Why doesn't Ukraine manufacture missiles?

We don’t produce missiles not because we don’t have the capability. A quick search reveals numerous promising developments in this area.

And there's the Thunder-2 missile system, Ukrainian equivalent of the Iskander, and the Korshun cruise missiles. Even over a year ago, someone was boasting that we had adapted the Neptune missile for strikes against ground targets.

So the problem isn't that we can't make missiles. The issue is that we do it very slowly and in insufficient quantities. This is due to a lack of systematic approach and prioritization, along with ineffective and poor management decisions that delay development and production. This whole set of issues - specifically, the lack of understanding and willingness to intervene in production processes - creates a situation where “the higher-ups don’t understand, and the lower levels can’t manage.” This is why the domestic missile program is still struggling.

All the problems hindering the development and production of our own missiles existed even before the full-scale invasion - throughout all years of independence. Ukrainian industry has deteriorated over 30 years, with much lost and forgotten. Processes, from logistical connections to internal production processes, have been disrupted. Everything needs to be rebuilt, and currently, hardly anyone is addressing these issues.

For analogy, imagine you have a car that has been in several accidents and starts malfunctioning. Similarly, the mechanisms of the Ukrainian defense industry are not functioning properly, and instead of repairing them, everyone thinks it will run on its own with just a bit of fuel. But it doesn't work that way.

At the same time, those who ordered the development of the missile program believe that solving the problem requires only allocating funds and issuing a government contract. They see this as the end of their role. However, even if money is found for the missile program, just like the situation with the Antonov factory when Zelenskyy promised to purchase its planes, it doesn’t guarantee the rapid production of these missiles. Moreover, many of the problems currently facing defense sector enterprises cannot be resolved by them alone.

For example, let’s consider the development process. Any industrial product is like a complex assembly made from various parts and components. Some of these components can be imported, but there are also components that are very difficult to import because the countries that own these technologies may impose export restrictions.

In the United States, the export of missile technologies is regulated by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). This regime restricts access to these technologies to all but key partner countries. Even though Ukraine is currently a partner of the United States, this does not mean that we automatically receive permission to access these technologies. Such permission must be obtained separately, and this is a political issue in itself.

In other words, systematic work is needed in this area, similar to the efforts made to acquire ready-made weapons from the West. While some efforts are underway, they are not systematic, and often the initiative comes from companies rather than from the top. Politicians then join in to gain publicity, sign a memorandum, and that’s where their involvement ends. There is no political effort to expedite the acquisition of these technologies at all.

Additionally, manufacturers may face issues with staffing. This problem is often difficult to resolve due to the degradation of the sector, which has left few specialists in the field. Therefore, political and managerial decisions are needed to find and train the necessary personnel. Moreover, it’s important to revitalize the profession, seek experts from other industries, or even attract foreign specialists to address our weak points. This work is also not being carried out.

It is also important to note that problems exist not only at the development stage but also in production. Even when there is a ready-developed weapon, we still cannot produce it in large quantities. This is explained by the degradation of production facilities, loss of skilled personnel, and the inability to organize production effectively.

What can be said when these people are currently unable to even establish mass production of simpler rocket artillery shells or even ammunition—simpler products than advanced missiles? If we can't solve the problem with shells, it's unlikely we will see progress in the missile program, as the necessary conditions for this have not been created.

I even suspect sabotage in weapons manufacturing, as Russians could recruit defense sector employees just like they recruit spotters for missile strikes. Participants in the process might deliberately slow down production, telling our officials—who may not fully understand—that it’s impossible to produce more or faster.

Therefore, I have doubts that these problems will be resolved. If there were clear signs of a willingness from management to address these issues, I might have a more optimistic outlook. Right now, I don’t see that.

Source

About the author: Pavlo Vernivskyi, economist, expert at the Oleksandr Pol Institute

The editors do not always share the opinions expressed by the authors of the blogs.