Depletion of Russian air defense exposes rear regions to strikes

The high efficiency of these strikes in the rear of the aggressor country raises an important question: where is Russia's air defense?

Ukrainian military observer Oleksandr Kovalenko has analyzed recent strikes on Russia's infrastructure and air defense losses in Putin's war on Ukraine.

At first glance, the strike on Engels might seem like part of Ukraine’s systematic operations against enemy rear positions, and to some extent, it is. However, there is one significant nuance, Kovalenko notes.

Even during the Soviet era, its airspace was never reliably and fully protected by layered air defense systems. The Soviet Union lacked the resources to establish dense air defense across its vast territory, prioritizing western regions instead.

After the USSR's collapse, the situation didn’t improve significantly; in fact, Russia’s ability to secure its airspace further declined.

As of 2021–2022, the most protected airspace in Russia was around Moscow and the Moscow region, followed by the temporarily occupied Crimea, with third place going to regions bordering EU countries that housed strategic facilities, including Saratov region. What’s the situation now?

Currently, controlled fuel burning continues at the Engels oil depot after “falling debris” destroyed at least three tanks with a capacity of 120,000 cubic meters each, damaged six more tanks, and left the strategic aviation fleet without 800,000 tons of fuel.

How did one of Russia's most protected regions become vulnerable to relentless Ukrainian drone strikes?

Air defense losses

In the third year of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, the aggressor’s air defense forces have suffered critical losses, affecting their combat effectiveness not only on the front lines but also in Russia's rear.

According to Ukraine’s General Staff, Russia has lost more than 1,040 air defense units, including destroyed, damaged, and captured systems, during the invasion.

Based on monitoring and OSINT data, the losses include:

• 9K33 Osa: 30–40 verified, or up to 60–70 unverified
• 9K35 Strela-10: 50–60 verified, or up to 100
• Buk-M1/2/3: Over 90 verified, or up to 150
• Tor-M1/2: Around 60 verified, or up to 100
• Pantsir-S1: Around 30 verified, or over 50
• S-300/400 systems: Around 30 verified, or over 50

Additionally, approximately 100 radars of various types have been confirmed destroyed, with unverified reports indicating up to 150 lost.

At first glance, these losses might not seem catastrophic compared to tank losses (over 9,750) or armored vehicles (over 20,270). However, air defense systems are far more difficult to replace. Many of the lost systems are no longer produced in Russia.

While Russia loses dozens of air defense systems monthly, it can only produce a handful. In the war's third year, air defense has become one of the most deficient categories for Russia, with gaps filled by redeploying systems from distant regions to the front lines or nearby rear areas.

Production challenges

The Russian defense industry struggles particularly with producing radar systems, especially those used in S-300 and S-400 complexes. Sanctions and the lack of foreign components have made radar production one of the most resource-intensive tasks.

The situation has become so dire that Russia deployed unique Arctic-designed Pantsir-SA systems to protect the Moscow region. These systems, mounted on DT-30PM tracked vehicles, are equipped with only missile components and lack cannons.

In August 2024, a prototype Pantsir-S1M was spotted on the Kerch Bridge, originally developed for export to hot climates. Similarly, in November, a Tor-M2KM system on a KamAZ chassis, intended for Armenia, was seen in Russia's Kursk region.

These examples show how Russia scrambles to reinforce its air defense with whatever is available.

Foreign assistance

Another telling example is Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's request to Vladimir Putin to expedite the delivery of S-400 systems, a contract Russia has repeatedly delayed.

In 2018, India ordered 11 divisions of S-400 systems, equivalent to five regiments, with delivery expected by 2024. Russia delivered three regiments on time, but since the full-scale war began, the remaining deliveries have been delayed until at least 2026. Even this timeline seems unlikely given Russia's production struggles.

On January 12, footage surfaced of a Russian FPV drone striking a North Korean Pongae M-2020 short-range air defense system, analogous to the Tor-M2. This was the first confirmed use of North Korean air defense systems by Russia, indicating that Moscow has sought assistance from Pyongyang to address its shortages.

Conclusions

In the third year of the invasion, Russian air defense is no longer in a phase of regular replenishment but rather a desperate reshuffling of dwindling resources. As a result, a unified layered air defense system no longer exists, allowing Ukrainian drone strikes to become increasingly effective and damaging.

While Ukraine’s current successes rely on drone strikes amid Russia’s air defense depletion, 2025 could see the deployment of far more destructive weaponry.

Ukraine has only just begun, while Russia is already unprepared to counter even these “early warnings.”