Ukrainian victory: how do we see it?

On the contrary, after World War II, many wars ended with very uncertain outcomes that allowed for dozens of interpretations of who won and who lost.

Common examples are frozen or semi-frozen military conflicts without peace treaties or even armistices, when the front line turns into a quasi-stable line that can exist in this state for decades.

The main reason is that wars are no longer closed, localized events where there is an obvious advantage of one force over another, so the outcome is determined by the balance of power and the closeness of the conflict. Open wars are almost doomed to freeze, because there are many forces in the world that fuel the opponents to prevent them from losing.

“In less than a year, Russia's war against Ukraine has transformed unnoticed by many from a purely imperialist revanchist war into an almost global conflict (World War III), as today, primarily indirectly, dozens of countries are involved in it, and the number of such countries is growing rapidly.”

In less than a year, Russia's war against Ukraine has transformed unnoticed by many from a purely imperialist revanchist war into an almost global conflict (World War III), as today, primarily indirectly, dozens of countries are involved in it, and the number of such countries is growing rapidly.

About 50 democratic countries have united around Ukraine, providing us with various types of assistance; Russia has attracted world outcasts (North Korea, China, Iran, Syria, terrorist groups such as Hamas, Taliban, Hezbollah, and others) to its gang, helping it to circumvent sanctions.

We can state that for the first time in world history, the war has divided the world along a civilizational fault line: a democratic civilization is opposed to the aggressive military onslaught of an authoritarian-totalitarian civilization.

What do we want from victory?

- The ideal peace for Ukraine is an outcome of the war that gives Ukraine real long-term guarantees of non-aggression in the coming decades;

- Russia in its current borders, with its history, by definition, cannot transform into a democratic country living in peace with its neighbors. Under any government, it will sooner or later stabilize again in a renewed imperialist format, because it was not Putin who created such a Russia, it was such a Russia that elected a criminal like Putin to the throne. And it will continue to do so, up to complete, crushing defeat.

“Russia in its current borders, with its history, by definition, cannot transform into a democratic country living in peace with its neighbors. Under any government, it will sooner or later stabilize again in a renewed imperialist format, because it was not Putin who created such a Russia, it was such a Russia that elected a criminal like Putin to the throne. And it will continue to do so, up to complete, crushing defeat”

- Russia must withdraw all its troops from the territory of Ukraine beyond the 1991 borders;

- Russia's leadership and all executors of criminal orders must be brought before an international tribunal ("New Nuremberg") and be punished as they deserve;

- Russia must pay Ukraine in full all reparations and compensation for the economic consequences of the war;

- Peace must be guaranteed in Ukraine for the next 30 years, and this will only be possible when Russia is completely defeated, demilitarized and deruscifed (to get rid of Ruscism, meaning Russian fascism – ed.)

If the above axioms are not objectionable, then the understanding of Ukraine's victory should definitely be linked to Russia's crushing defeat in this war and its preferably controlled disintegration into a pile of fragments, some of which have little chance of becoming democratic countries in decades to come.

“The understanding of Ukraine's victory should definitely be linked to Russia's crushing defeat in this war and its preferably controlled disintegration into a pile of fragments, some of which have little chance of becoming democratic countries in decades to come.”

I have a degree in theoretical physics and therefore often reflect on aspects of probability theory. Everything stated in this essay is subjective opinions based on my perceptions of the world around us.

I would like to note right away that I am very much willing to be wrong in my assessments of the situation around and within our country.

I will try to outline four main options for the outcome of this war, as I see it, starting with the least likely and ending with the most likely:

The 1st option is ideal.

Ukraine, with the help of its allies, wins this war, Russia surrenders, international occupation forces control Russian territory, and under this control Russia is peacefully divided into natural parts that gradually become separate countries and in which, as a result of the coalition of allies, a new economic system, democratic system, political parties, democratic elections, an independent judiciary, and other components of democratic civilization begin to be systematically introduced.  World War II is an example.

The price is very high in both human and economic losses.

The 2nd option is a compromise.

The Armed Forces of Ukraine push Russian troops beyond the 1991 borders, and the war stops for a while. Russia remains within its borders, with an authoritarian regime, under certain sanctions because it does not agree to the terms of the winners, drags its feet on a peace treaty because it is not interested in it, dreams of revenge, gathers its strength, provokes clashes and shelling across the border, accumulates weapons and resources with the help of its rogue allies, and in a few years starts a new war against Ukraine. An example is the war in the Middle East.

The price is high human and economic losses.

The 3rd option is unsatisfactory.

Ukraine manages to liberate only a part of the territory, conditionally up to the line of February 23, 2022, there is no official truce, no peace treaty, because both sides do not want this, but want to continue the war, but no one has large forces, so there is no end to the war.

The price is moderate casualties.

The 4th option is hopeless.

After several powerful offensives and counter-offensives on both sides, this fall the front line becomes quasi-stable, no one has the strength to launch new offensives, the war becomes semi-frozen, mutual shelling continues with little activity, there are raids by subversive groups and provocations, and the situation of neither peace nor war becomes permanent, with no hope of a radical solution. An example is the war in Donbas between 2017 and 2022.

The price is minimal casualties.

Notes: It is clear that the abovementioned probability distribution of different options for a Ukrainian victory is not static, as it depends on many powerful factors (our motivation and our patience, the help of our allies, and most importantly, our ability to achieve mass social integration, and as a result, the timeframe for achieving national consensus). That is why we may see changes or even a rotation of neighboring positions over time.

The only thing that is not and will never be in this probability structure is our defeat.

Source

About the author. Joseph Zissels, member of the First of December Initiative Group.

The editors do not always share the opinions expressed by the authors of the blogs.