Bakhmut and counteroffensive

And so. Back in early March, the people I was fortunate enough to consult with on military expertise said that we should not only consider the scenarios we are seeing, but also those that we managed to avoid.

What was the Russian plan for the winter-spring of 2023?

1. To 'bleed out' the Ukrainian air defense system (thus opening the way for the wider and more effective use of missiles and aircraft, including at the front). And at the same time plunge the country into cold and darkness.

2. Using the overwhelming advantage in people (the result of mobilization) and certain types of equipment (the result of Soviet stockpiles), implement a plan for a 'major offensive' in several areas of the front. We can at least state their goals:

• offensive in the Kharkiv region, renewed threat to Donbas from the north; 

• to capture Bakhmut, Marinka and Avdiivka;

• to capture Vuhledar to improve logistics with the southern group of the Russian Armed Forces; 

• auxiliary activity in the Zaporizhzhia sector.

The implementation of this plan was supposed to significantly improve the strategic position of the Russian Armed Forces.

3. As a result of the implementation of points 1 and 2, to demoralize the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Ukrainian society and undermine the faith in possible Ukrainian success among Ukraine's allies.

In general:

1. Ukraine's strategic air defense has become an order of magnitude stronger. The energy sector has been restored and is working 'as if nothing had happened.' Announced and future deliveries of air defense equipment offset Russian efforts in this area.

2. The protracted battles near Bakhmut, Avdiivka and Marinka, and the failure at Vuhledar have largely neutralized the Russian offensive potential. The Russians withdrew a large part of the troops planned for the offensive in the Kharkiv region to carry out defensive strikes in the south, from the strategic reserve to assault Marinka, Avdiivka, and, of course, Bakhmut.

3. In general, the Ukrainian Armed Forces' defense operation in the winter-spring of 2023 was even more successful than the summer of 2022. Then the enemy managed to capture a much larger territory, including several cities.

“The protracted battles near Bakhmut, Avdiivka and Marinka, and the failure at Vuhledar largely neutralized the Russian offensive potential. The Russians withdrew a large part of the troops planned for the offensive in the Kharkiv region to carry out defensive strikes in the south, from the strategic reserve to assault Marinka, Avdiivka, and, of course, Bakhmut.”

The result of the winter campaign for Russians:

1. (Almost) captured the completely destroyed Bakhmut, on the flanks of which the Ukrainian Armed Forces have already made such progress that it is virtually impossible for the Russians to advance further. In other areas, the advance is from several hundred meters to several kilometers.

2. A lot of lost people and equipment. Plus, the processes of decomposition within the Russian army are intensifying, because Prigozhin's sharp conflict with the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defense is only what we see on the surface. And when there is such an open conflict between different 'towers' of the invasion forces, this is a great pass for us.

3. For almost six months, Russia has not managed to prove to any of its potential allies that it is worthwhile to provide them with significant military support.

The result of the winter campaign for Ukraine:

1. The Ukrainian command managed to impose its own scenario for the defense campaign. Yes, we also suffered significant losses, because the Russians' failure is the result of the heroism and talent of the Armed Forces. But in general, the enemy's plan has not been realized.

2. During this time:

- Tens of thousands of military personnel have undergone training, much of it abroad;

- Ukraine has managed to receive and master new air defense systems, tanks, armored vehicles, artillery and engineering equipment.

3. Successful defense convinces us that we can win the war on the battlefield. It is thanks to successful defense that we have already started receiving long-range missiles and finally have an understanding that we will receive Western aircraft.

“Successful defense convinces us that we can win the war on the battlefield. It is thanks to successful defense that we have already started receiving long-range missiles and finally have an understanding that we will receive Western aircraft.”

Does this set of results make future operations of the Ukrainian Armed Forces doomed to success? No, of course not. War is an unpredictable thing. And the enemy forces are still strong and we still should not underestimate them.

But our chances of winning and ending the war in a relatively short time (from 1 to 1.5 years) have rather increased over the past 5 months. Whether we will be lucky enough to use them remains to be seen. This is the case when it is not a shame to say “We believe in the Armed Forces of Ukraine.”

Source

About the author. Yuriy Bohdanov, publicist, specialist in strategic communications in business, public administration and politics. 

The editors don't always share the opinions expressed by the authors of the blogs.