On war fatigue and ending scenarios

On the one hand, politicization in a country with politics is inevitable. On the other hand, it is still quite a shame to undermine the country in order to discredit your political opponents in a time of war.

Because the logic of our diplomats to draw our “red lines” for potential negotiations is correct. As are the demands from our partners to provide weapons and money to keep these “red lines” away. Even if you don't like the fact that Zelenskyy is the face of this work.

Globally, all these death pits for the sake of likes and ratings are a powerful “investment” in the very fatigue of war that worsens possible configurations of scenarios for its end. Real fatigue from the war accumulates in absolutely everyone, it just manifests itself in different ways. Someone falls into depression, someone into escapism (and then into depression), someone into apathy, someone into hysteria. Some people find the answer in conspiracy theories, look for the guilty, or just go crazy.

It is becoming increasingly difficult to analyze impartially, and it is becoming increasingly difficult to refrain from being influenced by the vagaries of the psyche and the moods of others.

So we need to keep reminding ourselves. War is a scripted thing. In our war, everything is the same. And when we think about which scenarios are realistic, we must take into account:

• The difference in potentials (Russia is more powerful than Ukraine in terms of resources);
• the superiority of a nation-state over an empire in terms of sustainability and self-regulation (Ukraine has a big advantage here);
• the fact that both state systems are inefficient but still viable;
• that Ukraine's ability to defeat Russia is critically dependent on assistance;
• Ukraine's long-term security depends on a) security guarantees and rearmament after the war; b) Russia's willingness or ability to repeat its aggression.

In the current configuration, it is rather strange to whine about “everything is gone.” As well as saying that “the borders of '91” are possible in the current situation. A triumphant scenario is possible only with a radical increase in aid or an acute internal crisis within Russia. A catastrophic scenario is possible if Western aid (both military and economic) is cut off. Or if Ukrainians decide to kill themselves by destroying their own state. Here, no matter how hard the internal and external enemies and idiots from all camps try, it is not yet so critical.

“The scenario of triumph or catastrophe is largely about randomness. Considering the fragility of dictatorships and the critical dependence on aid based on circumstances, the point of no return for each side can come relatively unexpectedly and quickly. However, these are currently low-probability scenarios.”

Everything else is about the “in-between” in one way or another. Someone will call it the Korean scenario (realists), someone will call it the Croatian scenario (optimists), someone will be afraid of the Vietnamese scenario (pessimists). They are all about the configuration that emerges when both sides, their fan groups, and neutrals reach the stage of “okay, where is the table where we can sign something?”

In these circumstances, the best thing to do is to recognize that we cannot control everything. As Yuliy Morozov correctly wrote, it is impossible to return to the past according to the paradigm of “but we should have”. We will have to work with what we have, with the institutions we have built and the people who have grown up. Because fundamental institutional changes during a war of such intensity are about fairy tales.

I do not know 100% what kind of scenario we will come to. And no one else does either. Probably, we will not have to choose between “total victory” and “shameful defeat”. And there will be public frustration with the results of the war regardless of the scenario. Because the questions “why?” and “how to live with this?” are inevitable for society and each of us. It is impossible to prepare for this fully, but you can at least think about it. Sometimes.

We will take the exam to learn the lessons of the war in the first 20 years after its end. It will show what we have learned. The task now is to try not to fall into despondency, hysteria or apathy.

Source

About the author. Yurii Bohdanov, publicist, specialist in strategic communications in business, public administration and politics.

The editors do not always share the opinions expressed by the blog authors.