Russia-Ukraine war in 2024: frontline gains and peace prospects

Content

1. Ukraine loses land equal to four Kyivs, Russia loses 0.63% of male population
2. Key battles of 2024: from Avdiivka's loss to Sudzha's capture
3. Domestic challenges: mobilization, anti-corruption efforts, military reforms
4. International challenges: Trump’s policy impact and potential talks with Russia

Espreso will cover the key battles of 2024, the challenges, and the prospects of the Russia-Ukraine war, which has become not only a matter of Ukraine's territorial integrity but also a struggle for democratic values and the international order.

Ukraine loses land equal to four Kyivs, Russia loses 0.63% of male population

The infographic displays the number of Ukrainian territories lost in square kilometers along the vertical axis, with the losses for 2023 and each month of 2024 represented on the horizontal axis.

According to information from the Ukrainian General Staff, in 2024, the Ukrainian Armed Forces eliminated over 420,000 Russian soldiers. For comparison, in 2022, Russia's losses totaled 105,000, and in 2023, this number doubled to 255,000 soldiers. These figures indicate that Russia is increasing its efforts to advance deeper into Ukrainian territory each year, but the number of casualties doubles annually. Notably, Russia has around 66 million men, meaning they lost 0.63% of this number in one year and about 1% over nearly three years of war.

The colossal human losses (more than the combined armies of the UK, Germany, and France) have yielded modest results. According to UA War Infographics and Deep State, Russia's territorial gains this year amount to approximately 3,160 square kilometers of Ukrainian land. For visual reference, this is nearly the size of four Kyivs, or the total area of London, Berlin, and Madrid combined. However, compared to last year, when Russia captured only about 150 square kilometers, this represents a significant increase - almost 21 times more.

The DeepStateMap at the beginning and end of the year

On the other hand, are these 3,100 square kilometers worth the lives of hundreds of thousands of Russians? A rhetorical question. At the final press conference, Russian leader Vladimir Putin stated that this "movement" should have started earlier. This means that the Russian leadership not only acknowledges its strategic mistakes but also publicly demonstrates indifference to the losses among its own population.

Although Putin believes that an earlier escalation of aggressive policies against Ukraine could have led to the faster achievement of his geopolitical ambitions, reality shows the opposite: the colossal resources spent, hundreds of thousands of lives lost, Russia's international isolation, and economic degradation are gradually becoming an unbearable burden for the Russian state.

Despite Russian pressure and Russia’s far greater capabilities, Ukraine continues to defend its territory, demonstrating resilience, while the world shows international unity, though there is some uncertainty due to Donald Trump's return to the White House. However, the existing Western support, technological advancements in defense, and fierce resistance to the occupying forces have helped counter Russia for almost three years.

Key battles of 2024: from Avdiivka's loss to Sudzha's capture

For most, war is about soldiers who destroy enemies and capture or reclaim territory. Thus, when comparing the situation on the front this year to the previous one, there's a significant difference.

2023 began on very optimistic notes due to the successes of late 2022 (the Slobozhansk counteroffensive and the liberation of Kherson). Public expectations were such that media and high-ranking officials talked about "having coffee in Crimea" by summer, suggesting that the Ukrainian Armed Forces would be able to push the occupying Russian troops not only from the territories captured since February 22, 2022 but also from those taken in 2014. However, while in 2022 the Russians were unprepared for the scale of resistance from Ukrainian forces, in 2023 they changed their strategy.

By bringing in more troops and equipment, and digging in with minefields, the Russian army was ready for another Ukrainian counteroffensive. Moreover, everyone knew where it would happen – in the south. The West, however, did not provide all the promised military equipment, and without air support, the Ukrainian forces found it extremely difficult to advance and break through Russian defensive lines. As a result, the summer counteroffensive of 2023 did not yield the expected results, with many resources, including human ones, being spent, which led to the autumn crisis with mobilization.

