Russians hope for breakthrough, throwing thousands of reserve troops, holding back armored vehicles - Colonel Grant

We understand that there are numerous significant events unfolding, yet the situation on the Pokrovsk front demands special attention. It is clear that the enemy has prioritized this direction.

As for the course of the fighting in the Russian-Ukrainian war, particularly in Donbas, the situation has not eased. There is a sense that the enemy is throwing all available resources to break through our defenses. What is your perspective on this, and what are your British and other international expert colleagues saying?

In the East, it's quite clear that Russia is going to keep advancing, and for the moment, they’re not going to be stopped. What is really important, though, is that we must maintain a coherent defense line in front of them. We mustn’t allow boilers, as there is one forming at the moment in front of Zoriane. We need to be very careful to keep the line as straight as possible, and there is a big reason for this: it allows us to use fewer troops directly on the front line.

As soon as the line becomes uneven, with large swathes pushing in and out, more troops will be needed to face the Russians. Therefore, we must keep the line as straight as possible, even if it means losing a few villages, because it's more important to conserve our troops for the moment.

The problem with the East right now is that we haven't taken a long-term enough view on ensuring that the troops understand the ground they're defending. Troops fight best when they have ownership of a specific piece of land. If you look at the past year, when a brigade has been left in charge of its own area, they have fought well and held their ground.

However, the moment you start moving them around, they have to learn new terrain, and you must remember that tactics and ground are inseparable — tactics depend on knowing the terrain. So if troops are unfamiliar with the ground, their tactics won’t be as effective.

It’s crucial that troops stay where they are, reinforced and strengthened in their current positions. Unfortunately, we haven’t been doing that. We've been moving them around like yo-yos on a chessboard, and that's not good. Every time they are relocated, they need to learn the new ground and adapt their tactics because fighting in fields is not the same as fighting in forests.

We need to focus on establishing stability in the East, and this definitely means creating divisional headquarters. At the moment, the major headquarters are too far back and out of touch with what's happening on the ground. The generals in the corps headquarters simply cannot manage the battle effectively because they're too far away — they aren't in fingertip touch with the battlefield where it’s all happening.

Small infantry groups in large numbers are being reinforced with artillery bombardments, air defense systems, and aviation. We understand that the enemy has preemptively prepared resources for these operations. Previously, it was anticipated that the enemy would focus on two main fronts — for instance, the Pokrovsk direction and the northern area, particularly the Kharkiv region. However, I have a personal sense (although I am not an expert in this field) that the Vuhledar direction in southeastern Donetsk may also see increased emphasis.

It appears that the enemy aims to implement a so-called 'broad encirclement' strategy, intensifying actions in the Pokrovsk direction while simultaneously ramping up offensive operations in the south. Is this strategy feasible, considering the described tactics of small infantry groups combined with artillery and aviation? Currently, they seem to be conserving their armored vehicles, which also suggests something. It seems that the dirtiest and bloodiest work is being left to Russian infantry, who are falling by the thousands.

The answer is, with Russia, it's always possible to have an assault because they've still got reserves, and the point you're making about keeping armored vehicles back is that, of course, what they’re looking for is a breakthrough where they can then drive quickly towards Kyiv.

That is their aim. So they’re looking for an opportunity to bring the armored vehicles forward when they can’t be stopped.

But that means a breakthrough first, so it’s important to stop a breakthrough so that they can't just drive quickly anywhere on our side of the battlefield. Russia will try to act where they think we are not prepared. Hopefully, Belarus has been taken out of the equation. It looks like the Belarusians are realizing that, in this war, they need to be on the side of the West in the end, not on the side of Russia. They've had plenty of opportunities to fight for Russia, and they haven't done so. So I think we can fairly say that the Belarusian border is not where they’re going to attack, but they have plenty of other areas where they can strike.

You have to assume, because it’s Russian doctrine, that they will keep the pressure on in the East, in Pokrovsk, while looking for somewhere else to draw our reserves away.

They know most of our reserves are in the north, and they'll be looking to find the rest by attacking somewhere else, whether that's Zaporizhzhia or another area. But I’m sure they’ll try something like that because they’ll want to regain the initiative. They lost it around Kursk, and now they’ll want it back, so they’ll do something else.

On the other hand, one could say that a certain military miracle, or at least a tremendous surprise for our enemy, has occurred. The launch of offensive operations on Russian Federation territory was unexpected for the enemy. Neither Gerasimov, nor Shoigu, nor Putin anticipated this. No one knew it was going to happen, and this is not just a military operation but also a military-political one, as there were no leaks of information.

The enemy was unprepared, and our forces have entered the Kursk region, where fighting continues. The Kursk region holds not only symbolic significance but also crucial strategic value. Based on my assumptions, there may have been part of the continental missile defense system there since Soviet times, making this strike particularly painful for the Russians.

