When will this war end?

But before predicting WHEN the war will end, it is worth understanding HOW it may end. The analytical model gives 4 options for the end of the current phase of the war, or the military campaign that began with the Russian troops’ invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022.

The first option out of those initially considered by analysts is the surrender of Ukraine. Under current conditions, it implies recognition of the loss of more territories, refusal to join NATO, disarmament and some degree of political and ideological subordination to Moscow. Theoretically, such an option is still possible, but it requires 3 new factors: a sharp qualitative and quantitative increase in the military potential of Russia, the loss of political will by the leadership of Ukraine, and the refusal of Ukraine’s Western allies to support it. So far, there are no prerequisites for the emergence of such factors. Therefore, we consider this option as unlikely.

The second option is the complete opposite of the first, it involves the capitulation of Russia. Specifically, the return of all occupied territories to Ukraine, payment of compensation and guarantees of non-aggression in the future, which can only be implemented in the form of Russia’s demilitarization and denuclearization. It is clear that all this is impossible to imagine without at least the dismantling of Putin's regime, but it is more likely that all this becomes possible only after the territorial disintegration of the Russian Federation. This perspective should be kept in mind, but it is hardly feasible within the time frame of this military campaign. Therefore, we also discard this option for now.

There are 2 intermediate outcomes that should be considered as the most likely. The first is a truce with an agreement, the second is a truce without an agreement. Russia is trying to push the situation towards the first option, while Ukraine stubbornly sticks to the second scenario.

What is the difference between them, and what are the interests of the parties?

Russia needs any peace agreement for 2 purposes. Externally, such an agreement inevitably leads to at least partial lifting of sanctions and restrictions (open political and backroom economic bargaining will determine which specifically). Internally, the agreement will allow Putin to legalize some of his next victories, whether it is a "protected Donbas", or "NATO deterrence", or a land corridor to Crimea will depend on the delineation of forces at the time of the truce.

The ceasefire with the agreement preserves and cements the Putin regime, becomes a starting point for the growth of revanchist sentiments in Russia and its preparation for a new stage of the war.

A truce without a peace agreement has all the same consequences, but with some differences. It would make Putin's defeat more obvious to the domestic Russian audience, and thus complicate the process of regime consolidation and make the emergence of a radical revanchist opposition to him (which is currently taking shape in the form of a community of warlords, Prigozhin's army and other "militias" a la Girkin) more likely. At the same time, such a truce will preserve the majority of Western sanctions and a certain isolation of the regime on the international arena. It also grants Ukraine the opportunity to continue recapturing its occupied territories at any convenient moment in case Moscow authorities dwindle.

Of course, the demarcation line at the time of the ceasefire is another important factor. There are also 4 options for where it will lie.

The first is to maintain Russian control over part of the territories seized after February 24, 2022. Particularly, the northern Luhansk region, Azov sea region and the left bank of the Dnipro River. For Putin, this will be almost a victory. But for the Ukrainian authorities, recognition of these territorial losses in any form is absolutely unacceptable. Therefore, this option is possible only in case of a sudden weakening of Ukraine’s offensive potential and can hardly be based on any document signed by the parties. In this unstable situation, all Western pressure on Russia should be maintained, and the mobilization readiness of the aggressor country will remain high in the near future.

Such a situation can stabilize only in case Ukraine becomes weak, which may be caused, for example, by the loss of allies, internal conflict or socio-economic decline. But such weakness is likely to provoke Russia to a new offensive, so it is almost certainly the prospect of a new war.

The second option is for Ukrainian troops to reach the front line of February 23, 2022. Such an outcome of the war would be a great disappointment for the patriotic public in both Russia and Ukraine. It will be very difficult for Putin to accept and explain it to his population. But, most likely, 3 important categories are psychologically ready for such an outcome: the "peaceful" population of both countries, not affected by patriotic mobilization, the civilian leadership of Ukraine (except maybe a few people), as well as Ukraine’s Western allies. Among the advantages is the possibility of maintaining a significant number of anti-Russian sanctions as punishment for the official annexation of 4 regions, war crimes and material damage caused to Ukraine.

It is unlikely that this option can be enshrined in any official agreement. It puts both Putin and Zelenskyy in a weak position in the post-war period, and also assumes an active role of the West in the further settlement process. As a last resort, to balance Russia's reputational losses, the West can force the Ukrainian leadership to fix the status quo by signing some document solely as a way to allow Putin (or someone else on the Russian side) "save face".

The third option is the recapture of Donbas by the Ukrainian Armed Forces, but Russia retains control over Crimea. For Putin, who has repeatedly declared the "protection of Donbas" as the main goal of the "special operation", this would mean an unequivocal defeat, which he will not want to admit in any case. That is, this option is possible only as an intermediate result, a temporary suspension of hostilities, after which both sides will immediately begin to prepare for a new stage of confrontation. The West in this situation will likely "wash its hands of this war". And Ukraine will find itself in a rather difficult situation: it will need to simultaneously restore the country after the hostilities, prepare for a new stage of confrontation and carry out complex work on the reintegration of the territories that have been under occupation for 8 years.

