Russia's wars: battles for gas in Ukraine and Syria

The Arab Gas Pipeline was intended to transport gas from Qatar to Europe via Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and Turkey, contingent on the construction of at least the Nabucco pipeline. In the early 2010s, Nabucco was widely discussed and seen as promising for delivering both Central Asian and Middle Eastern gas to Europe as part of the EU's Southern Energy Corridor concept. Persian gas was also planned to reach Europe but via a slightly different route - originating from Iran's Gulf fields, passing through Iraq to Syria (via the Shia corridor), and reaching Syria's Mediterranean coast, where it would be liquefied and transported to Europe by LNG tankers.

"Both projects - or rather concepts, since they never reached the stage of full-fledged design - were competitors to Russian gas in Europe. And as is well known, Russia does not tolerate competition; it prefers a monopoly. Putin himself said back in 2014 that a monopoly is good, but only when it’s your own."

Thus, the intervention in Syria was a preemptive measure to derail competitors’ plans by creating unacceptably high military and political risks - whether it concerned Qatari gas, backed by the U.S., or Iranian gas, Russia’s ally. This approach is simple: eliminate everyone, as gas must either be exclusively Russian or transported and sold in Europe under Russian control.

Russia successfully perfected the strategy of disrupting strategically important gas projects in Ukraine in 2014. A key motive behind the Kremlin's aggression against Ukraine was related to gas. The Russian occupation of Crimea and the invasion of Donbas derailed large-scale projects initiated by Ukraine on the Black Sea shelf, as well as in eastern and western Ukraine, involving leading global companies such as the British-Dutch Shell, and American ExxonMobil and Chevron.

One of the Kremlin's key motives was openly acknowledged in the media by General Ivashov, a prominent figure in Russia's military-political hierarchy at the time. In Syria, Russia did not intervene to "resolve the conflict," but rather to prolong it for as long as possible. No pipelines would ever be built through a country mired in chaos.

An intriguing story surrounds the (non-)entry of Iranian gas into the European market. It began back in the 1960s during the era of Leonid Brezhnev and the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. At the time, it was agreed that Iranian gas would be supplied to the Transcaucasian republics, while Soviet gas would be exported to Europe under the guise of Iranian gas. In 1970, the Astara - Kazi Magomed (now Adzhikabul, Azerbaijan) interconnector pipeline, with a capacity of 10 billion cubic meters of gas annually, was built, and deliveries began in 1971. However, they were short-lived, ending in 1979 with the Islamic Revolution. Afterward, Ayatollah Khomeini's Iran no longer wanted to deal with the "little Satan," as the Soviet Union was referred to. But that is another story.

"Regarding Syria and gas transportation projects through its territory, I fully agree with Serhiy Makohon that neither of these projects will be realized, despite all of Turkey's desires. Turkey, which remains genuinely interested in ensuring that all gas flows to Europe from Central Asia, the Caspian, and the Middle East pass through its territory."

This will not happen because Europe today is not the Europe of 15-20 years ago. Decarbonization is making its impact. The high price Europe pays for "cheap" gas from authoritarian regimes has also been a lesson. The EU does not consider dealing with Erdoğan to be preferable to dealing with Putin or the Iranian ayatollahs. Therefore, reliable Norway, LNG from the US and Qatar, supplies from Algeria, and in smaller volumes from Azerbaijan, are more than enough for the EU.

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About the author. Mykhailo Honchar, expert in international energy and security relations.

The editors don't always share the opinions expressed by the blog authors.