'Ukraine has chance to get NATO invitation': Serhiy Dzherdzh on Germany's skepticism, ongoing war, possible NATO invite excluding occupied territories

Is this really the case? FM Halychyna spoke with Serhiy Dzherdzh, head of the Ukraine-NATO Civic League.

Recently, discussions about inviting Ukraine to NATO have intensified. Is such an invitation possible during the active phase of the war?

I think it’s entirely possible, as there are no inherent contradictions here. An invitation is not the same as actual membership. Membership, following an invitation, requires extensive bureaucratic work. Each country would need to ratify certain conditions, and parliaments would need to endorse this process for it to take effect. While the invitation itself is an initial step, it is a very serious signal. I believe if this were to happen, it would send a message to Ukrainian society that NATO supports us, that we are on this path. It would also signal to European citizens that everything should be done to accelerate the ratification process. Most importantly, it would signal to the Kremlin that the decision has been made: Ukraine will be a NATO member. It would say, “Keep your hands off Ukraine.” Any attempts by the Kremlin to influence Ukraine's participation or non-participation in NATO will not succeed. Therefore, I think such an invitation could absolutely happen.

How, in your opinion, has the position of NATO member countries regarding Ukraine changed after Russia's full-scale invasion? For instance, the United States, Germany, and France.

Each country has shifted in its own way. If we look at France, during President Sarkozy's time, he and Merkel jointly blocked Ukraine's NATO membership. The French typically align their international policy with Germany. Usually, a new leader’s first visit is to Berlin or Paris, and it seems to me that if Germany played the leading role here, France would support the process.

Today, France's policy has changed radically. Macron has supported offering Ukraine an invitation to NATO, and it’s clear that France will no longer be the barrier blocking Ukraine’s entry into the Alliance.

As for Germany and the United States, the situation is that Germany has generally softened its stance a bit and is less likely to be a serious obstacle.

In 2008, President George W. Bush visited Kyiv and expressed U.S. support for granting Ukraine a NATO Membership Action Plan. After Kyiv, he went to the NATO summit in Bucharest, Romania, where this decision was blocked by France and Germany. Today, the United States is holding back somewhat, and we see that the U.S. and Germany have yet to fully support the process.

Can Germany's skepticism about inviting Ukraine to NATO be overcome? Or must we wait for the end of hostilities?

We need to work with Germany. We don’t know how the war will end as it’s still in its active phase. For now, we are asking our partners to support us. What is needed is realpolitik—focusing on what’s required here and now.

Let’s consider the Vilnius summit, whose declaration confirmed that Ukraine will become a NATO member in the future. Fortunately, they didn’t add “after the end of the war.” If they had included such wording, Russia could see it as a reason to perpetuate the war indefinitely. Even if, hypothetically, we push the occupiers back to our internationally recognized borders, they could continue to shell our territory daily, formally keeping the war ongoing and making it unclear when it would truly end. Instead, at the Vilnius summit, they used the phrase “when conditions are met,” meaning that, theoretically, this could even happen during active hostilities.

In Germany, there is a significant pro-Russian lobby. We see this group—for example, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party, which is funded by the Russian Federation. They oppose supporting Ukraine, raising the question: why? Are you in favor of allowing children, civilians, schools, and hospitals in Ukraine to be targeted? Clearly, Olaf Scholz is trying to balance this stance. Hopefully, Germany will eventually have other leaders who will pursue a different policy.

When Western media cover Ukraine and NATO, they often focus on the perspectives of the United States and Germany. Why don’t they pay as much attention, for instance, to the opinions of Hungary or Slovakia?

Hungary faces significant Euro-skepticism because it frequently violates European norms and legislative principles, implementing policies that go against the direction of the European Union. Hungary mixes its internal issues, such as its bilateral humanitarian relations with Ukraine, and brings them up as potential barriers to Europe-wide security matters. Hungary even raises these issues at the NATO council level, and several European countries have urged Hungary not to block broader European security for localized issues. Hence, Hungary faces considerable criticism.

As for Slovakia, like Hungary, there have been opposition claims in these countries that the ruling parties received financial support from Russia. Thus, the weight of anti-Ukrainian statements is minimized, as these countries appear to be acting in a way that caters to or serves Russian interests.

The focus is on the U.S. and Germany because they are the primary security donors, providing critical support in funding, technology, and military strength. If the U.S. and Germany shifted their stance on inviting Ukraine to NATO, these two countries could likely persuade Hungary and Slovakia not to obstruct the process.

Is it possible for NATO to invite only part of Ukraine, excluding the occupied territories?

That’s impossible. There are no "two Ukraines" or "three Ukraines." There is one Ukraine, recognized by the EU, NATO, and the United Nations. All international agreements recognize Ukraine with its internationally acknowledged borders. When we are invited to any organization, be it UNESCO or an environmental research club, the invitation is extended to the entire country. Similarly, NATO could invite the entire country.

However, NATO might regulate the application of specific treaty articles. For example, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which mandates the protection of any member country under attack, might come with a special note for Ukraine. It could apply solely to the territory under the control of the central Ukrainian government. This approach is possible, as it has been in place since NATO’s founding in 1949. In Ukraine, we’re all familiar with Article 5, but Article 6 specifies that this defense extends only to the European and North American mainland and does not apply to NATO territories south of the 23rd parallel north, which once covered colonies in Indochina held by the Netherlands, Great Britain, and France. NATO members opted not to defend those areas, given the ongoing decolonization, independence movements, and the emergence of new states.

A similar example is the Falklands War between Argentina and Britain. The Falklands were British territory, and Argentina deployed troops there, but NATO took no action to defend Britain in this instance because the Falklands are located south of the 23rd parallel. Britain reclaimed the territory on its own without NATO’s involvement. The same principle could apply to Ukraine: NATO could recognize all of Ukraine as a state with its established borders, but Article 5 could apply only to areas under central government control. This option is feasible, and it’s essential to clarify this approach.

To recall, over 80% of Ukrainians would vote for Ukraine’s accession to the EU and NATO if a referendum were held soon, according to a survey by the Razumkov Center, conducted from September 20 to 26, 2024.