Ukraine’s deep strikes into Russia: how Western media duplicates Russian propaganda narratives

In recent weeks, Western media have published dozens of articles that can be conditionally divided into two groups:

• “Why Ukraine should not be allowed to strike deep into Russia”.
• “Why the West should stop supplying weapons to Ukraine to achieve peace.”

There are some articles that make one's hair stand on end because of the Moscow narratives used. But eventually one gets used to this, because it is a traditional activation, when Moscow provides funds for propaganda and orders from journalists, and this has a temporary effect. But there is a category of publications where such things need to be dealt with, whether they are accidentally or deliberately intertwined with Moscow's messages.  These are specialized media outlets whose analytics are used by other analysts, observers, and various decision makers to eventually get a basic vision. 

That's why Ukrainian Telegram channel Resurgam has analyzed the manipulative article The False Promise of Ukraine's Deep Strikes Into Russia on Foreign Affairs.

To summarize: the author of this article seems to agree that Washington has imposed many restrictions on Ukraine. But through a series of beautiful manipulations of the facts, comes to the final conclusion that lifting the ban on deep strikes will not change anything in the war, because they will be ineffective. Since this cannot "tip the balance of the war for Ukraine", why allow it and risk escalation?”

Article’s arguments and manipulations

- The first general manipulation is that Ukraine is incapable of conducting a large-scale offensive, and that deep strikes are used to prepare the “battlefield” for such maneuvers. And then the conclusion is that if Ukraine is not capable of conducting offensive strategic campaigns, then why should it be given precious weapons and risk escalation?

Among the arguments in that text are the following points:

“Ukraine’s recent advances in the Kursk region of Russia illustrate the difficulty of turning the tide of the war. Ukraine attacked an unusually ill-prepared section of the Russian front, which enabled Ukrainian forces to take ground quickly. But as Russian reserves have arrived, the Ukrainian advance has slowed, and it appears unlikely that Ukraine will make any major breakthrough.”

The question is, what is the basis for the assertion that Kursk is the goal of the General Staff, namely a “ major breakthrough” or a large-scale “army operation”?

Next. “Ill-prepared section of front” - consisted of 2 lines of defense, which included anti-tank ditches, dragon's teeth and underground fortifications plus the border's shotgun terrain. 

Next. The fact that the place with the least trained enemy personnel was found is called a correct tactical calculation. Why is it taken as an irrefutable statement that there are no more such places along the 1,200 km of the front line and in the context of time and various circumstances, or will there be in the future?

- The second manipulation is that “it is costly and the supply of a large number of missiles will eat up the American budget for supporting Ukraine." For some reason, the author of the article cites “not the cost of ATACMS missiles” or “JASSM” missiles as an argument, but for some reason the cost of F-16s.

The author notes:

"US aid to Ukraine is limited by strict spending caps, making such systems impossible to provide without curtailing other kinds of provisions. A fleet of just 36 U.S. F-16 fighter jets, for example, would eat up $3 billion of the $60 billion allocated to Ukraine in the most recent aid bill."

If we even put aside the fact that the US has a significant share of the unused PDA program for Ukraine (10.5 billion), then we can simply look at the cost of ATACMS as an example. Then we will see the following. An ATACMS missile, depending on the modification, costs from USD 900 thousand to 1.3 million. For example, Finland has ordered 70 ATACMS with additional parts, equipment, and logistics support for 132 million, which is 1.88 million for a fully serviced missile. The transfer of 300 missiles to Ukraine is 550-600 million out of 10.5 billion from the PDA fund alone (not including the balance of 4 billion for USAI).

Given that these are not new missiles from production, but from warehouses, the actual cost of these missiles would be even less.

- The third manipulation is that the authorization of deep strikes will have a “limited, not a ‘decisive impact,’ so why expose the world to escalation for the sake of a limited result for Ukraine. 

I would ask a counter question: what weapons have a “decisive impact” in today's warfare? Another question is, “if the impact on the war and the effectiveness are limited,” then why is it taken as an axiom that there must be some kind of “incredible escalation” on the part of Moscow? Why should this “escalation” be different from the one that should have already occurred from the past “red lines” that were crossed, which, by the way, also had limited results in strategic terms, but eventually came to them?

The second point is that in modern warfare there is no “decisive weapon” - there is a decisive set of factors and tools available for this purpose. There is no Arya Stark who can stop the walkers with a single blow, no Death Star, no Gandhams. The argument “we shouldn't risk escalation because the resolution is not strategically decisive” is simply disconnected from reality.