At that point, Ukraine's military leadership began talking about the need for hundreds of thousands of soldiers. However, the government took its time weighing the "pros" and "cons" of this socially sensitive issue, and it wasn’t until May 2024 that they changed the mobilization laws, specifically reducing the mobilization age from 27 to 25 years.

Meanwhile, another crisis emerged from across the ocean. In the fall, Republican congressmen and senators in the U.S. began opposing President Biden and his bill to allocate an additional $60 billion in aid to Ukraine. The reason was that the U.S. presidential election campaigns had begun, and the issue of Ukraine became crucial for securing electoral support, possibly helping Donald Trump win. Regardless, political disputes in the U.S. dragged on for six months, and only in April 2024 did the Americans allocate the funds, which had already been absent from the Pentagon's budget earlier in the year. This meant that for several months, the Ukrainian Armed Forces were lacking both shells and other ammunition and equipment.

In addition, at the beginning of this year, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces changed. On February 8, President Zelenskyy replaced Valerii Zaluzhnyi with Oleksandr Syrskyi. As a result, Syrskyi began reshaping the military's management structure, adapting it to his style and vision.

This is important because it provides the context for the start of 2024, when, on one hand, there was a shortage of personnel, and on the other, a lack of weapons, along with internal reshuffling. The Russians took advantage of this, intensifying their pressure on Avdiivka, a strategically vital city located just 10 km from Donetsk, starting in October 2023. After intense battles, on February 17, the Ukrainian Armed Forces officially announced the withdrawal from Avdiivka. Since then, Russian forces have steadily advanced further west in the Donetsk region.

However, Russia did not limit themselves to Donbas and attempted to break through the defense line in the Kharkiv region as well. On May 10, fighting erupted in the northern part of the region. Russian forces captured several border settlements, and fierce battles took place in Vovchansk. As a result, the city was essentially destroyed, no one lives there anymore.

In the summer, Russian troops concentrated their forces on occupying southern Donetsk. Despite record average daily losses, exceeding 1,500 soldiers, the invading Russian forces steadily increased their pace of advancement each month. Specifically, on October 1, they captured the fortified city of Vuhledar, and on October 30 – Selydove, and dozens of villages. Now, the threat of encirclement hangs over Velyka Novosilka and Pokrovsk, and their loss would open the way for a land war in a new area – the Dnipropetrovsk region. Additionally, Pokrovsk is important as a logistics hub and home to the last Ukrainian mines extracting coking coal, without which half of its domestic metallurgy could come to a halt.

The situation is also critical in Kurakhove, which is already partially occupied, but the Ukrainian Armed Forces continue to hold back Russians in fierce urban battles, significantly slowing their advance in this direction.

Why have Russian forces managed to advance so significantly? A veteran of the Russo-Ukrainian war and former commander of the Aidar Battalion company, Yevhen Dykyi, noted in an interview with Radio NV that the Russians outnumber Ukrainian forces across the entire front line, which is the most critical reason for their progress. This highlights the shortage of military personnel due to mobilization challenges. As Taras Chmut, head of the Come Back Alive Foundation, explained in an interview with Ukrayinska Pravda, Russian troops are using a "seepage" tactic, advancing meter by meter with small groups, gradually pushing Ukrainian forces back. However, as Serhiy Zgurets, CEO of the Defense Express media and consulting company and a military expert, stated on Espreso TV, “The front is under strain but not collapsing.” This means that Russian advances do not signify a breakthrough. Ukrainian forces, as emphasized by Mykhailo Samus, director of the analytical organization New Geopolitics Research Network, are "successfully employing maneuver defense, inflicting significant losses on the enemy and buying time to strengthen their positions."

Screenshot from a video: Ukrainian soldiers at the Russia-Ukraine border

On the Ukrainian side, the most significant military achievement of 2024 was the Kursk operation, launched by the Ukrainian Armed Forces on August 6. Ukrainian troops crossed the Russian border near the city of Sudzha and quickly advanced deep into Russian territory, taking control of several settlements. Ultimately, approximately 1,200 square kilometers of Russian territory came under Ukrainian control. This marked the first large-scale operation by Ukraine’s Armed Forces on Russian soil since the beginning of the full-scale invasion and demonstrated to the world the illusory nature of the Kremlin’s “red lines,” often backed by nuclear threats whenever events deviate from their plans.

