Kursk operation: Putin faces a fork in the road

The first aspect. Putin has achieved his long-standing goal: for the second time in a year, Russian society, in its masses, does not care. Last year, it didn't care that its leader and his regime could be eliminated by a gangster, the owner of the criminalised Nazi Wagner PMC. This year, Russian society as a whole does not care about the invasion of their country by a foreign army.

One of the tasks of the Putin regime was to atomise Russian society so that it would be incapable of mobilising against the regime. It was a formula of ‘economic stability and television greatness in exchange for apoliticality.' The society fragmented and eventually became apathetic and incapable of real grassroots mobilisation.

And all loyalty to the regime is either out of hatred for the ‘others’ or out of habit. As for the war, there is also a certain balance: Putin is flooding the economy with money, the war is also mainly about money, we are living as if it were the last day, and it will be seen.

Currently, this same society is incapable of even 'unity around the flag.' Putin himself is reluctant to test the ability of society to act cohesively because he is uncertain about what the collective action of a fragmented and dehumanized society could lead to, except for civil unrest. Any sudden move by the authorities that disrupts long-standing or short-term social agreements could provoke widespread chaotic discontent.

The second aspect. Yes, Russian resources still outnumber Ukrainian ones, but they are limited. Russia does not have enough people, equipment and ammunition to simultaneously wage a bloody offensive in Donbas and protect its own border.

And here Putin is again faced with a fork in the road - either to take the same risky, unpopular steps with mobilisation instead of recruitment and involvement of conscripts in the war, or to reduce the potential of future operations for the sake of border security. This is not a choice that a ‘leader’ who is always confident in himself and his victory would want to make.

The third aspect. The roar of the 'red lines' falling is so dramatic that no official—whether Putin, Shoigu, Belousov, or Medvedev—has mentioned nuclear weapons. Talking about them without using them risks establishing oneself as merely a bluffer.

Russia has nowhere to escalate. Putin has nowhere to escalate without the risk of being destroyed by ‘his own’ or ‘others’. Russia can only repeat the crimes against civilians or the military that it has already committed. There is nowhere else to go. Of course, our partners have spent 2.5 years getting sufficient evidence that Putin fears nuclear escalation as much as they do, and they will still need time to realise this. But Kursk has dealt a crushing blow to this bluff.

No, of course, the battle in the Kursk region is not a ‘regime collapse’ or a decisive battle. But it is changing a lot right now and will change even more in the future. As a precedent. Those who came up with this idea and dared to carry out this operation will go down in history. And those who implemented it - even more so.

About the author. Yuriy Bohdanov, publicist, specialist in strategic communications in business, public administration and politics.

The editors do not always share the opinions expressed by the blog authors.