Resilient patient. How Western analysts wrote off Ukraine one year ago

Exactly a year ago, Western analyst James Landale published his first article on the BBC about 5 war scenarios. It was a pure concentrate about how the world still knows nothing about the Ukrainian Armed Forces, our volunteer troops, and the talent for resistance of ordinary Ukrainians.

The first scenario we were offered was a short war, where Putin would quickly achieve what he wanted. So, here is a direct quote from the analyst's text, which was spread by all the world's media until the liberation of Kyiv region: “Massive cyber-attacks sweep across Ukraine, targeting key national infrastructure. Energy supplies and communications networks are cut off. Thousands of civilians die. Despite brave resistance, Kyiv falls within days.” Next, according to the author, a pro-Moscow puppet regime was to come in. President Zelenskyy is either assassinated or flees to western Ukraine or even overseas to form a government in exile. President Putin declares victory and withdraws some forces, leaving enough to maintain some control. Thousands of refugees continue to flee westward. Ukraine joins Belarus as a satellite state of Moscow.

This could have been written by a person who seriously believed in Russia's long standing pumping of Western audiences about the world's second army, the power of nuclear weapons, and Putin's naked masculinity.

The second scenario that was offered to Ukraine was the Chechen war. The authors deliberately implied that the Russian army in Ukraine would face a Chechen war scenario. Westerners believed that “maybe it takes longer for Russian forces to secure cities like Kyiv whose defenders fight from street to street. A long siege ensues.”

Then Kyiv was supposed to meet the fate of the collapsed Grozny, and Ukrainian defenders were to become rebels. “And then, many years later, perhaps with a new leadership in Moscow, Russian troops would eventually leave Ukraine, broken and bloody, just as their predecessors left Afghanistan in 1989 after a decade of fighting Islamist insurgents,” the author concluded, suggesting that this was serious and long overdue. The BBC analyst could not even think that there is a significant difference between Ukraine and Chechnya. Firstly, the territory. Secondly, we have a regular army with similar weapons to those of the rashists and appropriate training, so the scenario of running around in hiding for 10 years was broken at the start. Additionally, all of Russia's successes in Chechnya and Syria were because there was no one to cover the civilian population from the air. That's why Western analysts who seriously thought we were a banana republic with a comedian as its leader – were wrong.

The third scenario of Western analysts a year ago was what prevented us from getting weapons quickly and for clear purposes. James Landale warned that Putin's defeats in Ukraine would necessarily provoke aggression against NATO states and that there would be a nuclear strike, at least with tactical weapons.

“Putin could declare Western arms supplies to Ukrainian forces are an act of aggression that warrant retaliation. He could threaten to send troops into the Baltic states - which are members of NATO - such as Lithuania, to establish a land corridor with the Russian coastal exclave of Kaliningrad,” the BBC article said. 

Unfortunately, this article was seriously quoted by respected Western politicians right up to the open graves in Bucha. It was only in May that moves to provide Ukraine with serious arms packages began. Fear and the misconception that Russia has the strength to fight several intense wars at once did us a disservice. Too many lives have been lost for our Western partners to finally work through their fears and risks in the face of the colossus with feet of clay, Russia.

The fourth scenario was a diplomatic one, which was presented in various variations under the single idea that Putin should be allowed to save face, otherwise everything would be bad. Let's analyze the most interesting points.

“Consider this scenario. The war goes badly for Russia. Sanctions begin to unsettle Moscow. Opposition grows as body bags return home. Putin wonders if he has bitten off more than he can chew. He judges that continuing the war may be a greater threat to his leadership than the humiliation of ending it,” the Western analyst wrote. 

The General Staff has recently released a new figure for the number of invaders killed – 150,000. The question is: where is the Russian opposition? Where is the Russian opposition press? Where is the public discontent – or do Lada cars and fur coats (presented or promised to the relatives of the killed troops – ed.) solve everything?

Then there was another powerful Western illusion of last year – “China intervenes, pressuring Moscow to compromise, warning that it will not buy Russian oil and gas unless there is de-escalation. So Putin is starting to look for a way out.”

In practice, China benefits from a war in Ukraine where democracy will not be a clear winner. China buys oil and gas cheaply, while arming Russian forces with drones, satellite map data, and possibly weapons. The year of the great war in Ukraine has made the world realize that the red monsters are all the same, and that this trade with China should be curtailed without any precautions.

According to this option, the West last year was not opposed to a peace agreement that would be written at our expense. “Ukraine, for example, would recognize Russian sovereignty over Crimea and part of Donbas. In turn, Putin will recognize Ukraine's independence and its right to deepen ties with Europe,” the Western analysts said. Fortunately, over the course of the year, the mood of Western elites has changed, and the rhetoric is that “Ukraine will decide the fate of Crimea itself.” At the same time, Russian military bases on the peninsula are a legitimate target.

The fifth scenario of Western analysts envisioned Russians' fear of war, growing popular discontent, and revolution.

“Perhaps there is the threat of popular revolution. Putin uses Russia's internal security forces to suppress that opposition. But this turns sour and enough members of Russia's military, political and economic elite turn against him,  BBC analysts naively hoped a year ago. 

The year of the great war has clearly shown that there is no opposition in Russia, and what is considered to be an opposition is the same Putin. Khodorkovsky, Navalny, Kasparov, Prigozhin, and Girkin – all of these people believe that Russians are better than Ukrainians. And that they can always put their hands in here if there is a public demand. And it will not disappear.

Russia decided to go to war with Ukraine because caviar, vodka, and ballet have clouded many people's sober minds. Plus, we ourselves have been mucking around in the space of Russian relations for so long that we have come to be perceived as some kind of bad demo version of Russia. So it's good that Western analysts – whose reports are used by governments to make decisions – have finally seen the light. It is a pity that too many Ukrainians are now lying in their graves for this epiphany, that caviar and vodka are not a symbol of friendship. It is a method of getting you drunk and robbing you of your money.

About the author: Maryna Danyliuk-Yarmolaieva, journalist, political analyst.