion—whether the meeting with Zelenskyy was canceled or held, or the opposite. Zelenskyy's statement is quite valid; he noted, "Listen, Trump has no program." But what does that really mean? Trump himself responds, "Everything in its due time."

At one time, we honestly said that a full-scale invasion was being prepared, i.e. Putin's body language was quite eloquent, his body language and hysteria were directly reflected on the faces of those of his accomplices who were sitting at this council. And they were sitting there, not even a fly could pass by, nodding: yes, yes.

You know, over these two and a half years of war, its course, its interim results, the failure to take Kyiv in three days, we must clearly say that the system itself has changed. It has changed. The war has changed it, so now it is more personalised. It is totalitarian - this is what has finally developed in it, despite the fact that some signs point to authoritarianism. It's a harsh dictatorial regime, but there are still totalitarian elements. Putin himself determines the tactics, strategy of war and state policy. It was possible before, but there were different circumstances, and now these are the conditions of war.

And now it is impossible, unacceptable to imagine that there could be even a whiff of doubt in Putin's environment - on the one hand. And then we have already seen systems like this: the more you strengthen the system, as Stalin did, for example, the more you try to eliminate any risks associated with threats and challenges to your system. That is, you remove the most loyal people, shoot them, put them in prison. Why? What if they turn disloyal and start looking for ways to get rid of you? Moreover, the external environment is conducive to this.

Only the lazy are not calling on the Russian elite to get rid of Putin and solve all their problems.

Not the problems of Ukraine, of course, the war, the problems of peace. But internal problems, because Putin's mobilisation policy, and I mean this in a broad sense - economic, social, humanitarian - has changed the life of the elite. The elite is now under his full control, and he is punishing them for what he used to reward them for. For example, for corruption. When has something like this happened before?

Putin has no way out, but the elites have a way out. They can hide and then pretend to be innocent of anything. And on whom will Putin shift the responsibility? On whom will he shift the responsibility? Putin has no way out, but the elite do. Even somebody like Bortnikov (director of the FSB) has a way out. Yes, because he may not be hanged, shot, or imprisoned for life.

Will a MOSSAD card or a third Zimbabwean passport do?

By the way, yes, it's an interesting logic. Perhaps they do have a Mossad ID. But Putin doesn't have that option, even if he has a fan of these passports and certificates, he has no chance.

Therefore, for Putin, this is a fundamental, inevitable, fatal situation in which he must go all-in. But for the elite, this is not an all-in move.

The elite can jump out of this - ‘I'm retired’, ‘I'm in the garden’, ‘I'm sorry, I didn't make the decision to go to war, Putin did’.

That's why you mentioned the events of February 22nd, when the Security Council decided to recognise the DPR/LPR republics, but in fact we understood that the issue of starting a war was being decided. And Putin needed to see this on TV. Putin needed to involve his entire entourage to make a collective decision, so that he could always say: ‘It was a collective decision. It was not my personal decision.’

Now he no longer has this reflection. He doesn't have to try to pretend to do anything, because everyone understands that the war is his area of responsibility and, of course, all those who stand behind him. He was going to fight for three days. At that time, he tried to use the old approaches of collective, collegial decision-making. And now he cannot lose.

The Russian elite can lose the war in Ukraine. And what will happen to it? Is it that Moscow will be taken over? No.

Russia's loss is simply the failure to fulfil Putin's goals of capturing Ukraine.

Do you understand? And what does the elite, the whole environment, lose from this? It doesn't matter whether it's a member of the Security Council or an ordinary employee of some district administration. He loses nothing. He remains where he was. He works and does what he has always done. But Putin loses everything. You know?

Putin failed to achieve the military and political goals he set for himself. Accordingly, the operational situation on the battlefield has changed, we have entered a long bloody war, and the prospects are rather vague. What is your opinion on the Victory Plan, Putin's reaction and what are called very different signals, such as from Scholz and all those people who would like to launch a certain negotiation process?

You know, I will tell you this, Putin would not have paid attention to Zelenskyy's Victory Plan and its discussions, if it were not for one thing - the Kursk region.

If it involved the front line in Ukraine, assistance to Ukraine, and even a strike on Russian territory—albeit without establishing a foothold in the Russian Federation—Putin might have taken a lenient view of this. For example, in two districts of the Kursk region, where nearly 1,000 square kilometers are currently seeing fighting as the Ukrainian armed forces attempt to push back beyond the state border, he would likely respond similarly to how he approached the Peace Formula. Before the events of August and the start of the Ukrainian Armed Forces operation, he dismissively presented three conditions that needed to be met for negotiations to commence, almost in a manner resembling an ultimatum.

Everyone understood that these conditions were impossible. Let me remind you of them. On the eve of the Peace Summit in Lucerne, he demanded the liberation of four regions within their administrative borders, meaning that the Ukrainian Armed Forces would have to withdraw from those areas. He also insisted on the lifting of all sanctions and a commitment to Ukraine's non-aligned status from the outset of negotiations. In essence, this amounted to the end of Ukraine's sovereignty. Let's call a spade a spade.

