ISW: Putin tries to avoid risky decisions

It is stated in an Institute for the Study of War (ISW) report.

"Putin's indecision during the war demonstrates his desire to avoid risky decisions that could threaten his rule or international escalation - even though his maximalist and unrealistic goal of total conquest of Ukraine likely requires further risk to have any hope of success," it is said in the report.

The Russian president's decisions regarding Ukraine after the failed February 24, 2022 invasion indicate a disconnect between his maximalist goals and his willingness to make the potentially risky decisions necessary to achieve them.

At the same time, Putin probably falsely assumed that Russian troops would be able to force Kyiv to capitulate without significant military losses, and therefore viewed a Russian invasion as an acceptable risk, analysts say.

Russian special services were waiting for the collapse of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and Kremlin propagandists published an article written beforehand praising Russia's "victory" on February 26, 2022, experts say.

A number of economic moves by the Russian government indicate that the Russian dictator and his people mistakenly believed that the West would not incur serious costs due to his invasion.

The report says that the failure of the Kyiv offensive forced Putin to face difficult decisions. However, the dictator is still reluctant to bring about complex changes in the Russian army and society that are necessary to change the course of the war.

ISW cites a number of examples that demonstrate Putin's reluctance to take risky decisions:

• Putin was reluctant to order full mobilization after the June-July 2022 fight for Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk and several failed offensive operations that exhausted the Russian army

• Putin ignored repeated calls from Russian nationalists in May 2022 to mobilize reservists, declare war on Ukraine, impose martial law in Russia, and modernize the army conscription system

• The President of the Russian Federation did not make many public speeches related to military operations from the beginning of the war until mid-December

• Putin began to take domestically unpopular decisions, such as declaring partial mobilization or extending martial law, only after the terrible situation at the front and the Armed Forces successes made it clear that the Kremlin needed additional combat power

• The Russian president could have announced a larger-scale mobilization, more than 300,000 military personnel, but he might have feared that the already unpopular prospect of mobilization would further damage his popularity in Russian society

• Putin also did not officially declare martial law within Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk regions, instead ordering these regions to develop the legal framework necessary to support Russian mobilization

• The President of the Russian Federation apparently does not intend to announce a second wave of mobilization and is likely to lean toward a "quiet mobilization" due to the first wave of mobilization unpopularity concerns 

• Putin conducts polls to gauge Russians' perception of mobilization, but has not yet decided when to begin further mobilization

• The Russian president relies on "scapegoats" who publicly take the blame for military failures and unpopular Kremlin policies. Russian propagandists blame the former commander of the Russian army in Ukraine General Sergey Surovikin for the withdrawal of troops from Kherson and the right bank of the Kherson region.

"Putin's reluctance to take risks directly related to the war he has unleashed indicates that he remains unlikely to decide on nuclear escalation or war with NATO. Putin obviously values his domestic status-quo and seeks to avoid risky and controversial policies to support his own military goals," the analysts added.