Putin sees Trump as weak

Let’s break it down — what’s changed?

In my view, Putin saw Trump as weak, someone incapable of standing up to Russia in general and Putin specifically. It seems Putin’s inner circle, those few allowed to discuss such matters with him, collectively reinforced this belief. They likely convinced him that now is the perfect time to project strength. Especially since the Kremlin doubts there will be meaningful sanctions on the so-called shadow fleet in 2025 or any real effort to push oil prices down to the critical $50-per-barrel mark (the Russian budget is based on nearly $70 per barrel). This is an interesting situation for us, as Trump has never been so openly regarded as a weakling before.

Here’s what matters: the Russian provocation involving the severing of an electric cable in the Baltic Sea is both a test move and an attempt to raise the stakes. If the U.S. and EU (mainly the U.S.) don’t react, Putin will conclude the shadow fleet faces no real threat. Reminder: 60% of Russia’s oil exports come through Baltic ports.

"Equally significant: a lack of a strong response will only deepen Putin’s perception of Trump as a weakling, and his “peace through escalation” doctrine as nothing."

We can’t overlook that, before launching this latest counteroffensive, Russia consulted with China. Medvedev’s visit to Beijing wasn’t just symbolic; it was for consultations. Russia appears to have secured tacit agreements on two key points: China, at least through the first half of 2025, won’t block the flow of dual-use goods and won’t squeeze North Korea too hard when it comes to its support for Russia.

It’s also worth noting that Trump’s recent remarks about Canada being the 51st state, the Panama Canal, and buying Greenland all tie back to his trade war with China. From Trump’s perspective, these territories are part of the U.S.’s “backyard,” and China has no place there. Essentially, this echoes an updated version of the Monroe Doctrine. For us, the key takeaway is that the Kremlin assumes Trump, preoccupied with these matters (plus the Middle East), won’t pay much attention to Russia or Ukraine.

Putin’s stance may be utopian, but we should keep a few points in mind:

• As I’ve mentioned before, Putin is likely to approach negotiations with a “Finnish scenario” in mind (Ukraine formally giving up certain territories) and will, at least in the first stage (January–February), reject any alternative offers. This explains why the Americans are in no rush to begin talks.
• U.S. support for Ukraine is unlikely to diminish during this period.
• The key aspect of negotiations will hinge on U.S.-China relations. Both Ukraine and Russia are proxies in this broader conflict.

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About the author: Vadym Denysenko, political scientist.

The editorial staff does not always share the opinions expressed by the blog authors.