Impending threats: Russian strikes on energy sector, WWII-era mine procurement scandal. Serhiy Zgurets’ column

Russia’s strike on Ukraine

On the morning of January 15, Russia launched a missile strike on Ukraine. Russia targeted Ukraine's gas infrastructure in the Kharkiv region, as well as in Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk regions. Currently, there is no information on critical damage. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated that thanks to air defense and all involved units, Ukraine's power grid was able to remain operational. 

This map shows the directions from which Russian forces used missile weapons to strike Ukrainian energy infrastructure. To remind you, the most massive Russian missile strike occurred last November, when 263 missiles were used. In the latest attack, Russia used 117 missile airstrike systems, including 43 missiles. This suggests that, given the accumulation of Russian missiles, similar strikes may occur soon, especially with the onset of colder temperatures.

The missiles used by Russia included: one Iskander ballistic missile or a Korean missile, seven Kh-22 missiles, which are difficult to intercept, and four Kalibr sea-launched cruise missiles. There were also guided missiles. Among the cruise missiles, 27 were Kh-101s and the well-known Kh-55CMs.

The Kh-55CM is a missile also used by the Tu-95 bomber, but these missiles were equipped with iron blocks instead of warheads. These missiles are typically used by Russia for strategic nuclear forces as carriers of nuclear weapons. The versions with dummy warheads are used to distract attention and confuse Ukraine's air defense capabilities, as they still need to be intercepted, which is exactly what happened.

Overall, 80% of the missiles and almost all Shaheds and drone imitators (74 of the latter) were shot down, indicating a high effectiveness of the air defense system. Although Volodymyr Zelenskyy, in his commentary on the Russian missile attack, again mentioned that at the Ramstein meeting Ukraine's partners promised more air defense equipment, not all of it has been delivered yet. 

It was also discussed that Ukraine should be equipped with licensed production of these air defense systems and missiles. This is a very challenging direction, but it must be pursued, and we hope for the support of Ukraine's partners.

Ukraine's Defense Procurement Agency clarifies WWII-era mine contracts

Now, moving on to weaponry, but in a slightly different context. On January 14, we discussed a contract by the Defense Procurement Agency, a state-owned enterprise of Ukraine's Ministry of Defense, with a Bulgarian intermediary company for the purchase of several hundred thousand anti-tank mines. Indeed, anti-tank mines are critically needed, but this is the first time that mines over 80 years old are being procured for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, rather than received as aid. Under this contract, the Defense Procurement Agency is set to purchase hundreds of thousands of M6A2 anti-tank mines with detonators.

The cost of each mine is around 600 euros per unit. According to the document, the production year of the mines is 1941 and beyond. That is, these mines were produced roughly from 1944 to 1945. They were later decommissioned by the U.S. Army as they did not fully meet the requirements for tank warfare. However, the key question raised in our publications was whether these mines are truly suitable for use after being stored for 80 years. What happens to the TNT? What happens to the detonators? And, of course, the price of these mines.

The Bulgarian intermediary in the contract stated that it guarantees the product is suitable for operation. Following this information, the state-owned Defense Procurement Agency issued the official comment.

The Agency revealed some details of this process, which I find quite positive, as such a response took place. The Agency notes that the contract for the purchase of mines was signed without financial obligations.

As the Agency emphasizes, this contract with the Bulgarian intermediary allows for reserving the goods in warehouses without risking money. The purchase of these mines depends on a positive conclusion from a technical inspection of all the products with the involvement of the end user, such as representatives of Ukraine's General Staff, including conducting field tests of each batch of goods from this production.

However, it is worth clarifying certain details that the Agency will likely comment on later regarding the reservation of goods mentioned by the Agency. In reality, this is an exaggeration because the intermediaries know that only Ukraine is willing to buy these mines with such a storage time delay. The question remains as to what terms Ukraine will agree to and how Ukraine will react.

The contract, which is likely concluded, stipulates that Ukraine pays a 10% advance, with the total sum of the contract amounting to several hundred million euros. However, the technical inspection mentioned by the Agency takes place only before the ordered batch is shipped and before the remaining 90% of the amount is paid.

Regarding the technical inspection, it turns out that the intermediary supplier set conditions that the Ukrainian commission should consist of no more than three people and the inspection should last no longer than three days. I hope the Agency can secure more reasonable conditions for conducting the inspection in the country where these mines are stored.

Another detail concerns the price of these mines. In fact, the Agency has not commented on the pricing, but there is one point. I recall that the same mines currently contracted by the Agency at 590 euros per unit were offered to Ukraine by another intermediary company just a few months ago at a price of around 250 euros. However, at that time, this price was considered inadequate.

Now, some time after the intermediary company was changed, the price has risen to 590 euros per mine, and the Agency has signed such a contract. So, I think these details lead to certain reflections. As for the anti-tank mines, Ukrainian military will indeed use both old and new mines. They will find ways to apply them on the battlefield, but the key issue is that the price should correspond to the risk.

In fact, we understand that the pricing of the product is currently the most challenging aspect of evaluating this contract with the Bulgarian intermediary. It can be executed if the Ministry of Defense can find the funds to purchase these anti-tank mines. So, there are other details of this contract, and we will have to wait and see how the situation develops and add more details regarding the interaction with the Defense Procurement Agency.