The declared goal of Ukraine's operation was to preempt Russian forces preparing for an offensive in this direction by creating a "buffer zone" to protect Ukrainian border territories from shelling and to reduce Russia's military potential. As of December 2024, Ukrainian forces continue to hold part of the Kursk region, though they have had to relinquish nearly half of the territory gained in the early days of the operation.

The war in the Kursk region also marked a new chapter in the conflict, as Russian forces began deploying soldiers from North Korea, making them an official third participant in the war. According to Ukraine’s president, the number of killed and wounded North Korean soldiers in the Kursk region has already exceeded 3,000, with the risk of additional deployments in the near future. However, the involvement of North Korean troops prompted a response from the Biden administration, which finally approved the use of long-range missiles against Russian territory - a decision it had previously opposed.

Recently, there has been increasing talk about the threat of Russian breakthroughs in the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions. However, experts note that the Russian army lacks sufficient resources to carry out its plans. Additionally, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are acting proactively to prevent the Russians from crossing the Dnipro River. So far, Ukrainian intelligence has not detected the formation of an offensive group in the Kherson region.

Domestic challenges: mobilization, anti-corruption efforts, military reforms

The full-scale war is approaching its third year. While Russia has suffered hundreds of thousands of casualties, it is evident that Ukraine has also lost many soldiers. But how many exactly? The answer varies.

In September, The Wall Street Journal reported that the combined losses of both countries had already reached one million people. According to The Economist, Ukraine may have lost between 60,000 and 100,000 soldiers killed, with an estimated 400,000 wounded. However, the President of Ukraine refuted these figures, stating that Ukraine has lost 43,000 servicemen during the full-scale war, though he did not clarify whether this number includes those missing in action.

Heavy losses and fatigue among soldiers, who cannot be demobilized because the corresponding legislative initiative has yet to be approved by the Ministry of Defense, have led to the growth of another significant problem - unauthorized absences (AWOL). In the fall, at a critical moment, about 100,000 soldiers reportedly went AWOL. However, lawmakers developed legal amendments that allowed some soldiers to return without facing criminal liability.

Despite an increase in mobilization during the first months after the legislative changes, these efforts significantly slowed again in the fall. This complicates the formation of reserves and, according to experts, does not even compensate for combat losses. Cases of corruption and abuse in the mobilization process further undermine its popularity.

Such circumstances occasionally force the reclassification of specialists into infantry roles. For instance, there have been cases of medical personnel being reassigned as riflemen. In response, the president signed a decree in early December prohibiting such actions. Additionally, Western media reported that the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces allegedly ordered air defense personnel to be sent to the front due to a shortage of infantry. However, the General Staff later denied this information, calling it "inaccurate and indecorous."

Ultimately, as American officials have stated, Ukraine's current issue is not the lack of weaponry but the shortage of personnel. In November, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan remarked that the world did not see a significant difference on the battlefield either when tanks were supplied to Ukraine or when aircraft were provided: "Our view has been that there's not one weapon system that makes a difference in this battle. It's about manpower, and Ukraine needs to do more, in our view, to firm up its lines in terms of the number of forces it has on the front lines."

Additionally, the U.S. has long urged Ukrainian authorities to lower the conscription age to 18. However, during a press conference in Brussels on December 19, Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated: "If a person is unarmed, what difference does it make whether they are 20 or 30? There is no difference." Zelenskyy emphasized that the priority is weapons, not the number of soldiers, as some brigades remain understrength. He also noted that only two out of 14 brigades underwent training abroad due to a shortage of weaponry. According to the president, modern warfare primarily depends on technology - missiles, drones, long-range artillery, and air defense systems.

