Ukraine’s top general in Kursk region: highlights of Ukraine's 2024 defense campaign on land, air, sea. Serhiy Zgurets’ column

Syrskyi in Kursk region

Let's start with the front. The Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Oleksandr Syrskyi, visited the Kursk region and awarded the soldiers defending there. Syrskyi stated that the actions of the Ukrainian military forced Russian troops to maintain a significant grouping of forces on their territory and to transfer reserves from other directions. According to Syrskyi, Russian losses in Kursk amounted to 38,000 personnel and more than 1,000 units of equipment.

These are indeed impressive Russian losses in this area. Additionally, Russia currently has about 50,000 personnel there, including airborne troops, marine infantry, and North Koreans. However, this entire grouping is unable to push back Ukrainian units, which are holding the defense and destroying Russian troops.

Key outcomes of Ukraine's 2024 defense campaign on land, air, sea

The Kursk operation was and remains an important element of Ukraine’s defensive operation, which we will discuss further. So, when we talk about the results of 2024, Ukrainian forces carried out a strategic defense operation. Russian troops conducted an offensive, while Ukraine conducted a defensive one. Russia's attacking offensive operation began around October 2023 and has essentially continued since then.

Ukraine’s defensive goal, in turn, was aimed at exhausting Russian forces as much as possible, inflicting losses on their manpower and equipment, holding territory, and, in the case of Russian superiority on certain fronts, giving up territories in exchange for time and Russian losses. This was the conceptual approach for Ukraine in 2024. At the same time, this war was not only on land, of course, but also at sea and in the air.

When we talk about these two dimensions, I will start with the sea, where Ukraine deprived Russia of dominance, particularly in the Black Sea. Ukrainian transport corridors operate there, which are used for grain export. This is extremely important. And Ukrainian fighters at sea are writing new chapters in tactics, particularly in the use of unmanned systems.

On December 31, we know, there was a historic piece of news that Ukrainian units, specifically the special forces of the 13th Special Unit of the Main Intelligence Directorate, destroyed a Russian Mi-8 helicopter that was attacking Ukrainian drones. However, Ukrainian Magura-V5 drones were equipped with missiles capable of targeting and shooting down aircraft. Thus, one Mi-8 helicopter was destroyed, as reported several days ago.

Another helicopter was destroyed during the Russian attempt to somehow protect themselves or counter Ukrainian maritime drones. So, in any case, we can say that this operation involved extremely painstaking work by both drone operators and all the soldiers who carried out the operation, as well as the developers of this new weapon system, which combines aviation missiles adapted to shoot down Russian helicopters and aircraft. So, at sea, Ukraine certainly has something to be proud of.

As for the air, the situation is complex and dynamic. We know that Ukraine’s air defense fought against Russian cruise missiles and drones with quite high effectiveness throughout the year. Over the year, as President Volodymyr Zelenskyy reported two days ago, 1,310 cruise and ballistic missiles and 7,800 Shahed-type drones were shot down.

And in turn, we know that Ukrainian drones and missiles have struck deep within Russian territory. At the same time, we also know that Russia currently has a certain advantage when it comes to countering Russian guided bombs. The Russians hold an advantage here, but recently, they have been using guided bombs less frequently on the battlefield.

Now, let's return to what has happened on land. Russian forces have indeed made some gains; by the end of the year, they occupied 3,500 square kilometers of Ukrainian land. As for tactical successes, the Russians captured Avdiivka. However, this happened after Ukraine went six months without receiving American military assistance, with weapons and ammunition not reaching the frontline.

Then came the capture of Vuhledar, which is an important defensive position. Russian troops essentially divided Ukrainian forces on the Kupyansk-Lyman front on the left bank of the Oskil River. Currently, Russian forces are encircling Kurakhove and Velyka Novosilka, with their advance toward Pokrovsk.

All these Russian actions seem challenging for Ukraine’s defense, but we understand that for these 3,500 square kilometers, Russia has paid an extraordinarily high price. Over 430,000 Russian soldiers have been killed or wounded.

These are nearly record losses. Looking at October, November, and December, we see that 42,000, 45,000, and 47,000 Russian soldiers were eliminated, respectively. These figures surpass Russia’s ability to recruit soldiers for money. Currently, they are mobilizing about 600-800 mercenaries, but their losses are twice as high, indicating that Russia cannot build up reserves.

In any case, this year will continue Ukraine’s defensive operation, employing the same approaches as in 2024 but with certain improvements. We need to draw conclusions to enhance the efficiency of troop management, address fortification issues, adapt organizational structures, and implement new technologies. Overcoming these challenges is essential to ensure the most effective destruction, leveraging better combat organization and technological solutions.

Technological solutions on battlefield

Next, we will discuss technological solutions with a Ukrainian Armed Forces serviceman, the Chairman of the Board of the New Energy of Ukraine Alliance, and the commander of the strike drone unit White Eagle, Valeriy Borovyk. His team demonstrated strike drones to Ukrainian military leaders as early as 2014. Back then, we were on the training ground together, and since then, reality has proven that this approach was absolutely correct, given the current demand for strike drones on the battlefield.

He assessed the situation on the battlefield and highlighted the trends that would have the greatest impact on the frontline.

"Our approach in Ukraine, unfortunately, is characterized by waves. When we started on the training ground in 2015, we created the first kamikaze strike drone, Yatagan. Back then, there was no codification for it. There were discussions about where to classify it - under artillery or who would control it. We went through 10 months of testing, reached a joint decision on procurement, and yet, it was never purchased. So, these issues have been with us since 2015. What I’m getting at is that a big wave of FPV drones arrived after the full-scale invasion began. I was the first to show an FPV drone to Commander-in-Chief Zaluzhnyi. While the Americans were presenting their drones, we showed him the FPV drone, and he said, 'Give me enough for an entire front; develop a concept,'" Borovyk shared.