At the same time, we understand that the enemy is exerting pressure in the south — in the Pokrovsk direction, Vuhledar, and there is considerable activity around Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi in the Kharkiv region. We are also conducting our own offensive operation, which requires significant resources. The enemy is likely trying to turn our success into a public defeat by exploiting our broad front in the Kursk region. How should we address this? Let's discuss this military aspect, and then move on to the changes you proposed in your article.

Kursk was a surprise to everybody, which is wonderful as it shows the operational security by the defense forces was second to none. The battle in Kursk took the initiative for the first few weeks, but now we're coming up against stronger and stronger defenses. It may just turn into another part of the defense line unless our troops can break through again somewhere.

Looking at the diagrams, it's hard to tell where the pressure is at the moment in the Kursk salient on both sides, but we can be absolutely sure that Russia will prepare and execute a counter-attack. They will try to push our troops out of Kursk, and then it becomes a matter of resources.

I’m uncertain whether we can sustain Kursk, just as I’m unsure if we can sustain the East. It’s unclear what reserves the defense forces have and whether those reserves are quality troops or newer units that haven't properly seen battle and may not be well-trained.

In the next two or three weeks, it’s going to be uncertain what happens next. We can't anticipate this—we can only watch, hope, and trust that the armed forces are prepared for whatever Russia throws at them, whether in Kursk or in the East. But the pressure from Russia will remain. There's no doubt we've lost the initiative around Kursk, and we need to regain it somewhere.

Dear Colonel, recently you published an important article in which you discuss the simultaneous conduct of the Pokrovsk defensive operation and the offensive operation on the Kursk front. In your article, you emphasize the need to delineate certain responsibilities more clearly. This is an important signal, and I would like you to clarify what you specifically mean.

Military command typically involves having a single commander who issues clear orders, which are then executed with accountability for any failures. This is known as military responsibility. However, even the most brilliant commander needs a strong team that can be trusted to carry out their orders. Yet, mistakes can still occur. In your view, what would be the best way to strengthen the work of our General Staff?

You are raising a lot of questions, some of which I didn’t address in my article. The main point I made is that the job of the Chief of Defense is not to fight. If he’s fighting, nothing else gets done. You have two separate responsibilities happening at the same time: one is fighting, and the other is defense management. And right now, defense management isn’t being done.

The problem isn't fighting—we're good at fighting. Some of our brigades are truly world-class, and with the resources they’ve got, nobody could do any better. They’re brilliant in battle. But when nobody is looking after defense management, when nobody is making the system work, the troops at the front aren't supported properly because the system isn’t functioning behind them. The job of the Chief of Defense is to make the system work, to ensure the fighting is properly supported, and to make sure that everything in the system functions as it should.

He cannot delegate these responsibilities to others. He can’t delegate training, personnel selection, or any of those critical tasks. His role is to ensure the system works, and right now, we don't have that because Syrskyi is fighting, and no one else is reorganizing things, improving the system, or making structures more efficient. He’s trying to do everything himself, and as a result, the system is failing — and we’ve seen this. The TCC is failing. Nobody is controlling or managing it; it just continues, killing morale and doing things that are unnecessary for the country.

The Chief of Defense either needs to step back and allow his officers to fight the war properly and choose the right commanders, or he needs to step down and become the fighting commander, letting someone else be the Chief of Defense to manage the entire defense system. He cannot do both. There are only 24 hours in a day. If Syrskyi is rushing from one battle in Pokrovsk one day to Kursk the next, it’s absurd. You can’t do this. You need two competent commanders: one in Kursk with clear responsibility to push forward, and one in Pokrovsk with a clear responsibility to keep the East safe.

We don’t have that. We don’t have these commanders because the Chief of Defense is trying to be all the commanders himself, and it doesn’t work.

The biggest failure is in the defense system. I can list 30 or 40 things in the defense system that aren’t working properly. Someone has to manage those.

Now, you might say that’s the job of the Chief of Staff, but I would argue that the Chief of Staff should be working to ensure the system functions properly, not also serving as a commander. The commander needs to focus on tasks like getting laws changed, briefing Parliament regularly, briefing the President regularly, and ensuring that the rules and regulations for everything are correct.

That isn’t happening at the moment. We’re still fighting with Soviet doctrine, Soviet rules and regulations, Soviet practices, and Soviet manpower systems. If we don’t change those things, we will lose the war. Someone needs to be a proper Chief of Defense and reform the system. Let someone else handle the fighting.

That’s what I’m talking about. It’s difficult and harsh, but it’s real. We know it’s real — you see it on Facebook, with hundreds of people writing about problems every day. These things must be fixed because, if they aren’t, they eat away at the morale of the army. And morale is the most important thing we have in Ukraine.

Without high morale, there is no winning.

Two years ago, when our public's main military hero and expert was Arestovych, who told tales that people wanted to believe, we discussed the prospect of a long, protracted, and very challenging war. Unfortunately, despite the optimistic promises of many so-called oracles commenting on this war, you indicated that the enemy would not exhaust its resources quickly.

