If Russia's arrogance persists, Trump could see it as the main problem — expert Fried

The new administration under Donald Trump has yet to take office, while the current administration of President Joseph Biden is gradually relinquishing certain areas, positions, and control. Meanwhile, the diplomatic and negotiation process has intensified, with numerous signals emerging. These messages suggest that a potential truce or peace agreement is not entirely off the table. However, this could involve the establishment of a demilitarized zone and might even jeopardize our NATO membership.

At this moment, it’s difficult to assess the exact negotiating positions being discussed. Here in Ukraine, the situation is causing great concern. The signals we’re receiving are too intense and often contradictory, leaving us uncertain about what to expect. What changes might the Trump administration bring for Ukraine? And what should we anticipate from President Biden, who has achieved much and appears eager to do even more in the final stretch of his term, though not all Republican circles seem to align with his efforts? 

You've asked the most critical question. I don't need an interpreter; I got most of it. You've asked the critical question — and the right one. So, what we have now is the Biden administration pushing for the fast delivery of weapons to Ukraine and, I believe, preparing additional sanctions on Russia. This is important and good news.

Congressman Mike Waltz, who Trump has named as his new National Security Advisor, says he's in touch with Jake Sullivan, Biden's National Security Advisor. This is a positive development.

The second encouraging point is that General Keith Kellogg, who Trump has named to be his special envoy on Ukraine and Russia, has endorsed the accelerated delivery of weapons to Ukraine, calling it a good thing. This is a promising sign. First of all, General Kellogg is a solid figure, and his statements reflect a commitment to continuity. He is now speaking in terms of a smooth handoff between the Biden administration and the Trump team, rather than a sharp break or direct criticism of the Biden administration's actions. This is reassuring.

You also asked, and this was critical, about the outline of the Trump team's plan for ending the war. While we don't yet have the full details, you're correct that we do have a rough sketch of it. The sketch seems to involve freezing the conflict along existing lines. This approach is immediately complicated because the current lines include Ukraine's possession of Russian territory in Kursk Oblast. This situation gives Ukraine a distinct advantage. There are arguments for and against Ukraine's surprise and successful attack in Kursk last summer, but it undoubtedly provides a strategic edge.

If the Trump plan unfolds along these lines, it will be interesting to see how these dynamics play out.

Secondly, the issue becomes: what about Ukrainian security?

This is where things become uncertain. I do not know where the Trump team will ultimately land. Originally, according to J.D. Vance, the idea was that NATO membership for Ukraine would either be ruled out entirely or postponed for twenty years. However, it is not clear if this is where Kellogg and the Trump team will actually end up.

The Ukrainian government has shown both wisdom and a welcome seriousness of purpose by not outright rejecting the Trump plan. Instead, Ukraine has expressed a willingness to engage with it while emphasizing the critical need for security. I think this is absolutely the right approach. It is a smart strategy for the Ukrainian government to avoid opposing everything outright and instead focus on identifying what is most critical and advocating for it.

Now, the issue of Ukraine’s NATO membership is going to be complicated for Trump’s team. Many in Trump’s orbit have doubts about NATO itself. However, a third element of the plan, which remains less defined but has been mentioned, is the need for monitoring the ceasefire line or line of contact. European forces, specifically European NATO members, would likely take on this responsibility with American backup.

In my view, if European countries are willing to put boots on the ground, the Trump plan has the potential to work. I am not saying it will, and I am not delving into the details, but the basic outline offers a chance for success.

The Ukrainian government has been prudent in accepting the general concept of the plan as a basis for dialogue. They are also right to insist on NATO membership because it remains the best security arrangement for Ukraine. Any alternative security framework would likely be less effective.

The Kremlin has attacked the plan. Kremlin spokespeople and officials have stated that the precondition for talks is for Ukraine to recognize Russia’s illegal conquests of Crimea and all four oblasts: Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson.

However, Russia does not occupy all of these provinces, as Ukrainians well know. What Putin is demanding is for Ukraine to retreat as a precondition for talks, effectively giving Russia land it has been unable to conquer. Russia has failed to conquer this territory because of Ukraine’s successful resistance. This is not a serious offer but an arrogant demand for Ukraine's surrender.

