Rare earth deal turns into pressure leverage against Zelenskyy

Each option comes with significant risks, primarily for him. If he signs it, a campaign can be launched accusing him of betraying national interests. If he doesn’t sign, military aid could be put on hold, leaving the country vulnerable.

At times, the Americans hint—sometimes subtly, sometimes not—at whom they find comfortable to work with and whom they don’t. Statements about “elections,” “dictators,” and “4%” stem from this. Trump hasn’t forgotten Zelenskyy’s failure to investigate Burisma and Hunter Biden. He still brings up the claim that his victory was stolen.

Recently, Volodymyr Zelenskyy publicly stated for the first time that he is willing to sacrifice his presidency for peace (and for Ukraine’s NATO accession). This is an interesting statement, especially since it was his immediate response to a journalist’s first question. It looks like a signal to Trump’s team, which has turned the rare-earth minerals agreement into personal blackmail against Zelenskyy.

It’s odd that out of all the points in the Victory Plan that Zelenskyy brought to the U.S. in September, the new administration focused on just one—one that does nothing to prevent Russia’s creeping offensive (which, I should note, continues in some areas of the front). Not to mention that this potential agreement in no way deters a possible future invasion. The argument that Russian troops wouldn’t enter areas where American companies operate is weak—after all, American companies had a presence in Crimea, as well as in Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson. The Ukrainian president reminded us of this again today.

So, the minerals agreement may be just one of the cards the Americans are keeping under the table. Otherwise, why pressure Ukraine when Russia could always offer more in terms of resource extraction?

The fact that the Ukrainian President’s Office can’t get through to the White House to arrange a bilateral meeting between the leaders is hard to call a strategic partnership—especially when one country is at war. And let’s not forget, no one has canceled any provisions of the Strategic Partnership Charter (from December 20, 2008).

In summary, Zelenskyy is going through a difficult time, and pressure from the U.S. administration and some European countries will only increase.

In 2022, despite falling approval ratings, Zelenskyy managed to unite the country. He could do the same now—at a time when Ukraine can no longer count on unconditional support, empathy, or grants.

If he doesn’t lean, as he did three years ago, on Ukrainian society, we will all lose.

The key mechanisms are well-known and have been suggested multiple times:

1. Reprogramming domestic political resources—forming a broad coalition in parliament with corresponding government powers, strengthening the diplomatic corps, and making personnel changes in ineffective institutions that hide behind loyalty.
2. Replacing (or adjusting) key players in the U.S. track.
3. Initiating the creation of a major Defense Alliance (with the UK, Poland, the Czech Republic, the Baltic states, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway as the core).

This could serve as the foundation for expanding and defining Ukraine’s long-term strategy. Because the “let’s see how it goes” approach, which has worked in the past, is clearly not suited for the present times.

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About the author: Viktor Shlinchak, Chairman of the Institute for World Policy.

The editorial team does not always share the opinions expressed by blog authors.