Understanding military operation in Kursk region: expert’s perspective

The recent activity of Ukrainian forces in the Kursk region sparked a lot of theories about their goals. Some even thought Ukraine's army was aiming for the Kursk nuclear plant or Kursk city itself, or that the operation was meant to force Russia to move troops from other areas.

But none of these theories turned out to be true, Ukrainian military observer Oleksandr Kovalenko writes on his Telegram channel.

If Ukrainian forces were really planning to attack Kursk or Kurchatov, where the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant is, they would need much more force to break through the strong Russian defenses built over the last six months. Those defenses are serious, and it would take around 50,000 troops just to break through. And that’s just for Kursk, not more.

Instead, Ukrainian forces acted with fewer troops, and videos from the Russian side showed that their actions weren’t as large-scale as Russian propaganda suggested. The dramatic claims about Ukrainian troops moving toward Kursk or the nuclear plant likely had another purpose altogether.

When the media presents narratives about Ukraine's supposed offensive goals and those goals aren't achieved—something quite logical since they were never truly set—it’s easy to proudly claim victory, such as defending Kursk.

But what were the real objectives of these operations? Was it a diversion to pull forces from other fronts? Here’s some military expert's insights for consideration:

• In the Vremivka sector, Russian forces in the 127th Motorized Rifle Division (MSD) area, part of the 5th Combined-Arms Army, west of Velika Novosilka, are deploying the 34th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade.
• To the north of the Kurakhove Reservoir, along the Slovyanka-Petropavlivka-Shevchenko line, the command of the Center military grouping is preparing to reinforce the 90th Tank Division with resources from the 41st Combined-Arms Army, including the 35th and 137th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigades.
• This week, southern approaches to Pokrovsk have seen assaults from the 35th and 57th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigades, while the 74th and 137th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigades are gradually being deployed into the fight.

The deployment of forces and resources in the main combat zones has reached its limit. The Russian military has no extra units available to reinforce positions, and instead of rotating troops out for rest, they are being replenished on the frontlines, dealing with daily losses.

This is when the Ukrainian forces in the Kursk region became active. Despite the operation being relatively small, the panic in Russian media was disproportionate. This was because the main Russian strike forces in the Kursk area, including the 155th and 810th Marine Brigades, as well as the 76th and 83rd Airborne Divisions, were stationed along the western frontlines. The Ukrainian strike, however, hit areas held by Russian motorized rifle units from the 72nd Division and National Guard forces, including Ahmat troops.

This panic reflected the reality: there was no way to reinforce those positions, there were no reserves, and any reinforcements from other fronts would be limited.

"A few days later, after the audacious strike of the Ukrainian forces in the north-eastern direction, it becomes clear that the goal at this stage was not a course to Kursk, but a dynamic test of the capability of the occupying Russian army to reinforce extremely dangerous parts of its front. And the result is that the Russia's military capabilities are comparable to a string stretched to the limit," Kovalenko concludes.

• Ukraine reports 108 combat clashes at front, repels 17 attacks in Kursk region