Kursk, Donbas and Russia's cunning plans

We are already inundated with alarmist claims and Russian fake news: "Our equipment is being destroyed in the Kursk region, why did we go there? It would have been better to focus on Donbas," "Russia is sending more and more units there, now it will be difficult for our forces," "The Ukrainian Armed Forces are advancing in the Kursk region, but the Russians are still pushing hard in Donbas," and "The Russians must have some cunning plan."

Here again, we need to clarify basic information and organizational details.

First, regarding Russia's so-called “cunning plans” from clever KGB officers: the past 2.5 years should have proven that these cunning plans are a myth. Russia has essentially two and a half methods for conducting offensive operations:

1. Burning everything with a massive number of shells and missiles, as seen in the summer of 2022.

2. Throwing manpower at Ukrainian positions, regardless of personnel losses.

3. A combination of the first two methods.

Throughout the war, at the strategic level, we have seen approximately zero examples of creativity from Russia similar to the Kharkiv or Kursk operations.

The main methods of their information work are terror, intimidation, and sowing discord to further fragment society. They appeal to fears and resentments, both inside Russia and beyond.

They have no positive program of their own. Like the KGB in the USSR, they rely solely on exploiting the vulnerabilities of their targets. Yes, this approach works on a traumatized psyche, but it requires a position of strength. As soon as Russia loses its advantage, its psychological tactics dissolve like a snowman.

As for the losses in the Kursk sector: first, this is war. Losses are unfortunately inevitable. Second, Ukraine took control in a week and is currently fortifying a territory twice as large as the area Russia has occupied since the beginning of the year through extensive bombardment and significant casualties. In other words, the entire Russian offensive in Donbas, the advance in the south, and the attempted offensive in the Kharkiv region are twice less effective than a single operation by Ukrainian forces. The effectiveness gap is even greater.

Regarding the redeployment of forces: regardless of the global political goals of the operation in Kursk, one of its additional objectives was to divert Russian forces from Donbas, the Kharkiv region, and the south. This aimed to weaken their advance, slow it down, and eventually stop it. The goal was to reduce the pressure on the forces defending those areas and open up opportunities for local counterattacks. The military leadership knows the situation better.

That’s why the fact that the Russians are sending additional forces is not a flaw. This was the plan. The burned columns on the march or the equipment captured during deployment are a result of this redeployment.

As for their continued advance in Donbas: if we had 200,000 troops in reserve, with sufficient equipment and ammunition, and this large army was to cross the border in the northeast and move directly towards Belgorod and Kursk, it is likely that the Russians would abandon everything, go into deep defense, and rush to save Belgorod and Kursk.

But we don’t have such forces, which is why the Russians are mostly pulling back their reserves. The forces that are advancing are continuing to do so. Therefore, there will be no immediate end to their offensive, not until they are exhausted. Someday it will happen.

Now, to address the most idiotic question: wouldn’t it have been better to launch such an offensive in Donbas? I can only paraphrase the words of a wise person who explained it to me as follows: “Where is it better to attack and irritate the enemy - where he has almost nothing and where you can hurt him relatively easily, or to advance where you face a wall of fire and people, and the only thing you can do is meet the shells with your face?” The answer is quite obvious.

Don’t listen to those who sell you panic and disbelief. They aim to undermine trust in the Ukraine’s Armed Forces and Ukraine, regardless of your sympathies.

At the very least, try to filter out those who sell you their content at the expense of your emotions. This doesn’t bring victory or peace any closer, it’s merely a way to profit from your feelings.

Source

About the author: Yuriy Bohdanov, publicist and specialist in strategic communications in the fields of business, public administration, and politics. 

The editorial board does not always share the views expressed by blog authors.