Recently, General Kellogg, in an interview, was asked about these Russian demands. His response was very telling. He said the Russians had better think twice. Essentially, he made it clear that if they believe they can intimidate or bully Donald Trump into accepting a maximal Russian position as a starting point, they are mistaken. I appreciated his response. It was tough and assertive, pushing back against Russian arrogance.

That said, the Trump position is not yet clear. I do not know what it will ultimately be. However, what is emerging shows potential to be workable. The key element is not so much the territory or the ceasefire line but the principle that the West must never recognize Russian annexation of legitimate Ukrainian territory. All of Ukraine’s territory is legitimate. Security and sovereignty are the two fundamental principles.

I also want to remind Ukrainian listeners that the United States has a strong track record of refusing to recognize territorial annexation by aggressors. The Stimson Doctrine from the 1930s rejected Japan’s occupation of Manchuria. The Welles Declaration firmly denied recognition of Soviet occupation of the Baltic states. In 2018, the Pompeo Declaration stated that the United States would not recognize Russia’s occupation of Crimea. These are strong precedents. Two of these examples were set by Republicans, and one by a Democrat, demonstrating bipartisan commitment to this principle.

It is critical that we never recognize Russia’s illegal claims against Ukraine. Ukraine’s international boundaries were established, including in the Russia-Ukraine treaty from the early 2000s, which Putin himself agreed to. We must maintain this position and take Ukraine’s security seriously.

Earlier this week, I spent two days in intensive meetings with Ukrainians, including the former Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba, Hryhoriy Nemyria, and others. These discussions also included former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Steve Biegun, Europeans from Finland, Poland, and France, as well as other Americans. We discussed these very issues in depth, and our conclusions can be found on the Atlantic Council website. It was a serious discussion that covered many of the critical points you raised.

The conclusion we reached is that Ukraine’s NATO membership must be part of the victory. That is the gold standard. We must not negotiate Ukraine’s NATO membership with Russia, nor should we ever recognize Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian territory — not now, not ever. A ceasefire line may be one element, but we must stay true to our values and security interests. These include supporting Ukraine as a sovereign and independent country.

I apologize for the lengthy response, but you asked a critical question, and I felt it was important to provide a thorough answer.

You have outlined the current situation with remarkable detail, but the weak link remains the Kremlin's unpredictability and aggression. The central issue here is whether that aggression can be effectively contained.

Under President Joseph Biden, the administration has been consistent and predictable. President Biden himself is a noble and wise leader. In contrast, while I have not met Donald Trump, he is widely recognized as unpredictable. This unpredictability is concerning because strategies that might succeed in the Euro-Atlantic community or even in dealings with China may not work with Russia. The Kremlin could exploit this unpredictability, escalating tensions further in hopes of extracting additional concessions, especially given that their offensive continues.

Donald Trump might propose a trade deal, whether openly, discreetly, or behind the scenes, aimed at both Ukraine and Russia, seeking a resolution acceptable to the broader international community. However, if the Russians reject such a proposal, there is a risk that Trump could shift pressure onto Ukraine and its government. This is particularly concerning given figures like Mike Johnson, who have demonstrated the potential to block significant aid packages such as the recent $24 billion proposal through mechanisms like the liberum veto principle of unanimous decision-making. Such risks could pose challenges for Ukraine's security and stability.

The question remains: what levers of influence could President Trump wield to exert greater pressure on Russia? And, crucially, how might those levers impact Ukraine and its allies?

Once again, you have asked the right questions. Trump is unpredictable, and there are different voices within Trump’s circle.

For example, Tucker Carlson is in Moscow. He is very sympathetic to the Russian point of view and ignorant of the issues. His type of thinking would have us make a deal with Moscow over Ukraine's interests. Such an approach would be bad for Ukraine, bad for us, and beneficial only for Vladimir Putin. However, that is not representative of everyone in Trump’s circle.

