Ukraine must shift to 'long diplomacy' amid world's changing support

For Russia to be exhausted, Ukraine needs constant and growing support from its allies. Otherwise, it will be a disaster.

Unfortunately, it is also becoming a common statement that support is no longer unconditional.

We may not like it, it may indeed be unfair, but no one owes us anything.

The collective West feels quite secure under the nuclear umbrella and the military and economic power of the United States.

Russia's powerlessness to somehow counteract NATO's expansion to Finland and Sweden now shows the Kremlin's real ability to carry out its threats to ‘reach the English Channel’.

The world knows this.

"The positive shock of how the Ukrainians thwarted Putler's blitzkrieg, the skill of the Armed Forces and the unity of the people has already worked. We were given something to take and give in an urgent, emergency manner."

And it was enough to stop the enemy's advance in Donbas and to push them back in Kharkiv and Kherson regions. And to restrain the Russian bulldozer. However, slowly retreating.

A long war has its own patterns. Perhaps the most important is that it changes.

And not only the situation on the battlefield. Not only the nomenclature of weapons, tactical techniques and strategic findings.

The complex relations around the war are changing.

In particular, the attitudes and feelings of people who are involved in the war, or watching it, or who believe they are interested in it or know something about it, are changing.

"The winner is the one who senses these changes at the previous stage and adequately prepares for the next."

So, the old methods don't work. The craze is fleeting. We have already been thanked for it. It no longer justifies the distortions that are increasingly reported in the news.

Especially if the enthusiasm was based on assumptions, not all of which stand up to reality.

Ukrainians are fighting, and this is perhaps the only positive message that remains valid. And it definitely needs to be adequately supported by other actions.

And here are more and more questions.

1. The world was convinced that Ukraine was a democracy fighting tyranny.

"Attacks on the opposition, infringement of freedom of speech not justified by military necessity, and corruption scandals do not fit this picture."

Enemy propaganda, or even just politicians who would like to direct resources elsewhere, are speculating on this.

It is useless to try to hide it - there are a lot of journalists, experts, and observers in Ukraine and around the world. Social networks are turbulent and emotional. You can't hide a needle in a sack.

2. Everyone was impressed by Ukrainian unity. But the headlines in Western newspapers that the opposition is not allowed to participate in international forums are not because the opposition is complaining.

It's because in democratic societies, it is customary for all mainstream politicians from different forces to voice issues important to the nation. And they are very surprised when they see only 'servants' and their satellites in the delegations.

3. In the end, the Free World was convinced that it was helping ‘its own’. This does not fit with the politics of special effects, shouting, hysteria and insults. No matter how much the public, journalists, or experts in Ukraine might not like it.

No matter how much it does not correspond to 'our truth', our understanding of justice.

Try to talk to your neighbours in the house in the tone of voice that you hear from the ‘marathon’. And after a while, ask for a favour...

It's time to change the approach. It's been a long time coming.

The problem is that it was possible to make a relatively painless adjustment last year - and now we have to regain the lost attitude.

The time has come for ‘long diplomacy’. More precisely, but more boringly, it is time for systemic diplomacy.

1. Form groups of all politicians (except for ex-regionalists) and civil society experts that should work across all government bodies, political organisations, expert communities, regions and electoral movements of the partners. Constantly. Replacing each other, if necessary.

It is often said that ‘hired lobbyists can handle it’.

This is not entirely true. In the US, for example, lobbyists have to declare their clients and fees. How do you think people will feel if they learn that Ukraine is begging for help and then spends millions on lobbyists?

2. The consensus principle that existed in February-March last year should be restored in the development and adoption of decisions in Ukraine.

That unity was the basis for both the effectiveness of decisions and the unprecedented trust in them.

And if Bankova Street pulls the blanket over itself, it should not be surprised that it will increasingly have to deal with the problems.

"The Government of National Unity should be a manifestation of unity, but Bankova is running away from the idea. ‘We'll do everything ourselves.’ And the result is the same..."

3. Transparency and involvement of the opposition and society not only in controlling, but also in determining activities in critical defence areas will allow for the most effective decisions to be made.

All these are suggestions from the point of view of efficiency. If you are interested in the result for the country.

Because if the government refuses to grow up, it will be held accountable for the result.

Ukraine has already had periods of monopoly on both force and media. But not for long.

Source.

About the author. Rostyslav Pavlenko, Ukrainian politician, political scientist, political technologist, and lecturer.

The editors don't always share the opinions expressed by the authors of the blogs.