Now, as we enter a hot, bloody, and exceptionally difficult autumn, the enemy shows no signs of fatigue. They are prepared to continue throwing their soldiers at our defensive positions, literally overwhelming them with 'meat'. This issue involves not only resources but also the proper organization of these resources and additional strikes, particularly into the depths of Russian territory.

Therefore, I would like to ask for your perspective on the medium-term outlook and forecast for the current autumn campaign. Our troops have successfully targeted many military sites within the Russian Federation, including the significant fires at oil storage facilities in the Rostov region and beyond. The Russians are hurting, and their air defense system has been ineffective. They claim to shoot down our drones, but in reality, our drones are hitting their targets. If these were powerful missiles, the situation might be different. However, we lack the authorization for such strikes. What is your medium-term forecast for the campaign?

Let me talk about this long-range firing issue. I think we’re in danger of looking for some sort of magic pill that will solve the war, but it's important not to search for a quick fix. Instead, we need to fight as best we can with what we have.

What we should focus on is damaging the army right in front of us, rather than worrying too much about the back lines. If we are going to strike deeper targets, using long-range capabilities — which we already have — then we should focus on things that affect the population, not by killing them, but by making an impact.

We are already reducing fuel supplies, which will affect heating this winter, but we need to ensure it will work and that we’re not just wasting efforts on resources they have in abundance. We should be looking at damaging infrastructure that will truly affect the daily lives of Russians. One thing to consider is sewage systems — if we hit sewage works so that people can't flush their toilets properly, that will cause real discomfort.

We should also target key bridges in places like Saint Petersburg, where they simplify routes for people. Disrupting those could make life more difficult for them.

The coming autumn will be challenging because Russia still has a lot of resources, and they don't seem to be running out. They are still recruiting 29,000-30,000 soldiers a month, and while we may be killing that many, they are still replenishing their ranks and pushing forward. We can't assume things will get easier for us.

That means we need to concentrate more on the front line. We can't let it wear us down. We have to use the front line more effectively. One problem is that if we keep moving our troops around, they lose vital links with the artillery. This trust between artillery and units is crucial, and if you keep changing the units, they don’t know the communication language or tactics, which hinders cooperation.

We need to focus on what we have to do now, not what we would like to do or hope the U.S. will allow us to do. Our time must be spent fighting the battle we are facing today, not the one we wish we could fight.

As we head into autumn, if we don’t focus, we’re just going to keep getting pushed back.

I would like to clarify: Is the current escalation by the enemy, particularly in the Pokrovsk direction and the broader Donbas sector of the Russian-Ukrainian front, a temporary situation or does it fit into a larger campaign?

In simple terms, the enemy has significantly intensified their activities on the ground — in Pokrovsk, Vuhledar, and other areas. Are they waiting for the results of the American elections, fearing the arrival of a candidate unfavorable to them? Or are they prepared to maintain this pace for as long as their resources allow? It seems they may continue to throw their forces at the positions for some time. What is your perspective on this?

I think they are going to keep pushing forward. The Russian doctrine is very clear: exploit success. If you're making progress, you keep going forward; you don’t stop and you drive everything you have in the direction where success is. At the moment, that success is in Donbas, so they will continue advancing there and will try not to divert reserves away from Donbas. If anything, they will increase support for Donbas with more artillery and other resources because they believe they are close to a breakthrough.

I’m sure they believe this because they are making progress day by day. They will keep moving forward and won’t stop quickly. We need to be prepared for this. We must anticipate their continuous advance and establish defensive lines in better positions further back that we can hold. We need to prepare for the eventuality that they will keep taking kilometer after kilometer. Thankfully, their advance is slow, which gives us time to adjust our system. However, we are not using that time effectively. We are wasting it by acting without considering the long-term implications of our actions. We need to think long-term about the system if we are going to win this war. If we keep moving backward without preparing ourselves to move forward, we will face the same problems 50 or 100 kilometers down the line as we do today. We must change the system, as I have written about many times.

Putin both desires and fears increased mobilization in Russia. Will he dare to implement it, or will he hold back?

He doesn’t need it at the moment. He’s still managing with his ridiculous offers of money and is getting virtually the number of troops he needs to keep the battle going.

If he decides to use mobilization, he might do so if we break through and take Kursk, which could provide a reason for it. But right now, it’s not just that he doesn’t need to do it; I’m not sure he has the management system in place to handle a large influx of people. He’s lost many officers and people who know their jobs well, so managing additional troops would be challenging. The army would end up being trained by school teachers and IT experts rather than experienced soldiers because he doesn’t have enough trained personnel to do more than what he is currently managing. He will continue with the current process as long as he can.

​​Thank you so much, Colonel, for this incredibly important conversation. God save the King. Glory to Ukraine.

God Save the King. Heroyam Slava. And we are going to win sir. We are going to win with just doing what the Americans do - everything wrong first before we do something right.