How Ukraine's Kursk operation shattered Russia's hopes to freeze war

More precisely, it's not Russia as a whole, but a specific old man, whose continuation of the war threatens his power and life more than its end. Until then, all talk of peace is just talk.

It’s entirely possible that we are nearing the point where Russia’s economy or military system collapses. Or perhaps we’re not close yet.

Until that moment, we are dealing with three undeniable facts:

1. The Russians have more resources, from manpower to shells and missiles. While Ukraine can offset the latter two to some extent, it cannot compensate for the first.
2. Ukraine remains the underdog in this war. This could have changed in 2022, but Ukraine's esteemed partners were somewhat frightened by both its success and their own. However, there’s no point lamenting the past - it’s already happened.
3. The main advantage of a nation-state over an imperial autocracy persists: Ukraine has greater internal resilience even under greater external pressure. Yes, the much-discussed societal "division" remains largely confined to social media.

Overall, the lack of noticeable successes (the Ukrainian Armed Forces had been retreating in Donbas for many months before Kursk), combined with real exhaustion, exacerbated by Russian propaganda and local collaborators, allowed Russia to promote its narrative of "negotiations" in a format favorable to itself - a format of actual capitulation. This created the impression that a protracted conflict would deplete Ukraine's and its partners' resources much faster than Russia's.

The Russian narrative relied on the myth of “Fortress Russia,” supposedly impossible to attack. Strikes on the Kursk region revealed significant vulnerabilities in this fortress. Moreover, long-range strikes undermine the faith of the Russian so-called society in the government's ability to guarantee security even in remote regions.

Successful operations in the Kursk region (including ongoing defense efforts) have proven that Ukraine is not in a hopeless situation. On the contrary, demonstrating strength and the ability to strike Russian rear targets has shown that Ukraine can seize the strategic initiative if it gains more resources.

We need to reduce the resource deficit, and we have significant challenges with this, but Russia's victory in the "war of attrition" is not an inevitable scenario.

Yes, the Kursk operation did not stop the Russians in Donbas (and even if the forces involved had been sent to Donbas, it wouldn’t have stopped them), but it at least delayed their plans for a new offensive on Sumy and Chernihiv. The fact that Russia was forced (and for Russia, it was indeed forced) to enlist fighters from North Korea proves their vulnerability, even in a city where they seemed to have the greatest advantage. It comes down to the human factor.

Read also: Strikes deep into Russia: Biden's logic

The decision to approve ATACMS was made before the elections, but it was after the Kursk operation that the current, very cautious administration in the U.S. realized that these strikes are part of the necessary defense and have a clear strategic justification. As part of the necessary defense, the war must be taken to Russian territory.

You might say that Trump will overturn all of this and force Ukraine into catastrophic concessions? And then its successes in Kursk will be in vain, and what was lost in Donbas won't be regained. Yes, such a risk exists.

But in reality, the entire narrative about "territorial negotiations" (including the idea of "preserving what we still have at the cost of concessions") distorts the true nature of this war. This war is, in essence, about the sovereignty of Ukraine and the Ukrainian people.

Sovereignty is best guaranteed by weapons, the economy, and strong relationships with partners. Therefore, any format of resolution or freezing that limits these aspects is unacceptable to Ukraine. Anything that doesn't limit them can be considered, even if Russia retains temporary control over something until the current regime falls. But Russia must be brought to this "dialogue," which the Kursk operation has advanced.

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About the author. Yuriy Bohdanov, journalist, specialist in strategic communications in business, public administration, and politics.

The editors don't always share the opinions expressed by the blog authors.