Ben Hodges: Balance is beginning to shift slightly in Ukraine’s favor

What is your assessment of the current strategic situation, especially in view of the recent visit of the President of Ukraine to the United States, where the Ukrainian Victory Plan was presented. This document is largely classified or confidential, but how do you think the United States reacted to this plan, and what possible changes in the policy of the American establishment do you foresee?

I'm disappointed that the U.S. Administration did not fully address all of President Zelenskyy's requests or the plan he presented to the American leadership. I'm also disappointed that we still seem to be more concerned about provoking Russia instead of defeating it.

Furthermore, I believe we will regret this for a long time to come. However, I don’t think this will change with the current administration.

After the next election, if it's a Harris administration, I believe we will see more decisive and positive action.

How seriously should we take Russian nuclear threats? Is Putin attempting to intimidate certain Western partners, and who do you think he is targeting in this regard?

Of course, we have to take the threat seriously because Russia has thousands of nuclear weapons, and they clearly do not care how many innocent people they kill, even their own, so you can't just ignore it. However, I think it is very, very unlikely that Russia would use a nuclear weapon because there is no benefit for them in doing so. The benefit for Russia comes from the threat itself. They see that the threat works, particularly with the United States and Germany. We hesitate to take certain actions because of it.

Once Russia uses a nuclear weapon, it’s no longer just a threat. There would be catastrophic consequences for Russia. Even China and India would not be able to continue supporting Russia because they know they would lose access to cheap oil and gas, which could become a target from the U.S. side as well. So, I believe the likelihood of Russia using a nuclear weapon is extremely low. 

When President Putin talks about a new doctrine, for example, or conducts nuclear exercises, these are all part of an information operation meant to keep reminding the U.S.: 'Hey, we have nuclear weapons,' because they see how we react and how worried we are about provocation. As a result, we are actually paralyzed.

We understand that Putin is capable of violating all relevant conventions, especially when it comes to the interests of the Russian Federation and China. We know that no one will openly discuss the potential actions Ukraine’s Western allies might take if the Russian Federation were to deploy nuclear weapons. However, I would like to hear your thoughts on whether such possibilities are being considered at all.

My president said almost three years ago that if Russia used a nuclear weapon, there would be “catastrophic consequences for Russia”. Of course, he did not specify what those consequences were, but clearly, I would anticipate that they would involve a combination of kinetic strikes not – nuclear, but long-range weapons – that would destroy what’s left of the Russian Black Sea Fleet or other Russian assets outside the sovereign territory of Russia. There are also many more economic measures we could take that would be severely damaging to Russia. These are the kinds of things I would expect to happen.

Certainly, I think even some of the countries that are not pro-Ukraine but tolerate Putin would find it difficult to ignore if Vladimir Putin, from his permanent seat on the UN Security Council, were to use a nuclear weapon. It would be hard for those countries to simply look the other way on something like that. Accountability for Vladimir Putin, however, will start when the Russian people finally decide that he has ruined Russia – its reputation around the world, and its future.

When the Russian people finally remove him from office, in whatever form that may take, perhaps, just like when Serbia handed over Milosevic to the International Criminal Court, Russia might hand over Vladimir Putin. I don’t know if that will happen, but I think that’s the only way we’ll see him face a legal court process.

How might the current crisis in the Middle East impact the Russian-Ukrainian war and the United States' support for Ukraine? Some of the support that could have been allocated to Ukraine may now be redirected to the Middle East.

I may be mistaken, but it seems that these two theaters of war are interconnected. Iran is a hostile nation that provides Russia with ballistic missiles, while Israel is a close ally of the United States. In this context, how could the crisis in the Middle East influence the Russian-Ukrainian conflict?

This is a very interesting and important question because I also believe that the conflicts between Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Iran are connected. Iran has no true allies in the world except for Russia, and if Ukraine defeats Russia, Iran becomes more isolated and will have less ability to support Hezbollah, the Houthis, or Hamas – their proxies.

So, there’s a benefit for Israel if Ukraine defeats Russia, which means there’s also a benefit for the United States and its allies in the Middle East. On the other hand, if Israel is able to either destroy the Iranian regime or diminish Iran’s capabilities, Iran will be less able to supply drones and ballistic missiles to Russia. This would also benefit Ukraine. If Israel is successful against Iran, it strengthens both Israel and Ukraine.

What the United States should be doing is supporting Ukraine and Israel in defeating two of the biggest threats we face. This is an opportunity to do so.

I don’t understand why the current administration allows our pilots to fly missions in Israeli airspace against Iranian missiles and has the U.S. Navy shooting down Houthi missiles in the Red Sea, but is unwilling to take similar actions in Ukraine. I think this is a terrible policy decision by the administration, and I can only hope that when there is a new administration, they will be much more proactive and take these necessary actions.

My next question is whether, in light of the new NATO Secretary General's appointment, any additional measures will be taken to enhance missile and air defense across the European continent against Russian missile threats, including ballistic missiles?

Well, of course, unfortunately, it’s not within the authority of the Secretary General to decide if the United States or Germany, for example, are not willing to allow it. In the alliance, as with all things, one nation can block anything. I don’t see a change happening just because the Secretary General wants it. It’s good that the Secretary General is more forward-leaning, and perhaps we could move in that direction if he can get all the nations to agree. But, of course, each nation is sovereign and can make its own decisions.

Whether it’s Poland, Romania, or the Baltic countries, individual nations have the authority to act on their own. However, it’s not quite that simple. The biggest problem is that the United States and Germany are not willing to support this, and that’s where we need to see a change in policy.

