Russian forces in tight spot following Ukraine’s retreat from Velyka Novosilka. Serhiy Zgurets’ column
The village of Velyka Novosilka held strong during the defense in 2022 and became a focal point of Russia’s counteroffensive in 2023. Under pressure, the Ukrainian Defense Forces have retreated from Velyka Novosilka in 2025
Appointment of a new commander of the Khortytsia troop grouping
Since Sunday, January 26, Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi has been appointed by Volodymyr Zelenskyy as the commander of the Khortytsia operational-strategic grouping, replacing Andriy Hnatov, who has moved to the position of Deputy Chief of Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The Khortytsia unit is responsible for the area spanning from Kupyansk to the Lyman direction and down to Velyka Novosilka, covering some of the most challenging and critical regions.
Currently, there are at least seven such challenging areas where Russian forces hold the initiative, and where at least half of the entire Russian troop grouping is concentrated. This means that half of the 570,000 Russian troops in the Khortytsia area are focused on these regions.
Mykhailo Drapatyi will combine his new position with his current position as commander of the Land Forces, just as Oleksandr Syrskyi, Ukraine's Commander-in-Chief, did. Drapatyi, 42 years old, is part of the new generation of Ukrainian military leaders, having begun his service as a serviceman 10 years ago. He has earned significant trust within the army, and there is great hope that he will bring stability to a challenging front line. As some have said: "Let's hope for the talent of the new commander."
Personally, I don't expect a quick miracle, as this situation requires tackling deep-rooted systemic issues within the Defense Forces — such as a shortage of infantry and reserves, and management challenges stemming from the differing styles of combat operations carried out by various groupings and battalions. Therefore, Drapatyi will need to simultaneously plan and execute combat operations on a challenging section of the front while also prioritizing reserve training and restructuring staff.
We must also keep in mind the need to transition to divisions or corps, which would address the inconsistencies in the use and deployment of individual brigades. And all of this responsibility falls on one person. This is an incredibly challenging task for Mykhailo Drapatyi, but we remain hopeful that he will succeed.
This raises the question of increasing the number of people who can be entrusted with such complex tasks and the need to provide opportunities for other young officers and generals to demonstrate their dedication and professionalism across different sections of the front.
On the situation on the Velyka Novosilka front line
First of all, let me mention the situation near Velyka Novosilka. This village, which withstood the defense in 2022, became one of the centers of the counteroffensive in 2023. Under Russian pressure, the Ukrainian troops withdrew from Velyka Novosilka in 2025. Objectively, this is a rather serious loss in this area, as it is associated with both a lack of fighters and certain miscalculations in defense.
Let’s recall an example from after the capture of Vuhledar, when Russian forces rapidly advanced from Zolota Nyva, moving between the Kashlahach and Shaitanka rivers from the northeast toward Velyka Novosilka. There were no mined roads or anti-tank weapons to slow them down. This is just one small fragment of how the invading forces quickly pushed toward Velyka Novosilka, then implemented their strategy of flanking and cutting off logistics routes.
For three months, the Ukrainian military held the line in extremely difficult conditions, in an operational environment. Of course, this raised the question: what will happen next? Because the Ukrainian garrison was encircled from the north, south and east. And to the west is the Mokri Yaly River, which Ukrainian troops had to cross. And this was the only way to ensure the replenishment of Ukraine's military grouping in this area.
On January 26, there was positive and significant news from Ukraine's 110th Separate Mechanized Brigade, which held the line in the Velyka Novosilka area. The soldiers of this brigade stated: “From areas where encirclement was a threat, our units skillfully withdrew, using the weather to their advantage. This doesn't mean we've completely left the city, as fighting continues in Velyka Novosilka.” In other words, all actions are currently aimed at minimizing their own losses and maximizing the damage to their enemy.
Now, we are talking about the fact that if Russian troops have entered Velyka Novosilka and Ukrainian forces have retreated beyond the Mokry Yaly River, Russian troops are now in extremely difficult conditions. This is because there is a new line of defense further ahead. The 110th Brigade is currently inflicting as much damage as possible on Russian forces, as they are unable to move forward and are hindered by the Mokry Yaly River.
We will see what happens later and how the situation will develop. There are also dominant heights where a new defense line has already been built, and I hope it meets Ukrainian forces' needs. We will assess where Russian troops will move after their regrouping, but the main markers show that they will concentrate their efforts in the direction of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk.
This will be a priority area for the invading Russian forces, given that key logistics are established there and it aligns with their political objectives of capturing as much of the Donetsk region as possible. We will see whether the Russians succeed. The outcome will depend on the forces and resources they commit, as well as the countermeasures the Ukrainian Armed Forces deploy in response to these attempts.
Siversk direction
Russian forces will also likely attempt to intensify their actions in other areas. One such area is the Siversk direction. While it may not appear to be as active, it holds significant importance in terms of Russian intentions.
Mykola Hrytsenko, junior lieutenant, chief of staff of the 4th battalion of Ukraine’s Rubizh brigade from the Siversk direction, said that over the past 2-3 months Russian forces have become more active, intensifying their offensive and assault operations in an attempt to break through Ukrainian front line. The Rubizh Brigade is standing at one of the hotspots of the conflict in this area. Russian troops are attacking in various ways, including on foot, using armored vehicles, and more mobile vehicles such as motorcycles, buggies, and cars.
The junior lieutenant emphasized that the most effective way to counter Russian troops is by targeting and destroying their firepower and UAV takeoff points. Russian forces are also actively working against Ukrainian units, understanding that drones are their most effective tool. As a result, they try to locate Ukrainian UAV takeoff points and target them, often launching offensive and assault operations. However, thanks to the Ukrainian military’s ability to analyze and establish additional combat launch points for UAVs, the Russians are unable to act swiftly. When Ukrainian forces detect the takeoff points of Russian drones, they immediately destroy them. Without their "eyes" on the battlefield, the Russians become vulnerable, unable to conduct effective assault operations, leaving them in a dead-end defensive position.
The junior lieutenant added that when Russian soldiers detect Ukrainian positions, they relentlessly target them around the clock by "tamping" on them with fire. Ukrainian soldiers, however, do not operate in the same way; they conserve ammunition, as it is not as abundant as the Russians’. Despite this, they have access to mortar and artillery ammunition. Ukrainian forces cannot conduct counter-battery operations as effectively as the Russians, but they cover these tasks with the help of UAVs. However, they can easily destroy Russian soldiers on the approaches using artillery and mortars, thanks to the training and coordination of Ukrainian mortar and artillery personnel.
Hrytsenko noted that Russian forces use aviation on a daily basis, with various types of guided bombs frequently targeting the brigade's area of responsibility. They primarily focus on striking decision-making centers — such as headquarters and logistics points — rather than the front line. However, their efforts have not been very successful. They are unable to conduct effective reconnaissance, as Ukrainian FPV drones are quickly destroying Russian aircraft. Russian troops often strike indiscriminately — targeting fields or unknown houses. Despite their attempts, their air strikes are largely ineffective.
The officer explained that there is enough time to train the soldiers who join the brigade after mobilization. First, there is a stage of general military training that lasts at least 2 months, then another month of coordination within the unit, so that a person understands how the unit works. Only after these stages does the fighter take up positions, not on the front line, and adapt to the realities of war. And if he manages to cope with that load, then he can serve on the front line.
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