Ukraine outside of NATO and Ukraine in NATO are two different Ukraines. And everyone understands this perfectly well, no one is a fool.

And here comes the Kursk region. And how can he continue to behave in such a brazen manner, given that you don't know how long the troops will stay there, what the losses will be, whether the Ukrainian army will advance further, and what if they go into the Bryansk region.... and what if something completely unimaginable happens... what if...

Nobody could believe it before, but now it's a common place. For two months now, foreign troops have been on the territory of the Russian Federation, occupying administrative centres. And this is certainly a disturbing, irritating factor that affects Putin's decision-making. In a sense, he has become more cautious, much more cautious in his public statements, too, if we are not talking about nuclear blackmail.

For example, judge for yourself, he says that "we don't care what the bandits, the gangsters, the provocateurs from the Ukrainian Armed Forces do." What provocateurs? What are you talking about? There is a war going on. You occupied 20% of Ukraine's territory. Yes, but what did you want? This is the way he said: "we will continue what we have been doing on the front line in Ukraine itself."

I believe that the Kursk region and the situation there is the biggest challenge to Putin after two years of war.

Because the talk that the war would spread to Russia itself has come true. Here it is. So, now, if sooner or later there is a decision to strike deep into Russian territory, it is absolutely clear that these strikes could lead to a continuation of the operation, during which the Ukrainian Armed Forces will occupy new territories in Russia. Moving on to Kursk or Kurchatov or other large cities in the Kursk region.

Of course, this is an irritating factor, and the Victory Plan has become not just a slogan, but a threat. Because if we are talking only about Ukraine, then win or lose, you are liberating your territory. But here, you can suffer and the population of the European part of Russia can be the object of war. And not with sporadic, pin-point drone strikes, but with missiles carrying 200 to 500 kg of explosives. That's a lot of explosives. A drone carries 50 kg, for comparison. There are different types of drones, but still.

Obviously, the damage will be many times greater given the presence of foreign troops on Russian territory. Could Putin be afraid of some kind of domestic outrage, of this situation being used by those around him who are dissatisfied with him to get rid of him?

For instance, if the Ukrainian Armed Forces were to reach Kursk, what would happen then? It's only 50 to 55 kilometers from Sudzha, which isn’t a significant distance. From Kursk to Moscow is 500 kilometers. I'm not suggesting that this will happen; I’m merely discussing the political implications of this scenario. This is why the Victory Plan is perceived in a different way.

There are other sensations that Putin is picking up on, he understands that things are not that simple. Taking Vuhledar and Pokrovsk will not solve the problem of the Kursk region.

This is not an automatic solution, they are not connected. You can capture a few more cities before or after the new year, although there will probably be a winter pause, but this does not mean that you will automatically solve the problem of the presence of foreign troops on the territory of the Russian Federation and their occupation of a significant part of the territory of about 1,000 square kilometres. This is the problem.

However, there’s another aspect to consider: if there are indeed additional tools or factors that might interest Putin, he could engage in a specific negotiation or pseudo-negotiation process. He can't simply exit the war without a clear moment or justification for doing so. On the other hand, it's evident that Putin is prepared to play the long game. This means that if no agreement is reached, the situation is likely to continue at a similar pace, resulting in a prolonged and bloody meat grinder.

Certainly, this is a dead end for Putin specifically, but not necessarily for the elite, Russia itself, or the population. There’s a prevailing notion that Putin can spin any situation into a victory for the public. However, I believe there are limits to this. He can't sell absolutely everything as a victory if it's merely a concession, a loss, or a compromise. Given his political stance, he has set expectations that he cannot fulfill without facing significant backlash.

De facto, they intended to take Kyiv in three days—whether it was three days or a month is irrelevant. The narrative suggesting that Ukraine is incapable of resistance has proven false. The reality is that Ukraine is a fully-fledged state that continues to fight back.

Even if we were to imagine a scenario without allies, the question arises: how would one govern this territory? The only means available would be through repression and mass murder to force Ukraine into submission. There are no other viable alternatives.

Putin has nothing to offer Ukrainian society to change its attitude to the war, to the government, to the alliance with Russia. He has no tools. For Putin, this is certainly a dead end.

Yes, a forced entry into Kyiv and the installation of a puppet government could have provided at least some chance of control. But what if that doesn't happen? They didn't even consider this possibility. That's the crux of the issue—Putin had no backup plan. His approach of eliminating those who initiated this war with him, like Patrushev and Shoigu, reflects his mindset. I believe Gerasimov will hold on until the New Year, but he too will eventually be replaced. There must be a visible symbol of defeat rather than success in Ukraine.

For Putin, this situation is a dead end. He will continue to push forward, at least until some significant turning point occurs, insisting that peace must be concluded on his terms.

Of course, Putin is seeking peace talks; he wants this process to end the war, as it provides him some relief.