Because then I would like to hear which one type of weapon or type of authorization is “decisive”?

The lack of understanding of the current realities of war in this analysis can be seen even in one phrase: “Cheap drones cannot fly hundreds of miles to reach distant targets.” 

The range and effective destruction of Ukrainian drones has been recorded at a distance of 1,600 km (1000 miles). The only problem is that a drone cannot carry the weight of a warhead that a missile can. Therefore, the tactics and tactical purpose of the means are different. 

But if deep strikes are allowed to be used in conjunction with decoy missiles, ballistic missiles, interceptor missiles, air-to-ground cruise missiles, and a hundred Ukrainian drones that will deplete enemy air defense, will it surely have no effect? Moreover, taking into account the area of Russia that they have to cover with air defense systems and the scattered variety of targets.

Allowing Ukraine to launch precision strikes does not mean an immediate and immediate strategic advantage. And very few would argue that it does. Like the Abrams tank or the F-16, it is a means of warfare, not a guarantee of “unconditional strategic advantage,” especially in the quantity that Ukraine has been granted. But a limited number or a limited strategic impact on the course of the war in general does not make them “unnecessary,” although the risk of their transfer also had threats of “red lines.”

Ukraine needs to be authorized to strike deeply because:

- 1. The mere fact that a combined strike is possible pushes back enemy aircraft (including attack helicopters, which have a limited tactical range), logistics bases, and logistics centers. The mere fact that the Ukrainian Armed Forces could strike forces the enemy to act more cautiously, raises the operating costs of equipment and the cost of logistics, and increases the potential time for Ukrainian forces to react. The fact that some of Moscow's aviation has been pushed back only from the mention of the possibility of “permission” already demonstrates its effectiveness, but this does not prevent them from using the airfields in the future if the West shows another fear of Putin. And it's not just aviation, there are facilities that cannot be moved.

- 2. To be effective, Ukraine must be able to conduct combined strikes in the depths. Each weapon has limited effectiveness separately from other means - tactical or strategic results are achieved in a “combination of means.” Ukrainian attack drones, which can fly up to 1000 miles, have limited effect without being combined with other means, just as other means have limited effect without being combined with air defense depletion, such as cheap drones.

- 3. To stretch the enemy's logistical arm. Moscow's logistics are highly dependent on railroad lines and logistics bases near the railroad. These are a limited number of targets that do not require “thousands of missiles.” Even the potential for destruction itself, which is the banal authorization of deep strikes, will force the logistics shoulder to be stretched.

- 4. Undermining the “red lines” as pressure on Putin. I would like to remind you again of the “red lines” that have already been crossed: the transfer of heavy weapons to Ukraine, the transfer of aircraft, the attack on the Black Sea Fleet, the blowing up of the Crimean bridge, the freezing of Moscow's assets, and the use of frozen assets for Ukraine's military support. And the main red line is the transfer of the war directly to the territory of Muscovy. In which of these cases did Moscow confirm its “red lines”?

- 5. Moving enemy operational and tactical missile systems (OTMS) away from the border. Moscow uses these systems to terrorize civilians in Kharkiv, Sumy, and other cities. Also, the range allows them to reach tactically important Ukrainian airfields, as the range of Iskander-K is up to 500 km. OTMS are often located deep in the territory of Russia, because they know that there they are better protected by “Western restrictions on Ukraine” than by their own air defense systems directly in the occupied territories of Ukraine, where Ukraine can still attack.

No war is won without risk, because war is the highest form of crisis in international relations. War is inherently risky. A defensive war, as in Ukraine's case, is a risk, but one imposed from the outside. 

And if you constantly demonstrate to the aggressor that you are “not ready to take risks,” “you are afraid of him,” but at the same time the aggressor is ready to take risks, you will “lose” every time.

Putin also has a limit to his “risk,” but every time he shows weakness in front of him, this limit shifts in favor of Ukraine and its partners. Every time the West demonstrated resilience and unity and willingness to make decisions, Putin pushed back his “risk” limits, because he also has a “risk limit.” And allowing strikes deep into Muscovy is clearly not a real risk limit, where Putin would risk himself and his entourage.

The last time Europe and the United States were afraid to take risks, it ended up in World War II, so maybe you can't always avoid risks if you want results. It is not for nothing that the concept of “coercion to peace” exists, because repeating the same historical mistakes for the third time in the hope of a different outcome is a clear sign of insanity.

Source: Resurgam Telegram channel