After Moscow's defeat in Syria, Russian-Ukrainian war enters new phase

The defeat of Russia in Syria is uplifting, but will Ukraine actually gain anything from this setback? Or could it face the opposite effect?

The collapse of the Assad regime in Syria is a milestone event in the Middle East. Back in 1971, Hafez Assad seized control of the country through a military coup, and in 2000, his son Bashar Assad took over, continuing authoritarian rule for another 24 long years. And here’s an interesting parallel: Assad Jr. rose to power almost at the same time as Putin. Could this be a sign that Russia’s failure in Syria is a prelude to the Russian dictator facing a similar outcome in Ukraine?

The fall of Assad’s regime should be a wake-up call for all dictators: power built on violence and oppression is never permanent. This especially applies to Putin, no matter how hard he and his inner circle try to deny it.

The Syrian people have bravely resisted the genocide perpetrated by the criminal Assad clan against their own population. It’s hard to even fathom the number of innocent lives lost, people imprisoned, or those who suffered, all to keep Bashar Assad in power.

Now, the world has an opportunity to uncover all of Moscow’s crimes in Syria since 2011. In this context, the Russian naval base in Tartus and the Khmeimim airbase could become valuable sources of intelligence for the West — if the rebels manage to seize them swiftly and provide access to Western intelligence agencies.

When the Syrian uprising reignited, Putin had to decide: what mattered more — Syria or Ukraine? After all, Syria was Moscow’s key foothold in the Middle East. But given the Kremlin’s economic struggles, waging a full-scale war on two fronts wasn’t feasible. So, the focus shifted to trying to dismantle Ukraine’s statehood.

It’s also worth noting the economic side of Russia’s involvement in Syria. From the start, the Wagner Group wasn’t just a military force — it was an economic tool. Wagner fighters weren’t only earning money for themselves but were also generating revenue for the Kremlin.

Moscow’s interest in Syria was further driven by the country’s rich gas reserves. Putin’s decisions to interfere in other nations’ affairs are never purely about ideology or helping allies — he’s always chasing economic gain and self-interest.

The Kremlin’s intervention in Syria wasn’t only about propping up Assad’s regime. Another key objective was to curb Turkey’s influence in the Middle East. Now, Turkey has struck back by supporting the Syrian rebels. Sensing Russia’s exhaustion from its prolonged war in Ukraine, Ankara has seized the moment to assert its power.

There’s an interesting historical parallel here. When France lost Haiti, Napoleon Bonaparte sold Louisiana and gave up on his plans in America to focus on his war in Europe — which he also lost. One might hope for a similar outcome with Putin.

But there’s another possible scenario. After the USSR’s defeat in Afghanistan, it wasn’t long before the repressive Soviet Union itself collapsed. This allowed nations that had been held together by force to finally gain their independence. Similarly, there’s a high likelihood that the Russian Federation could follow in the footsteps of its Soviet predecessor.

A geopolitical domino effect could come into play: Putin’s loss in Syria might lead to Moscow’s defeat in Ukraine, and eventually, to the collapse of the Russian empire itself. It’s this exact fear that reportedly pushed Putin to stop supporting Assad.

The global geopolitical math was straightforward: Russia + North Korea meant continued war in Ukraine, while Russia + Syria guaranteed defeat in Ukraine. So, Putin dropped Syria from the agenda, abandoning any commitments to the Assad regime.

Meanwhile, Iran and Hezbollah, weakened by heavy fighting in Gaza and Lebanon, also didn’t step in to save Assad. Israel had already destroyed 70% of Hezbollah’s missile reserves in Lebanon and Syria, leaving the group in no position to regain its influence in the Middle East for at least five years — even under favorable conditions.

The Turkish factor has also become a key element in Assad’s downfall. Turkey has long supported armed opposition movements in northwestern Syria. Meanwhile, Kurdish areas remain under the control of the PKK, a group historically at odds with Ankara. This convergence of local and regional interests is shaping the situation.

