Losing Vuhledar: Causes and consequences

1. Significance of Vuhledar

The defense of Vuhledar stands as a heroic chapter for Ukrainian soldiers, who, for over two and a half years, inflicted massive losses on the Russian forces — far exceeding their own — while repelling two major offensives in 2022 and 2023. The city held strategic importance in southern Donbas — it was a key vantage point, an elevated urban stronghold that offered ideal radio horizons for drone surveillance and optimal firing positions for all types of weaponry.

2. Consequences

Retaining Vuhledar was crucial. Its loss is a serious blow with far-reaching strategic implications. A vital fortified area with numerous defensive positions and heavily mined fields has been lost. Now, Russian forces can push towards Velyka Novosilka from the east and Kurakhove from the south — both of which lack similarly favorable defensive lines. This development demands the urgent establishment of a new defense line to protect the borders of the Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia regions from eastern advances.

3. Timeliness of withdrawal, orders, and casualties

By September 24, the only route to Vuhledar — through Bohoyavlenka — was under Russian fire control, with their forces advancing to within 1,400 meters of the road. At this point, the "Donetsk" command (Colonel Lutsenko) should have ordered an organized withdrawal, as there was no capacity to break the siege. By September 26, Russian forces had effectively sealed off the city using drone strikes. Yet, the command delayed the order to retreat, instead insisting on holding the position. Finally, on the night of September 30 to October 1, the 72nd Brigade took matters into its own hands and began a withdrawal, understanding that continued defense was no longer feasible. The retreat, however, came at a cost due to the dense Russian fire. In those last four days, the brigade lost about 30 soldiers both in the city and during the withdrawal. At one position, five servicemen were captured by Russian forces and executed on the spot, it was captured by one of our drones.

4. Reasons for the loss of Vuhledar

• Lack of combat-ready reserves: The inability to replenish and reinforce the 72nd mechanized brigade, which was defending the city, played a crucial role. This responsibility falls squarely on the leadership of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
• Russia's numerical advantage: Russian forces outnumbered the 72nd mechanized brigade by at least 4 to 1. According to Russia’s Ministry of Defense, they deployed the 36th and 37th motorized rifle brigades, the 5th tank brigade, the 40th marine brigade, and the 403rd motorized rifle regiment, all bolstered by units of the 14th "special forces" brigade. In contrast, our forces consisted mainly of the 72nd brigade, alongside several poorly equipped battalions from the 125th and 123rd territorial defense units, which received no reinforcements. Five Russian formations, including special forces, were constantly resupplied, allowing them to sustain their offensive, while we struggled with depleted resources.
• Weak defense coordination: Tasks were assigned without considering the actual capabilities and combat readiness of our forces. There was insufficient attention paid to the integration of drones, electronic warfare (EW), and signals intelligence (ELINT) to shield troops from Russian drones. Vuhledar’s tactical position and its surrounding open spaces provided an ideal opportunity to strike advancing Russian forces with drones in collaboration with other systems, preserving infantry lives. However, the high command failed to concentrate sufficient drone units to deliver the necessary volume of strikes, which could have helped offset Russia’s infantry advantage.
• Ineffective counterattacks: For an extended period, under-strength and under-equipped territorial defense units were sent to counter Russian advances. Though they heroically delayed the enemy, they were unable to regain lost positions. Meanwhile, the 72nd brigade’s line battalions were given neither time to recover combat capability nor received reinforcements. The only substantial reinforcement sent in the last four months, the 1st assault battalion, was pulled much further north to engage with Russia’s 57th motorized rifle brigade and the 139th assault battalion due to the shortage of reserves for defense near Vuhledar.
• Inadequate secondary defensive line: A well-constructed second line of defense, pre-prepared and protected by minefields, could have halted Russian advances north of Vuhledar. Such a line was absent.

5. Concerning the death of Ihor Hryb, commander of the 186th battalion of the 123rd territorial defense brigade

I am gathering information and speaking with soldiers from the 123rd brigade. Soon, I will provide details on the circumstances of Ihor Hryb’s death, the actions of the 123rd brigade in the Vuhledar area, and the decisions regarding the brigade’s deployment and organization, along with their impact on the defense of the city.

Source

About the author: Yuriy Butusov, journalist

The editors do not always share the opinions expressed by the blog authors.