Ukraine lacks aviation and air defense for blitzkrieg – military expert Serhiy Zgurets 

The NYT article on the tactics of the Ukrainian Armed Forces

I would like to start our column with my own assessments against the backdrop of a recent publication in the New York Times. The article says that the Ukrainian army has abandoned the methods of warfare proposed by the US and has focused on depleting Russia with long-range artillery and missiles instead of storming minefields under fire, and is operating in small units. 

Allegedly, American officials (though it is unclear which ones) are concerned that a return to these tactics could lead to Ukraine wasting precious supplies, which could play into Putin's hands and put the Ukrainian Defense Forces at a disadvantage in this war of attrition. The American methods are about mobile warfare, maneuvers that use speed to bypass enemy positions to catch them off guard instead of exhausting fire. With new technologies, it is true that the possibilities for such operations have increased, but there has always been a bit of mythology in these concepts, because the US successes in recent wars have been as much the result of maneuver as they have been of superior firepower. 

During Desert Storm, the enemy's defenses were being destroyed for 40 days by air, and another four days by ground operations. Ukraine does not have such a luxury, and this concept cannot be transferred to the reality of the Russian-Ukrainian war, which is unique because at its current stage it is a dynamic parity between the armies of the two countries.

At least at the current stage, there is no point in talking about a maneuver war. Publications in the Western media are based on the assessments of two experts who have conducted an in-depth analysis on the front line, visiting various parts of it and researching their own publications: Franz Stefan Gady, Senior Fellow at the British Institute for Strategic Studies, and Michael Kofman, a research fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. They made realistic and critical conclusions. 

The experts say that the ability of Ukrainian soldiers to quickly master Western weapons has led to unreasonable optimism that training time of combat units can be reduced, which is a mistake. Now the commanders of companies, battalions, and newly formed brigades are forced to gain combat experience and experience in interacting on the battlefield, and sometimes at a high cost. However, even if they were better trained, the lack of key capabilities would prevent rapid advancement in a blitzkrieg maneuver, as there is a lack of air dominance, rapid demining, and close air defense. These are the prerequisites for introducing our own tactics of warfare: to maintain combat power and destroy Russian troops, we emphasize artillery, when it destroys the enemy's defense, and then the infantry advances. 

This will take an exhausting period. The enemy's awareness of our strategy is evident from the frantic statements made by Russian military commanders and former leaders of the 58th Army, admitting their inability to counter our counter-battery and destructive artillery fire. This serves as a validation of the effectiveness of our strategy. However, the challenge lies in ensuring that our partners correctly perceive the success of our campaign. As we enter the demanding phase before the strike and maneuver of our fresh brigades, it marks a new stage in the Defense Forces' counteroffensive. 

According to Mykhailo Samus, head of the New Geopolitics Research Network, he believes that the NYT journalist lacks a proper understanding of the situation due to the conflicting statements made. On one hand, the Ukrainian troops have been trained to fight in a decentralized manner, which aligns with Western doctrine. On the other hand, the Defense Forces are focusing on attrition. The combination of these two approaches seems unclear and raises questions about their compatibility. 

What does decentralization have to do with the lack of air dominance and more precise long-range weapons that would knock out air defenses or operate deeper. I mean bombs with a range of 160 kilometers, which we have been talking about for a year and which never come. The Ukrainian Defense Forces are acting in the same doctrine as they have been acting: first, operations that shape the conditions on the battlefield, in particular with the help of artillery, precision missiles, artillery, because we do not have advanced aviation; and when the enemy cannot effectively defend, the troops go on the assault and occupy the positions abandoned by the enemy due to exhaustion. 

While some refer to the liberation of the Kherson region as an instant operation, it actually began in June and July and concluded in November with the liberation of Kherson. During this period, the Ukrainian forces had to systematically exhaust the enemy and undertake the task of destroying bridges. One notable example was the time it took to target Antonivskyi Bridge. Initially, an illusion of an instant operation was created, but later the reality showed that the Russian defense lines persisted for six months after Zaluzhnyi's interview, where he mentioned the equipment needed for victory. As the events unfolded, disappointments arose. However, the current situation represents an optimal development of events. Ukrainian forces are making advancements while also exhausting and creating shell hunger for the Russian Federation by consistently destroying enemy ammunition depots in tactical and operational depth. If the Ukrainian forces had GLSDBs (Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles with a range of 160 kilometers), the Russians would face even greater shell hunger, and progress would likely be faster. The focus on combat capabilities reflects the essence of Western doctrine.