Mobilization issues

This week, the latest issue of "Reflections" was released. It is an analytical product published by the Defense Information Consortium. The first article is titled "What Concerns the Expert Community in Ukraine Regarding War and National Defense Capacity." It covers six problem areas. I wanted to start with these problem areas, but I see that the first one concerns mobilization, problems with mobilization, and finding ways to strengthen the front line. This coincides with the high-profile events regarding the attempt to transfer aviation technicians from the Air Force to infantry. There have been statements from both the General Staff and the President of Ukraine, as well as pilots, arguing that this should not be done in the way proposed by the General Staff.

Valentyn Badrak, Director of the Center for Army, Conversion, and Disarmament Studies, military analyst, and co-founder of the Defense Information Consortium, which unites several analytical organizations in Ukraine, assessed this situation in the context of the challenges related to mobilization in the country.

"Let’s admit that if the very information, the message about specialists from the Air Force being transferred to the infantry, exists, it primarily indicates a critical shortage of personnel in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. And this means that the mobilization problem is not fully resolved. In fact, it’s not just unresolved; it hasn’t been solved at all, and this problem has taken on an existential significance. In my opinion, we need to move in several directions. One direction is for the authorities to take steps so that society understands and sees signs that mobilization is becoming more just. This is the biggest problem right now — the injustice of mobilization and the attempt to mobilize people for the war, while on the other hand, there is a bloated government apparatus, twice or three times bigger than necessary," he said.

The military analyst also pointed out the large number of widespread corrupt practices, where corrupt individuals remain unpunished.

"There are signs of a division within society, and this is also a result of the approach to mobilization that exists. The situation must urgently, immediately change in a way that reduces the government apparatus, cutting it by half, by three times. And we should stop thinking about mobilizing 18-year-olds, but instead redirect those 'reserve' personnel from the government to the military. We need a review, an audit of these exemptions, as we still see nothing has changed in places like shopping malls, various McDonald's, and so on. We see many young people who could be joining the Armed Forces, among other things. Alongside this, it seems the issue of recruitment has emerged, but it’s not fully resolved. In particular, we are not utilizing opportunities that we could use. The logistics of recruitment. So, it’s not just about enlisting people into the Armed Forces, but also ensuring logistics, the transportation of these people, and working with intermediaries. All of this requires resources to be spent, and such resources need to be planned," he noted.

Valentyn Badrak pointed out that there are private military companies capable of bringing 5,000 people to Ukraine within 60 days: "And these are not just untrained individuals, but soldiers of various specialties with vast experience and honed skills. This is not being used."

"This is very problematic, and when people say it's a significant resource, the state must address these areas. Funds can be found by reallocating them from sectors not directly related to the war. This ranges from cutting funding for telethons to postponing various road reconstruction projects. We've discussed this many times. Another point, not directly connected but impactful on mobilization and potentially stabilizing the situation, involves urgent decisions to scale up effective, successful brigades and modernize their organizational structure, transitioning from brigades to divisions. This should include assigning less successful brigades and battalions under the command of effective ones. The transition to divisions should follow a process where, first, successful brigades manage their own recruitment. Second, they take full control over less effective brigades and also Territorial Defense brigades," he believes.

Ending practice of fighting with attached units

In his opinion, the practice of deploying attached units to the hottest directions discourages mobilization.

"Completely abandon the practice of fighting with attached units, as this has already become a negative trend of the war and simply deters people from mobilizing. Attached units are recklessly and arrogantly thrown into the hottest directions, practically ensuring that the chances of survival are minimal. This essentially undermines mobilization, damages society, and makes the situation critically severe today. Therefore, a complete review, a thorough revision, and all this must be done urgently. For example, we know that at the end of November, the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces decided to transition to a corps-brigade organizational structure, but at the same time, this issue is supposedly still being studied and researched," said the military analyst.

He emphasized that there is no time for such thorough studies now because every day and every hour impacts the situation.

"And the arguments of the General Staff that transitioning to a corps-division organizational structure is too expensive, too resource-intensive, and problematic — I, for one, do not accept these arguments. Everything must now be subordinated to the goal of uniting and ensuring the survival of the nation, increasing resilience in this war. All resources and everything necessary must be applied precisely for this purpose. Unfortunately, the rear operates as if in peacetime, while the army and those on the front line live in wartime conditions. This lag behind the lines creates a situation where society becomes divided," said Valentyn Badrak.

He emphasized that the army's supply situation also contributes to the negativity, citing the recent scandal over defective mines.

"For example, when it comes to mines, we see today that unprofessional and clumsy management in the state defense industry sector has led to a situation where significant harm was caused, and we can even talk about the failure of the mine program. If we're already talking about 100,000 mines, it's clear evidence of a failure. Who is to blame for this? Today, there is an attempt to place the blame on the heads of enterprises. For instance, in the summer, the head of the Zirka factory was replaced, and now a replacement is being prepared for the head of the Artem factory. But all of this is an attempt to shift responsibility away from those truly accountable. Responsibility should lie with those who managed Ukroboronprom and the Ministry of Strategic Industries at the time when mine production and the mine program were being developed. These are the individuals who should be held directly accountable, as this falls within their area of responsibility. There is also evidence of violations in the technological cycle during mine production.

Who is responsible for this? Factory directors testify that they were given instructions verbally or by phone, which led to violations by the Ministry of Strategic Industries, as it directly interfered with the economic activities of enterprises. Meanwhile, the Ministry can only rely on its regulatory function. As a result, a whole range of these problems and abuses remains without accountability. The worst part is when individuals outside the constitutional framework of decision-making — specifically, these five or six so-called effective managers of Zelenskyy — bear no responsibility for the decisions they make and their mistakes. This is a disgraceful situation that impacts all fronts of this war," noted military expert and director of the Center for Army, Conversion, and Disarmament Studies, Valentyn Badrak.