Since this option provides for a very high probability of a power crisis both in Kyiv and Moscow, internal stability will be a decisive factor for the further course of events. The one who "blinks" first will lose. If Putin's regime collapses, Ukraine will have an opportunity to return Crimea diplomatically. If a sharp political confrontation begins in Ukraine, Russia will take advantage of the situation to regain control over Donbas, and probably over the officially "annexed" southern regions.

Finally, the fourth option, which is the officially declared goal of Ukraine in this war, is to regain control over all occupied territories, including Crimea.

There is nothing to analyze here. This is possible only in case of complete defeat of Russian troops and the fall of Putin's regime in Moscow. To prevent this scenario, collective Putin, if he has time, can use tactical nuclear weapons, and then the reaction of the West will decide everything.

Since no one has been able to reliably predict the revolution, we will not assess the probability of the fall of the Putin regime in this article.

Thus, we can outline several scenarios according to which the military campaign in 2023 may develop, according to their priority for key players.

For Putin, the priority is the option when Russian troops retain control over the territory they currently possess, and Kyiv is forced to sign a document legalizing the actual demarcation line (for example, a ceasefire agreement without preconditions). Mobilization, shelling of Ukrainian infrastructure, and threats of new attacks and unprecedented weapons are aimed at this.

The "red line" for Putin is the Ukrainian troops' reaching the line of February 23, 2022. It is unlikely that Moscow will be ready to legalize this by any agreement, but in a non-public way it may eventually agree to such an option.

In either case, Russia will demand that sanctions be lifted and will renew its anti-Ukrainian propaganda campaign both inside Russia and around the world.

For Ukraine, the desired outcome of hostilities is to return to the administrative borders of the Ukrainian SSR of 1991. Putin's signing of any documents legalizing such a state of affairs is a priori impossible, so we can only hope that the military defeat will cause an internal political crisis in the Russian Federation and the transfer of power to the "party of peace". Then it will be possible to discuss a peace agreement.

The "red line" for Kyiv is the same line of February 23, 2022. Any new, compared to the losses of 2014 and 2015, territorial concessions will be perceived by Ukrainian society extremely negatively. Moreover, it will not guarantee that Russia never attacks again, but will only further motivate the aggressor.

The same line of February 23 can be defined as the optimal line under the armed phase of the conflict by Ukraine’s Western allies, first of all, the Biden administration. Returning to the status quo will make it possible, on the one hand, to declare that the West has defended Ukraine this time, and on the other hand, it will leave the opportunity to continue to put pressure on Russia by economic, legal and informational means.

Since the supply of Western weapons and ammunition makes it possible to regulate the offensive potential of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, it is Washington's vision that may be decisive in determining the outcome of the war and the speed of its achievement.

Returning to the question of when the hostilities will cease, it is worth noting that life is always more complicated than rational models. That is why few people believed in the possibility of Russia's attack on Ukraine. And, similarly, no one can guess what Putin's next decision will be, which is the main factor for the continuation of the war.

Usually, the war ends when someone wins it, or when its participants lose the motivation to fight.

So far, the situation at the front line is a stalemate, and neither side can hope for a complete victory. Similarly, the motivation in both camps does not decrease.

Ukrainian motivation is clear. Victory over the enemy is today for us not only a desire for revenge and justice, but also the only way to survive as a community.

For many Russians who support the continuation of the war, the motivation has moved from the ideological and value plane (to resist "Nazism", to protect "Russians") to instinctive, or rather hormonal ("let's show that we are stronger").

In fact, this war has not yet fulfilled its purpose. And this statement is true for all its participants, who can, in one way or another, influence its end.

Putin's regime is still transforming, which will allow it to achieve the necessary level of external closure and internal repression to guarantee the retention of power by the ruling corporation of Chekists and bandits.

Ukraine, which has received a powerful impetus of national self-awareness and patriotic mobilization, has not yet reached its design parameters neither in the territorial, nor in the socio-structural, nor in the semantic dimensions.

The West has not yet solved the problem of final disqualification of Russia due to the critical decline in its economic potential, as well as neutralization of Russian hard power and soft power.

Therefore, the end of the armed phase of the confrontation, which is likely to take place after the Ukrainian troops reach the line of February 23, will be only a truce, not peace.

After that, the parties to the conflict will take up with renewed vigor the tasks that they will not have time to solve in this phase of the confrontation: the "Ukrainian issue", the "Russian issue", global domination, etc. So, ahead is a great war of economic and military potentials, technologies, information resources, political will and new ideas.

Author: Maksym Rozumny, Ukrainian political scientist, philosopher, poet.