Russia does not import Shahed drones from Iran, but assembles them domestically

This conclusion (assumption) follows from the open source information.

1. Russia uses unmanned aerial vehicles (barrage munitions) for strikes against Ukraine, which are qualified as Iranian Shahed by their hull and a number of components. This is the basis for allegations that Iran supplies this equipment to Russia.

2. There is no record of the very fact of supply (transportation) of this equipment to Russia.

3. In general, in the statements of US officials and other Western countries there is no unambiguity about the supply of Shahed drones from Iran to Russia. It seems that all statements are based on the fact of using this equipment in Ukraine.

4. The statements of Israel representatives and other states (with reference to alleged intelligence) are also not convincing, not sufficiently substantiated. This also applies to statements about contracts, about the number of devices.

“Official Tehran denies that it supplies Russia with Shahed drones. And demands proof. This may indicate that the Iranian leadership is confident that there is no evidence of the supply.”

Because such information is highly classified, especially in Iran. The production and supply of Shahed drones is under the control of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The Iranian leadership is extremely interested in secrecy both in their country and in Russia. As I have pointed out, Tehran will not make direct deliveries in order not to provoke increased sanctions pressure against itself. Iranian diplomacy has 3 millennia of political history.

And if there was such a direct supply, then information about it, about the documents and the number of devices could have been obtained from one of the informants in the IRGC or from among the Iranian top leadership. In this case, the disclosure of information about the documents and the quantity means the voluntary surrender of such an extremely valuable informant to the Iranian special services.

And this would be criminal incompetence of the special services.

5. The official Tehran denies that it supplies Russia with Shahed drones. And demands proof. This may indicate that the Iranian leadership is sure that there is no evidence of the supply. And they do not consider some components of Iranian origin to be evidence, since most of the components in the Shahed drones shot down in Ukraine are not of Iranian production. Many components are of Western origin.

“Production and supply of Shahed drones are under the control of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The Iranian leadership is extremely interested in secrecy both in its own country and in Russia.”

6. Russia strikes Ukraine with Shahed drones in a dosed manner - in small numbers with short breaks. This may indicate that Russia does not have the capability and available number of drones for large-scale attacks.

7. On the Russian-occupied territory of Ukraine, Iranian specialists were seen training the Russian military to use Shahed drones or possibly participating in the launches themselves.

Summary

It is possible that these devices are not imported to Russia, but assembled on Russian territory.

In this case, components are imported: Iranian spare parts are imported not necessarily from Iran directly, and other components from different countries.

In this case, the assembly can be carried out by Iranian specialists. And the assembly process can take place on the territory of the Southern Federal District of Russia or in the occupied Crimea.

It is possible that this is a small assembly plant, and 1 or 2 launchers are used to launch the vehicles.

From all this follows an extremely important task for the Ukrainian special services: to find these assembly places, as well as the location and routes of the launchers.

Source

About the author. Volodymyr Volia, political scientist, international expert

Espreso TV does not always share the opinions expressed by the blog authors.