Can Russia сontinue to fight Ukraine for another decade

Oleksandr Kovalenko, a military and political observer with the Information Resistance group, shared his analysis on whether Russia has the capacity to fight for so many years in an article for Obozrevatel.

Human Resources

When discussing human resources in the context of Russia, it's often claimed that they are infinite, which is not true. While Russia's potential is extremely large compared to most countries, its mobilization capacity is also constrained by its repressive system, says the observer.

Now, the offensive of the occupying Russian army is estimated to result in the loss of one soldier for every 2.5-4 square meters of Ukrainian territory. 

Russian forces are projected to have up to 400,000 personnel casualties by the end of 2024, assuming combat operations continue at the current intensity. This means that the average monthly casualties will consistently surpass 30,000-35,000 soldiers. Russia has already been mobilizing 35,000 to 40,000 people per month for the war in Ukraine this year. However, Russia's mobilization system can only handle 60,000 to 70,000 individuals per month; anything beyond that would overload it.

Russia should mobilize 3 million over 10 years to compensate for losses due to the fighting in Ukraine. Currently, 530,000 personnel are involved, and their numbers are expected to increase. It's possible that Russia will continue to increase its personnel by 100,000-150,000 annually. This means that Russia should mobilize at least 450,000 personnel per year, or 37,000-38,000 per month, to compensate for losses and other needs.

Russia can afford these indicators, but there's a catch. The level of training and equipment directly affects the rate of personnel losses. During mobilization, the low level of training and equipment will cause the number of casualties to increase. With current combat intensity, the need for mobilization will grow, reaching a limit of 60,000-70,000 per month, estimates the oberver.

Military equipment

Russia's supply of Soviet tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery in storage is running low. The situation is most critical for main battle tanks and armored fighting vehicles, and somewhat better for barrel artillery.

Russia has about a year's supply of main battle tanks to compensate for losses, but there are fewer and fewer repairable ones. And repair processes now take much more time and energy resources than in 2022 and 2023. Thus, every month Russia is able to transfer fewer and fewer refurbished tanks to the troops, which in turn reduces the monthly loss compensation rate.

At the beginning of 2024, Russia had:

• T-90A and T90S - up to 100 tanks, with existing production averaging 50 tanks per year;
• T-72 - about 1,500 tanks of varying degrees of maintainability, with no production;
• T-80 - about 800 tanks of varying degrees of maintainability, with no production;
• T-62 - up to 600 units, with no production;
• T-54/55 - up to 600 tanks of varying degrees of repairability, with no production.

The total number of tanks in storage in a relatively and conditionally repairable condition was 3,600 six months ago. Currently, the number is much lower. The situation is similar with the armored fighting vehicles. Although the production of new ones is better than that of tanks, the need for these vehicles is almost three times higher.

Soviet artillery stocks in Russia in the categories of “put into service” and “in storage” tentatively amounted at the beginning of 2024:

• D-20 (152-mm) - about 100 (about 1,000 in storage);
• D-30 (122-mm) - about 450 (about 4,000 in storage);
• Msta-B (152-mm) - about 450 (in storage about 550);
• Giatsint-B (152-mm) - about 100 (in storage about 1 thousand);
• Gvozdika 2S1 (122-mm) - about 400 (about 1,200 in storage);
• Akatsiya 2S3 (152-mm) - about 700 (about 800 in storage);
• Giatsint 2S5 (152-mm) - about 150 (about 500 in storage);
• Msta-S 2S19 (152-mm) - about 400 (in storage about 150);
• Pion 2S7 (203-mm) - about 100 (in storage about 100);
• Nona-S 2S9 (120-mm) - about 300 (in storage about 500);
• Nona-SVK 2S23 (120-mm) - about 30 (in storage 0);
• Tyulpan 2S4 (240-mm) - about 30 (150 in storage).

The list did not include 120-mm mortars of the 2B11 type, 82-mm BM-37, 100-mm MT-12 Rapira anti-tank gun, 85-mm D-44 divisional gun, and others. The "in storage" category indicated the quantity tentatively suitable for restoration and can be brought to a combat-ready condition.

All these figures indicate that the potential for recovery and compensation for losses in the main battle tanks and armored fighting vehicles categories does not exceed the potential for half a year or even less. In the artillery category, this figure may exceed a year to a year and a half.

In any case, none of these indicators confirms that Russia has a 10-year warfighting potential. It will be exhausted, depending on the category, by the end of 2024 and during 2025. This will lead to a decrease in the ability to compensate for losses and, as a consequence, a worsening of the situation with the manning of units, which will lead to an increase in casualties.

"Russia can really fight for 10 years, but it has such a possibility only in the category of human resource. But it does not solve offensive tasks without mechanized support," the expert concludes.