Europe struggles even more than Ukraine in dealing with Russian disinfo. Interview with Anna Melenchuk

It is important to understand how Europe is resisting Russia's influence on public opinion and, even more crucially, how Ukraine is combating it within the state, given that Russia's influence is noticeable here as well.

Ukrainians are resistant to disinformation

How would you generally assess the current situation in Ukraine in terms of countering Russian disinformation?

In general, the situation is critical at both the state and public or private levels. Very little is being done because Russian tactics are constantly changing, and Ukraine simply does not have enough resources to develop and implement new countermeasures. Most disinformation is spread through social media, with artificial intelligence being actively used, but Ukraine does not have the capacity to respond effectively to this.

At the state level, there is a Center for Countering Disinformation, but it is under-resourced. Previously, it was under the Ministry of Culture, but now the center has been separated, and it is unclear what activities are currently taking place there. Again, resources are limited.

Can you identify the main problems?

I would highlight two key issues: Ukraine lacks resources, and there are no effective practices being shared by our Western partners. Of course, there are good initiatives from the public sector, such as StopFake, and other resources that Ukraine uses. However, this is still very insufficient.

If we talk about the cyber fight against Russia, which is part of the information war, there is the State Special Communications Service.

We have CERT-UA and the State Special Communications Service of Ukraine, which are responsible for cybersecurity in Ukraine. They receive some funding from Western partners. In terms of cyber warfare and attacks on critical infrastructure, we have special departments, etc. However, it's important to understand that a good cyber specialist in the civil service receives a very small salary. Such individuals do not stay in their positions for long. Additionally, bureaucracy slows down processes, and there is insufficient coordination between agencies. The State Special Communications Service used to be the main body in cybersecurity, but now, due to a corruption scandal, its current status is uncertain. The Ministry of Digital Transformation doesn't have enough resources to take over its responsibilities.

Does Ukraine rely solely on civic initiatives to combat the extensive Russian disinformation system?

Not entirely. There are efforts at the state level as well, so it's not accurate to say Ukraine has nothing to counteract it. The challenge lies in the disproportionate resources. Russia invests millions of dollars, hires people for bot farms, and employs sophisticated strategies developed over a long period. This makes it difficult for us to mount an effective response. Moreover, defending against cyber attacks is inherently more challenging than launching them. Creating effective countermeasures takes time and effort, unlike developing offensive strategies.

Why don't state and civic initiatives join forces? Is there a lack of effective communication?

They are trying. Compared to some other ministries, the Ministry of Digital Transformation is more open to various initiatives, fostering an ecosystem where the public can collaborate with government agencies. However, due to limited resources within government agencies, few initiatives are willing to engage in such partnerships. Issues such as data access and grant availability often hinder effective collaboration. Currently, I cannot cite any examples of successful partnerships.

What steps should Ukraine take to improve the situation?

Firstly, Ukraine needs to prioritize building human capital and enhancing resources in technology. Currently, the primary focus rightly remains on security through military means and technologies that directly impact Russia. Investments in military technology can also advance capabilities in combating disinformation and developing software technologies.

However, it's crucial to elevate expertise at the governmental level and foster partnerships that make collaboration appealing, especially in countering hybrid threats effectively. Instead of waiting for external assistance, Ukraine should proactively create its own solutions.

I would also like to emphasize the development of artificial intelligence (AI) and the implementation of EU legislation on AI regulation to support Ukrainian startups and public initiatives. This is crucial to keep pace with the rapidly advancing tools of disinformation.

If you ask me what we can do with our limited resources, I would say we should prioritize the development of AI technology. It can be used effectively to counter Russia's tactics. Moreover, AI has the potential to help create tools that assist people in distinguishing between fake news and the truth.

In the West, people are more relaxed about this because they do not see disinformation as a threat to their national security. 

Despite the critical situation, experts say Ukrainians are quite resistant to disinformation.

Ukrainians are resistant to disinformation because our survival depends on how we perceive news resources. Especially when it comes to internally displaced persons, who check information several times. If we compare our resistance to disinformation with that of European countries, it is higher. In the West, people are more relaxed about it because they don't see disinformation as a threat to their national security. 

Our people have learned digital hygiene over time, and Russia underestimated this. The average citizen may currently identify AI-generated videos as fake, but this could change. These technologies are advancing rapidly and becoming more affordable each month. The U.S. has determined that creating a fake AI video costs only a few dollars. This illustrates the rapid development of such technologies, and it's uncertain how resilient Ukrainian society will remain in distinguishing truth from fakes. There are several private and public initiatives in the Ukrainian market raising alarms and attempting to address this issue.

An example of a Russian dipfake aimed at discrediting mobilization in Ukraine:

The West will not endure as long as Ukraine has.

And what about Europe itself? What is the situation there?

The longer the war lasts, the more Ukraine will rely on the resources of the West and our partners. However, in this context, the West not only lacks the necessary resources but also lacks understanding. They don't fully understand the complexities and threats posed by Russian disinformation, and therefore they don't help Ukraine in this regard. While the situation with the war is clear, in the hybrid sphere and technology, unfortunately, our European partners are particularly weak on their own.

Russia is very actively directing such resources at our Western partners. They are betting that the West will not endure as long as Ukraine. 

But they block Russian media, conduct entire special operations to identify agents of influence, etc.

You know, the previous cadence of the European Parliament existed quietly for 4 years until their last year of functioning, when the FSB was found there. It's obvious how little Europe does to counteract Russian agents of influence. Not much is being done in Europe because Russia has not directly posed a physical threat. So if someone spreads fake news, they let them.

It seems that Russia has recently become more active in the EU.

Yes, and this includes physical actions like arson attacks. So, when the physical threat was perceived, the EU started investigating who these people were and what they were doing, and at the onset of the full-scale invasion, some Russian diplomats were expelled.

Diplomatic missions have not been closed, and they are functioning in every EU country where some part of the FSB still remains. It's clear that everything starts with embassies, and a state cannot just walk into a Russian mission and check what's going on there.

We've also focused extensively on the Russian church, which is a topic rarely discussed in the EU. Not much attention is paid to such spiritual institutions there. However, numerous non-religious activities occur there. Russian agents are present, recruiting ordinary Russians among others.

Of course, this includes information resources. Efforts are made to block Russian media, but they find ways around it. They create new domain names, register under different names, and remain accessible, especially online. Moreover, Russians are actively engaging with various local European media outlets, leveraging the perception of the Ukraine war as bilateral. They encourage journalists from smaller outlets to present the Russian perspective, notably in Italy. The Netherlands shows better awareness, understanding where Russian propaganda operates.

Unfortunately, Europe lags significantly behind in countering disinformation. Their focus is on controlling and regulating technologies, including artificial intelligence, rather than fostering development. We shouldn't expect substantial investments in this area. This ideological stance towards technology doesn't align with actively advancing tools to combat disinformation.