Turkey’s main concern, however, remains the potential creation of an independent Kurdish state, which could trigger a renewed push for independence in Turkish Kurdistan. 

After any power shift in Syria, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will work to ensure that Syrian Kurdistan’s border regions stay isolated from Turkish Kurdistan. This effort is all the more critical as the proxy war between Iran and Israel continues to reshape the region’s balance of power.

Putin’s defeat in Syria would have far-reaching consequences — not just for the Middle East but for global geopolitics. After the Assad regime falls, Turkey’s influence in the region would grow significantly, positioning Ankara as a more dominant player. For Turkey, the Syrian issue remains crucial for security, migration control, and regional stability.

To fully grasp the potential developments in Syria and Turkey’s strategy to capitalize on them, it’s important to assess the positions of global and regional powers. Ankara has traditionally opposed the U.S. support of the Kurdish PKK, which it views as a threat. Now, Erdogan sees a window of opportunity. He’s likely betting that if Donald Trump returns to the presidency in January 2025, the U.S. will deprioritize Syria and withdraw its forces, leaving the region open for Turkey to act.

And this could open up the following possibilities for Turkey:

1. Losing U.S. support for the Kurdish PKK party could strengthen Turkey's stance in the fight against separatism.
2. The chance to work with the U.S. on a joint solution for Syria, improving ties with Washington.

Turkey is also preparing to align its position with Arab countries against U.S. policies that prioritize Israel's interests. At the same time, it continues cross-border operations to secure its borders and cut off logistical routes to prevent coordination between Syrian and Turkish Kurds.

Managing migrant flows and creating safe zones for refugees remain critical for Turkey. To ensure the return of over 4.5 million Syrian refugees currently in Turkey, it’s essential to establish secure areas in northern Syria and invest in infrastructure there.

The collapse of the Assad regime could block routes for Russian gas transport. Even Russian analysts admit that without Moscow’s intervention to support Bashar al-Assad, the Russian budget would have faced severe challenges over a decade ago. 

Back then, all Arab oil would have flowed to Europe, leaving Russia sidelined. By intervening in Syria, Russia managed to block gas supplies from multiple Middle Eastern countries. As even Putin’s propagandists admit, the war in Syria has always been a war for Gazprom. But now, this advantage for Putin is coming to an end.

How might the defeat of Moscow's allies in Syria affect the Russian-Ukrainian war? It’s clear that Russia and Bashar al-Assad made a strategic misstep by freezing the conflict and agreeing with Turkey to occupy northern Syria.

Beyond the military factors, political reasons have also played a role in the weakening of Assad’s forces. With the ongoing war in Ukraine, Russia has drastically reduced its military presence in Syria, accompanied by questionable personnel decisions. Still, few anticipated that after years of pouring resources into propping up Assad’s regime, Moscow would abandon him at a critical moment.

It’s uncertain whether the Kremlin will accelerate talks with Ukraine after its setback in Syria. Despite its weakened position, Moscow is clinging to its outrageous demands: claiming four Ukrainian regions as constitutionally part of Russia and refusing to discuss Crimea. Unless Putin’s forces are defeated on the battlefield, Russia will not back down from its delusional demands.

Even after Assad falls, Putin is unlikely to fully accept defeat. Instead, he may double down in Ukraine, escalating offensive actions to pursue his obsession with occupying Ukrainian territory. While Russia may have given up on Syria, Putin remains fixated on his ultimate goal: taking control of Ukraine.

The Russian leader is also waiting for Donald Trump’s potential inauguration on January 20, 2025. Yet, there’s been no indication from Moscow that talks with Kyiv would be possible even if Trump were in office. After Moscow’s defeat in Syria, the Russian-Ukrainian war is entering a new phase. With Trump already hinting at plans to cut U.S. support for Ukraine, it’s clear that Ukraine must rely on its own army and the continued support of NATO and Europe.

Source

About the author. Viktor Kaspruk, journalist

The editorial staff does not always share the opinions expressed by the blog authors.