This year, Ukraine’s defense industry showcased several new developments already aiding the Armed Forces. In addition to various drones, these include the Palianytsia and Peklo drone-missiles, which have entered mass production. Moreover, Ukraine may have its own cruise and ballistic missiles by 2025. The country has also begun producing its own ammunition. However, as The Washington Post noted, "Faulty mortar rounds spark corruption allegations for Ukraine’s defense industry." Corruption in military procurement poses a significant potential obstacle to future aid and investment, undermining public trust and that of international partners, making the fight against it critically important.

It is also worth mentioning the reforms in the Ukrainian army, which, following the Revolution of Dignity, has clearly set a course toward adopting NATO standards and approaches. In particular, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are working to reinstate operational-tactical formations such as divisions and army corps to address certain chaos in army management, which leads to unfulfilled combat missions and unjustified losses. According to the commander of the 12th Special Purpose Brigade Azov, Denys Prokopenko (call sign Redys), the army in the field often depends on calls from higher leadership and "manual control of companies and battalions," which undermines its effectiveness, while generals lack clear accountability for their actions.

International challenges: Trump’s policy impact and potential talks with Russia

It is no secret that Donald Trump's election as U.S. president will impact support for Ukraine in 2025. However, the question remains: what form will this support take? Trump has consistently stated his intention to quickly end the war in Ukraine once he officially takes office on January 20. Therefore, he will likely use U.S. support as leverage over both Ukraine and Russia. He could either reduce or entirely halt aid to Ukraine or significantly increase it.

If President Zelenskyy's position has already been swayed towards negotiations, as signaled by statements from the Ukrainian authorities, including that the return of Crimea should be addressed diplomatically, the stance of Russian leader Putin still needs to be influenced. This is because Russia enshrined its territorial goal in the constitution in the fall of 2022 - seizing not only the Donetsk and Luhansk regions but also Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. Strategic shifts may occur during a meeting between Trump and Putin, which the new U.S. president is awaiting. In any case, Trump wants to stop Putin from shaping a new world order. Some analysts believe he views the Kremlin leader as a "pawn" in a broader game with China.

However, due to the fundamentally different positions of Kyiv and Moscow, all these negotiations may lead to a frozen conflict without resolving key issues. Perhaps a peace agreement will be signed after the elections in Ukraine. For Ukraine, the issue of security remains relevant, as there are no guarantees that Russia won't attack again after a potential ceasefire and regrouping of its forces. Therefore, the Ukrainian authorities insist on NATO membership (which is a priority in President Zelenskyy's Victory Plan) but also understand that not all countries agree with this yet. Consequently, Kyiv is exploring proposals related to the deployment of European troops along the line of demarcation. This idea is being actively pushed by the President of France. However, Ukraine also considers the participation of the U.S. in this process as crucial.

It is important to remember that while many countries continue to support Ukraine, elections and political debates within these states can unexpectedly change the situation. Perhaps that is why President Zelenskyy recently changed dozens of Ukrainian ambassadors. He noted that "foreign policy work next year will be even more intense than this year, and next year must be the time to establish peace - a reliable peace."

Foreign Affairs points out that only a well-thought-out security agreement will allow Ukraine to focus on economic recovery and democracy, rather than becoming a fortress state. As historian and political analyst Timothy Garton Ash writes in an article for The Guardian, the war in Ukraine will eventually end in peace, but it will be more advantageous either for Kyiv or for Moscow. This is the subject of the main behind-the-scenes discussions: how to strengthen Ukraine’s negotiating position despite the uncertainty on the battlefield. Historian and political scientist Vadym Denysenko stated on Espreso that negotiations over the war in Ukraine should begin in February 2025, but if an agreement cannot be reached by the end of May, the war could enter a new cycle of confrontation.

Although exact predictions about the development of the war in Ukraine in 2025 remain uncertain, the Ukrainian government and society signal some hope for achieving peace through diplomatic efforts and international support. However, this hope cannot magically protect the country, so Ukraine is trying to remain prepared for various scenarios and continues to strengthen its defense capabilities. After all, only a powerful Ukrainian military can protect the country from Russian aggression.