I would like to ask you about the strategic resources of our adversary, the Russian Federation. At one point, we hoped that the enemy would exhaust themselves, but we can see that Russia remains offensively active and is seeking support from its partners—North Korea, Iran, and others. We have delivered significant blows to their strategic arsenals, particularly in the city of Toropets in the Tver region and beyond. 

How do you assess this ongoing competition to deplete their resources? The enemy regularly targets the territory of Ukraine, hitting both our military and civilian facilities. What is their capacity to sustain the war, which they have characterized as a "protracted war"?

Of course, Russia is able to keep doing what it’s doing because of ammunition from North Korea, parts from China, and drones and missiles from Iran. But they are also able to continue because India and China are buying oil and gas from Russia.

If we could stop the export of Russian oil and gas to India and China, Russia wouldn’t have the money to purchase ammunition and drones from North Korea or Iran. Additionally, we know that some critical components for Russian weapons are made in the United States, sent to India, and then end up in Russian weapons. So, there are many holes in the sanctions regime.

Every machine, whether in a factory or an armored vehicle, requires lubrication for metal, and there’s a particular kind of lubricant needed for heavy machinery. A Chinese company, which is the largest producer of this lubricant, has an American subsidiary in Virginia. So, we need to track down all these networks and business setups to gradually choke off the external support that keeps Russia in the fight.

Now, we are hearing that Russia is finally experiencing some shortages of ammunition, while Ukrainian forces are not only good at producing their own drones but also at using artillery ammunition with scatterable submunitions—hundreds of small warheads inside a larger one. These have been very effective in targeting Russian artillery. So, I think the balance is beginning to shift slightly in Ukraine’s favor, though not enough yet.

Recently, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced that we are prepared to form 14 military brigades, but we currently have enough weapons for only four of them. This limitation has a direct impact on the course of the fighting. The situation in the southeast is extremely challenging, especially following the loss of Vuhledar. This issue extends beyond the city itself to include the dominant heights that provided control and stabilization of that section of the frontline. As a result, it may be necessary to make some additional, albeit unpopular, but swift decisions. In your opinion, what decisions could be made, and how serious is the situation given the loss of the Vuhledar heights?

I think there are two or three aspects of this that I see as an outsider. First, I trust the Ukrainian General Staff to make the best decisions because they know the Russian forces better than we do, they know their own capabilities better than we do, and they know the geography and terrain better than we do. So, I trust their decisions.

Second, yes, losing Vuhledar and other cities in this area is difficult psychologically. You hate to lose a town where you've fought so hard for so long.

But before we decide, 'Oh my God, this is a strategic failure,' we need to keep in mind that Russia is not able to fully exploit these captures. Whether it’s Avdiivka, Bakhmut, or now Vuhledar, they are losing tens of thousands of soldiers and equipment for very, very minor gains. They don’t have the capability to overrun everything and, for example, reach Dnipro.

I think the general staff is using the right tactics with what they have to prevent Russia from achieving any significant breakthroughs. At the same time, I applaud the decision to launch a counteroffensive in the direction of Kursk. This creates a real problem for the Russians, and I believe there is likely pressure on Putin to deal with this. It also puts Ukraine in a better negotiating position when the time comes.

This will certainly be a challenge for Ukraine moving forward, but people should not lose sight of the fact that after over 10 years of conflict, with Russia having every advantage, Ukraine still controls over 80% of its territory, and its army is growing in size and capability. So, I remain optimistic, especially if the United States—with a new Administration—and Germany decide that a Ukrainian victory is in our strategic interests

Currently, the Russian forces are actively utilizing the tactics of small infantry groups while consistently building up their reserves of personnel. In light of Russian offensive strategy and tactics, General Hodges, what should we expect moving forward? How do you assess the situation?

It only works as long as they have bodies to put on the front lines. At some point, they will have to start recruiting young men from Moscow and St. Petersburg, and that will become a problem. It also only works as long as they have the artillery capability to keep pounding Ukrainian defenses and aircraft using glide bombs to hit Ukrainian defenders.

If Ukraine is able to destroy Russian artillery, headquarters, and logistics, this tactic will become ineffective because those elements—the logistics, artillery, airfields, and aircraft—are what make it possible. So, if Ukraine can degrade or destroy those, I believe this Russian approach will no longer work.

Guided bombs and the aviation component are crucial in this war. We have received a certain number of F-16s, which, as I understand, have performed exceptionally well. However, this issue is not only about the types of aircraft but also their quantity. Russian guided bombs are causing civilian casualties, and the Russians have begun to use them actively, not just against Kharkiv but also against Zaporizhzhia.

In your opinion, is there a possibility of acquiring additional aircraft to bolster our aviation component and effectively deter Russian tactical aviation?

I don't have any new information about what else is coming up. I hope other countries will continue to find ways to support Ukraine, but I don’t have any new insights on what more might be coming

What is your assessment of the rumors regarding the possible resignation of Commander Syrskyi? 

Well, of course, it wouldn’t be appropriate for me to comment on rumors about what’s happening within the Ukrainian leadership. However, what Ukraine has accomplished over the past few years, despite overwhelming odds and inconsistent support from the United States, is remarkable. Every Ukrainian commander, from the beginning until now, has had to fight against those Russian advantages. I think people should understand that none of the commanders or the general staff are perfect, but they’re all doing their best with what they have. Rumors about leadership changes are not healthy or helpful. Whoever the president selects as commander is the commander, and constant speculation about changes is to be expected, but I don’t think it’s productive.