The dependence of aid to Ukraine on the US elections

Political strategists often focus on success stories, particularly concerning the Biden administration and military situations. The chaotic events in Afghanistan, such as locals clinging to a departing plane, presented an unfavorable image of the administration, which opponents in the election could exploit to prevent Biden's potential second term. The main task of political technologists is to prevent a negative context of support for Ukraine. 

For instance, if the US provides F-16s and ATACMS to Ukraine, and Russia shoots down some fighter jets and renders ATACMS ineffective, opponents may use this as a trump card against the Biden administration. They might argue that despite significant investments, Ukraine is not succeeding, leading to calls for negotiations with Russia and diverting attention from internal problems.

The Biden administration's perceived interference in the war may also fuel sentiments in Europe and the US, advocating a shift towards addressing domestic issues instead of involving themselves in foreign conflicts. The US administration will be watching developments, for example, in the summer and fall offensives of the Ukrainian Defense Forces. 

If successful, they may accelerate the delivery of F-16s. For example, the first combat squadron could be provided in the winter, followed by the second, and in the spring, when active hostilities begin, Ukraine could demonstrate its capabilities using the aircraft during the liberation of Crimea or Donetsk and Luhansk regions. If the campaign does not achieve contrasting successes, the US will avoid providing F-16s in 2024, or will provide them in portions that will not allow them to be used effectively before the November 2024 elections. There may be a direct request for restrictions on use close to the front line. It seems that the US would like to avoid responsibility for the failures of Ukrainian operations.

Integration of war into the elections in Russia

Russia is preparing for a large-scale mobilization, and is going to restrict the rights of Russians with electronic summonses, up to the termination of their passports and blocking of bank accounts. If someone receives a summons and fails to appear at the appointed time, they will not be able to exist in Russia. It is planned to recruit about 500,000 soldiers in September-October and prepare them for the next strategic operation in mid- to late winter. 

Right now, Russia cannot organize it, it is trying to slow down Ukraine's actions, trying to break through the front with counterattacks, such as in the Luhansk region, and turn everything around to seize the initiative. Russia has not succeeded. It is burning up reserves to slow down Ukrainian attacks, and it cannot plan its own offensive because it has no reserves. 

It is also needed for the strike force in Belarus. Wagner mercenaries are deployed there now: 5,000 so far, but it could be up to 10,000. The common approach taken by Russia is to rely on turbo-patriotism, maximizing nationalistic sentiments. In order to shift the agenda and assert Putin's leadership, terrorist attacks and provocations might be employed to create an illusion of victory only achievable under Putin's rule.

The Kremlin seems to have opted for a war of attrition as its current strategy. The negative signals about state investments in military technologies and equipment are concerning, especially since Ukraine was once a leader in developing innovative systems like "kamikaze" drones and FPV technology. Russia is focusing on putting its economy on a military track and employing asymmetric tactics, notably investing heavily in drones. This situation serves as a wakeup call for Ukraine to shift towards public investment in military capabilities. 

Relying solely on funds from UNITED24 and charities might not be enough. To effectively counter Russia's approach, Ukraine needs to bolster its own drone capabilities by mass-producing drones like the Bober (Beaver - ukr.), similar to how Russia has deployed numerous Shaheds. We would have maintained an asymmetrical approach, when with fewer human resources, weapons and equipment we could have reached parity and prevented Russia from seizing the strategic initiative. If they seize it with drones, it will be difficult for us.

Wagner PMC's actions in Belarus and Poland

The spread of the war beyond Ukraine is one of the most logical scenarios for the use of Wagner mercenaries. Several scenarios include posing a threat to Ukraine, causing chaos in Africa, and executing hybrid attacks in the Suwalki corridor. These possibilities have been considered since the West-2017 exercises. There are no obstacles for Wagner forces without insignia to make provocations in the Suwalki corridor and create conditions when NATO will have to decide whether to invoke Article 5 or bury its head in the sand. When a Belarusian helicopter entered Poland within 3 kilometers, the West tried to prevent an escalation between the countries. They are also trying to withhold information about the Shahed drone in Romania. The EU and the US are trying to avoid invoking Article 5 and entering into a direct conflict with Russia. Many in NATO do not want this, but it cannot be avoided.