The people Trump has named for his national security team, including Mark Waltz, Marco Rubio as Secretary of State, and Keith Kellogg as the Ukraine and Russia special envoy, are solid individuals. They appear to align more with Reagan-era policies.

Much will also depend on Europe, including the European Union and European members of NATO. Trump believes Europe is not contributing enough to its defense and will likely insist that Europe do more to assist Ukraine. Of course, some countries like Poland are making significant efforts for their own defense. Poland has increased its defense spending, and Finland is also contributing substantially. Both countries are highly supportive of Ukraine.

I am aware of bilateral Ukrainian-Polish issues, but I am not discussing those here. Poland’s strategy is centered on supporting Ukraine and its own national interests. Poland understands that Ukraine’s resistance to Russian aggression is fundamental to its own security. However, Poland will probably not send forces to any ceasefire monitoring mission without United States support. They would be correct to require that support.

Trump will evaluate whether the Europeans are willing to provide sufficient help. The Europeans, in turn, will look to the United States for backup assistance. This dynamic could lead to a successful agreement, or it could fail.

Trump is going to push hard. If Russia remains too arrogant and refuses to work with Trump along the lines of his proposals, Trump may conclude that Russia is indeed the problem, which we already know it is.

I cannot provide a definitive answer to your question. Trump is unpredictable, and he uses this unpredictability as a strategic tool to keep his adversaries off balance. While Biden may have been too predictable, Trump may be too unpredictable. A balanced approach might be better, but what I think is irrelevant. Trump is here, and we must do our best.

So far, the Ukrainian government has handled this situation well.

It has now been 30 years since the signing of the Budapest Memorandum, and the central issue is who will guarantee a so-called good deal. I am not referring to a bad deal, we have discussed that, but I cannot completely rule out the possibility of a bad deal in the current circumstances. We have about a month until Donald Trump’s inauguration and the appointment of his administration.

This month carries the potential for many unpleasant developments. The Russians are always prepared to escalate, and their recent demonstrative use of an intercontinental ballistic missile is evidence of this readiness. They could employ systems like Oreshnik at any moment, not necessarily to intimidate us, but to apply pressure on Berlin, Paris, or Washington. The result could be media narratives in outlets like Fox News, where commentators claim that the Biden administration brought the world to the brink of World War III and that President Donald Trump prevented it. They might argue that, although the deal may not be favorable to Ukrainians, it averted a global crisis and the threat of World War III.

The Russians are highly strategic in these matters, with a deep understanding of historical precedents like the Cuban Missile Crisis. This is a significant concern for me as well.

You are correct. Russia is trying to exploit Western, including American, fears of escalation to paralyze us. Your analysis is accurate. We need to demonstrate steady nerves. Putin aims to intimidate us, but we must not allow ourselves to be intimidated.

Russia has nuclear weapons, and so do we. We Americans learned during the Cold War how to resist intimidation during difficult periods, and we will need steady nerves once again. Russia is almost certainly unlikely to use nuclear weapons. Instead, they are using missiles to frighten Europeans. This seems to be having some effect in Germany, where Scholz appears worried about political repercussions and speaks of being a "freezing chancellor."

However, the fact remains that the best way to avoid escalation is to stop Russia’s aggression and show strength now. Delaying action only emboldens further aggression.

I am afraid I am pressed for time. However, I am happy to continue this conversation whenever you find it useful.I also agree with you that the Budapest Memorandum from thirty years ago was a mistake, and we must learn from our past errors.

Could you provide advice for our government representatives on the key areas they should focus on and the specific aspects they should approach with caution when engaging with the Trump administration?

The Ukrainians need to reach out to all of their allies in Trump’s circle, including former officials, Americans who served in the first Trump administration, and others, and maintain open dialogue with them.

As I mentioned, I believe the Ukrainian government was absolutely right to welcome the Trump team’s interest in working toward ending the war on fair and acceptable terms. Offering to collaborate with Trump is exactly the approach needed. That is what I would advise them to do.

I also know that the Ukrainian Embassy in Washington is active, and I wish Mr. Yermak every success in his efforts there.