Avdiivka and 'Prigozhin's trap'

The occupying Russian forces did not plan to stage such a grandiose battle for Bakhmut. Although they are not luminaries of strategic thought, they are not complete idiots either. As with Avdiivka, they first tried to flank Bakhmut and cut off supplies, but suffered enormous losses. This led to what I call 'Prigozhin's trap'. 

"The essence of this trap is that, in the face of initial huge losses, the only way to justify them is to produce results. And in this situation, losses no longer have a price. Russians do not have a concept of price, they have a concept of result. That is why Prigozhin calmly stated that the losses amounted to almost 50,000 killed and wounded, and no one but Girkin was shocked. Why? Because he took Bakhmut."

The situation near Avdiivka is completely falling into Prigozhin's trap. Having suffered colossal losses in equipment and manpower, the Russian generals now have no choice but to take the city at any cost. And that is exactly what they will do.

What does this mean for us? Again, the lessons of Bakhmut. Bakhmut itself has never been of strategic value, but it had a strategic function. Firstly, we were gaining time to train new brigades and obtain weapons for our counteroffensive. Secondly, the destruction of Russian troops prevented them from preparing their offensives and operations, as most of their resources were going to Bakhmut. Unfortunately, at a certain point, focusing on Bakhmut as a target in itself, rather than on the functions it performed, caused us serious damage. And this is a lesson I hope we will not repeat.

The point is not whether to keep Avdiivka at any cost or to retreat. The point is how we will use 'Prigozhin's trap' against the invaders to gain an advantage on the frontline as a whole, not in one battle.

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About the author. Victor Andrusiv, political and public figure, analyst and publicist.

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