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Analyzing path to Russia's target of drafting 300,000 more troops
At the beginning of 2024, the Russian command aimed to recruit 500,000 personnel for their army to maintain the current level of intensity in the war against Ukraine
Given the average monthly mobilization rate of 30,000 troops, achieving this goal seemed feasible, especially with plans to gradually increase the rate to 50,000 per month without declaring general or partial mobilization.
This approach would allow Russia to offset monthly losses of 30,000 troops and amass an additional 140,000 by year's end.
However, the question remains: how can Russia reach the widely discussed target of 300,000 troops?
The answer is straightforward—only by declaring general mobilization.
Only a general mobilization will allow Russia’s military-political leadership to recruit up to 100,000 troops monthly, with the mobilization system itself cracking down. At least 40,000 of these recruits would be needed to offset monthly losses, which are expected to increase. This means Russia could effectively build a human resource pool of 60,000 additional troops per month.
To accumulate a reserve of 300,000 troops, it would take up to six months. If Russia initiates general mobilization in June, these 300,000 troops would not be available to the Russian armed forces immediately but by the end of 2024.
Once again, all of this hinges on the above-mentioned indicators, and any change of them, whether greater or lesser, will alter the timelines and capabilities.
A completely different matter is the question - what to equip these 300,000 with? This entails the standard equipment for each unit, while the current Russian forces in Ukraine are already facing a severe shortage in this regard. This could suggest that transitioning to the marching battalion format for almost the entire Russian contingent is an inevitable medium-term prospect. Naturally, such a transition will necessitate different strategies in countering "cannon fodder assaults".
About the author. Oleksandr Kovalenko, military and political expert of the Information Resistance Group
The editors do not always share the opinions expressed by the blog authors.
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