But he doesn't see or consider any alternative. If he makes any compromises—such as not pursuing the "liberation" of the newly annexed territories and instead accepting Ukraine's sovereignty—it would mean that the 80% controlled by Ukraine's central government would align with NATO, the Western integrated community, the EU, and so forth. This would be a clear defeat for him; he would effectively lose Ukraine. Do you understand? Because no one will ever recognize the occupation of these new territories, and he can't legally resolve this issue. He finds himself in a situation where he has no legitimate claim over them.

What do you think Putin might be planning? There seems to be a public aspect and a non-public aspect to this situation. On the public side, figures like Yavlinsky (the Russian politician and founder of the Yabloko democratic party) are suggesting that we should freeze the conflict. We recognize that this is largely a cry in the wilderness, but at least it's being voiced.

We’ve heard this rhetoric about stopping the war and calling for a ceasefire—suggesting that if we do, people will stop dying. The reality is that they will not stop dying, and the war will continue. This narrative serves to create an atmosphere in which Ukraine is portrayed as the antagonist of peace. The aim is to tarnish Kyiv's image, framing it as resistant and bloodthirsty. This is the sole purpose behind it; nothing else.

In fact, these voices quickly assert that everyone is ready for peace, but only Ukraine stands in the way. This is a blatant deception, a large-scale Kremlin ploy that cannot be accepted. I want to emphasize again that it is directed against Ukraine and is ultimately just empty talk.

A simple litmus test can demonstrate how this narrative can be perpetuated, and it’s quite straightforward.

There is insider information that Putin has been offered many times to stop mutual shelling, meaning that you stop shelling the territory of Ukraine, and Ukraine stops shelling the territory of Russia using drones and missiles. Moscow has always refused. Always!

So you are fighting and fighting on the front line. Let's define a zone, no more than 20-30 km along the front line, but no more strikes on the territory of Ukraine, even in Kherson, even in Okhmadyt, even in other places. Why not agree on this? Why not stop destroying the whole country? Putin does not agree. So what does this mean? It means that he doesn't want any peace. He does not want any ceasefire, any end to the bloodshed.

I think that such proposals will be introduced. There is already information that a group of semi-loyal Moscow intellectuals is being formed, I won't even name them, everyone knows them, who are supposed to go around European capitals and form a non-governmental position for peace. This is all also launched by the Kremlin.

Will these people have a mandate? Will they represent someone's specific signature?

Of course, because this is what Abramovich is doing. He has been instructed to do this. He is pulling these people up. It is Abramovich and people connected to him who are doing this, i.e. a number of different officials who are connected in this sense. Apparently, Surkov is also involved in this. Again, there is talk of this. It looks like it, because Abramovich is engaged in exchanges. Abramovich interacts with the Turkish leadership.

Istanbul and the so-called grain corridor...

This situation is entirely his doing, which is why it will be pushed through now. First and foremost, experienced Western allies recognize this. It’s absurd to claim that Washington is oblivious; they understand everything perfectly well, even if they choose to act differently. There is a clear comprehension of the situation on their part. To suggest that they are naïve or foolish is simply untrue.

The real issue is that facilitating a negotiation process might be seen as beneficial, allowing Putin to avoid total collapse. We've discussed this many times because they fear the chaos and vacuum that could emerge if Putin were to fall. It's uncertain who would succeed him, and there is no predictable figure to take his place.

They are probably working on this issue, but they are not ready to take too fast and reactive actions to achieve the result of the same Victory Plan, because it will lead to chaotic consequences in Russia itself.

And they are thinking about it more globally, for the long haul, so no one will agree to a simple ceasefire, but at the same time, they will not give up on cooperation and attempts to find a compromise to start this peace negotiation process.

It was supposed to take place in Qatar and seemed to stop because of the start of the Ukrainian Armed Forces' operation in the Kursk region in early August. Again, we seem to be proceeding from the insider information and rumours that the press published.

I assume that some consultations could have taken place in Qatar. Why not? They could have been. Another question is what are the consequences of this kind of initiative? If this is a public negotiation process, then the parameters on which these negotiations will be based must be defined.

The Ukrainian side, as well as the international community, has proposed a formula for peace, international law, and an understanding of international security. We all know what it means - respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a country, and so on.

This is something that China, even in its 12 principles in 2023, published and declared in its first principle of commitment to international law, its recognition and respect.

And since the bases are not defined, there is an ongoing debate about what - where are the red lines, so to speak, geopolitical realities. The right of force, you know, is being discussed. And Moscow cannot prove its primacy in this matter, it has not demonstrated this right of force.

If Kyiv were taken, then, of course, we could say that the right of force has won over the rule of law.

But in this case, we are dealing with brazen blackmail, which is unjustified.

It will take them 100 years to reach Kyiv, if they are lucky, but that is not a fact. And in the meantime, the Ukrainian Armed Forces will reach Moscow from the Kursk region, I'm exaggerating, but in reality, it is impossible to start negotiations because two principles are competing - the law of force and international law. Until they agree on this, it is impossible to sit down at the negotiating table.