According to Valeriy Borovyk, they developed the concept, but it has been and remains a sports drone that the Ukrainian Armed Forces began using for strike operations.

"And now, we can say that the next wave is emerging - fiber-optic drones. The question is how to counter them and how to use them on our side. These drones operate under the influence of electronic warfare (EW), but EW doesn’t affect them because the communication channel runs through a fiber-optic cable. However, their range is limited; they can’t fly 20, 50, or 60 kilometers. They fly 5, maybe 10 kilometers. I’d like to caution that such trends of intriguing solutions shouldn’t overshadow the development of other directions. I’ve consistently told the Ministry of Digital Transformation, the State Special Communications Service, and the Armed Forces that it was wrong to allocate 80% of last year’s drone budget to FPV drones. Only a few thousand fixed-wing drones were purchased. Yes, they’re harder to produce, but we’ve now lost the range of 20 to 60 to 80 kilometers. I’ve repeatedly emphasized that this is a consequence of directing 80% of the budget to active drones," the serviceman stated.

He explained that the "lost range" refers to the gap between 25 kilometers and the distances where expensive missiles are used - 25 to 60 to 80 kilometers. This range is less saturated with firepower from strike drones.

"This wave-like tendency of buying a large number of FPV drones, then moving on to fiber-optic ones, and next focusing on artificial intelligence, is fine. These technologies will be used, but they still require extensive testing, target guidance improvements - everyone is working on this. It’s right to develop them, and they will be the next step, but we shouldn’t focus exclusively on them. There are inertial systems that can be used, and other approaches need to be explored. We must seek new ways to address the challenges we face, such as countering the enemy’s electronic warfare, spoofing, and kinetic defenses. These need to be bypassed when drones are being shot down by machine guns or other drones," noted Valeriy Borovyk.

He emphasized that all these areas must develop organically: "As drone manufacturers, we’ve been in discussions with aerial reconnaissance teams and other guys producing drones. So far, we don’t feel there’s a clear strategy. What do the Armed Forces, which I’m also a part of, need for 2025? What’s required? How much is needed? For this type of drone, we need this many; for that type, this many. Provide this information. Let us understand where we can deliver and not just report and create impressive videos or presentations about deliveries. The key question is how many drones reached their targets and how many enemy forces were neutralized. So these trends - artificial intelligence, and soon more surface drones - are important. We’re also working on underwater drones, and we invite others to join us. We’ve already made good progress in testing them."

Valeriy Borovyk explained why they began focusing on developing underwater drones.

"It was simply my idea: look, here's where the problem already lies - delivering warheads to Russian targets using kamikaze drones like Magura, Sea Baby, and others. The Russians have learned to defend against this. Therefore, we need drones that can reach these targets and neutralize them effectively. Our initial partners have already carried out operations on platforms, and other missions are in preparation. We've developed a surface drone that is in the final testing stages, while the underwater drone still needs a couple more months. Then, there will be a comprehensive use of long-range UAVs, missiles, underwater drones, and surface drones to dismantle Russian defenses. The goal is to strike with only about ten percent of what is deployed, but this portion will hit targets that are no longer protected by air defense systems or hunters of surface drones. For example, a few days ago, our comrades neutralized helicopters over the Black Sea, demonstrating effective countermeasures," the serviceman said.

Additionally, his company is working on producing long-range drones.

"We closed a contract a week ago for our drone, OSA, in fairly large volumes. It went well, and now it's being distributed. The frame is entirely ours, with about 60-70% of the components being domestically produced. There's significant interest in Vidsich, and we're working with several units on its future applications. To recap, Vidsich has a range of up to 60 kilometers and carries 3.5 kilograms of explosives. Long-range drones have been well-funded by the state, ranging from 800 to 2,000 kilometers. For distances beyond 2,000 kilometers, we are still in the early stages. We have a potential partner with extensive experience in such flights who may join our team. However, more work is needed, and it will likely take several months, perhaps more, to achieve a drone capable of exceeding 2,000 kilometers. This is a serious challenge, and I estimate it will take us about six months to reach this milestone," the serviceman noted.

He added that funding comes from cooperation with Western partners and state orders.

"We assist Western partners in supplying weapons and air defense systems. Currently, we are working on a major contract to integrate electronic warfare (EW) systems into our armored vehicles, including both Ukrainian models and German Mercedes vehicles. We also support the delivery of medical components, leveraging opportunities where companies can pay us commissions after contracts are fulfilled. These commissions are not the primary focus; the key aspect is servicing the equipment we supply. This collaboration enables us to reinvest any profits into developing drone technologies," explained Valeriy Borovyk.

He noted that volunteer and societal contributions currently account for a relatively small percentage of overall support.

"Additionally, the government provided 25%, though in reality, there isn't actually 25%. They don't account for VAT, unfortunately, the tax authorities refuse to include VAT in the cost price. So, you buy with VAT, but the government buys from you without VAT. As a result, 25%, I don’t know of any company that earns a clean 25%. On our last contract, we probably earned about 13-15%. Our team's decision is to reinvest this back into development, production, and so on. Volunteer and societal help currently makes up a very small percentage. Mainly, it's the government, state procurements, and cooperation with Western partners who are willing to test their products with us on our military operations and training grounds in Ukraine. They are ready to cooperate with us and, accordingly, ready to pay for it. And we reinvest this into drone production. For example, the Vidsich drone was fully made using our own funds," added Valeriy Borovyk, Ukrainian Armed Forces serviceman, Chairman of the New Energy of Ukraine Alliance, and commander of the White Eagle strike drone unit.