The more British anti-drone systems we get, the easier it will be to fight Russian UAVs. Serhiy Zhgrets column
Having means that can detect drones is very important for successful military operations of the Ukrainian Armed Forces
Military aid from France and Britain
Today it was revealed that Ukraine received two batteries of Crotale anti-aircraft systems from France as part of a package of other French weapons, which also includes launchers for projectiles. Crotale is an effective short-range air defense system, which can be used in the front area and to protect objects in the rear. It is mounted on a mobile chassis and can independently detect and destroy air targets. The target destruction range is up to 10 km. The system is equipped with 8 missiles and allows it to destroy 4 targets at once. We received two batteries. Their structure may vary; each may have up to nine launchers, so the exact number of launchers is unknown, but this is an important add-on to those air defense units already received from the US, Spain, Germany, Sweden or those that will be provided in the near future. Also, this weaponry is a good match with the supplies promised to us not only by France, but also by Great Britain. Let me remind you that yesterday the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Rishi Sunak, visited Ukraine and announced that there will be a special tranche for Ukraine, designed to counter Iranian-made ‘kamikaze drones’, and that we will be supplied with 20 guns from Great Britain and anti-drone systems. We've done a quick analysis of what weapons Britain can supply in terms of artillery. Most likely these are the products of the Swedish company Bofors, which is part of the British defense giant BAE Systems. This system can be used to combat drones. It is designed for naval purposes, but due to its small size, it can be installed on ground-based platforms and used to destroy air targets. The Mk 38 is a development based on the Bushmaster machine gun system and can destroy targets at a distance of up to 2.5 km. This is a good equipment unit, effective. The more we get them, the easier and more reliable it will be to fight against Russian UAVs and drones. In addition to the guns, we were also promised a number of anti-drone systems.
Defense Express expert on defense and technologies Anton Mikhnenko noted that a number of countries, in particular, Lithuania, are transferring anti-drone guns to us. Anti-drone guns are now in use. These are pretty good when used against civilian drones and at short distances, up to 5 km. In this context, they are effective. The distance is sometimes shorter, but these anti-drone guns play a role, especially when operating on a small civilian drone. Regarding the actual transfer of anti-drone systems from Great Britain, these are not anti-drone guns, but EW complexes against drones. Great Britain has its own good manufacturer. I will focus on the most famous manufacturer of anti-drone systems, the Blighter company. It manufactures the AUDC anti-drone system, which is designed to detect small drones and provides suppression of control, telemetry, and navigation signals, which are key signals used by drones to conduct reconnaissance. Undoubtedly, having anti-drone systems is very important today in the course of hostilities. We know how complex the radio-electronic situation is on the contact line. There is a very large number of various systems: means of communication, EW, radar. This is radio-electronic broadcasting, it is very saturated, so having means that can detect drones, suppress control, telemetry and navigation signals is a very important asset for the Armed Forces to conduct successful military operations.
Significant events in the Russian army
Russia withdrew part of its troops from the right bank of the Kherson region. The main question for everyone is: where will they try to redeploy these forces, i.e. in the direction of Zaporizhzhia or Donetsk and Luhansk. Combat operations are quite active there, and Russia has concentrated its key forces in the Donetsk direction, it is trying to break through to the border of Donetsk region and Luhansk region and fulfill the priority task set at the beginning of the "special operation". The second point dominating the infospace is the possibility that Russia may continue the mobilization in January-February. Both Russians and us saw that the resource thrown in the first wave of mobilization was not effective. Russia only managed to partially stop the advance of Ukrainian troops, and lost the right bank of the Kherson region. The Russian Federation will try to replenish the resources lost during this operation through new waves of mobilization in January-February. The main question is to what extent they will be able to ensure the fulfillment of the tasks that Putin sets before the Russian army. After all, there are certain characteristics i.e. the capacity of the system itself to prepare the necessary number of personnel for the troops. Training grounds are capable of accepting approximately 70,000 people. Regarding the ability of the Russian system to get recruits, it is used to work in such a way that they call up approximately 120 thousand military personnel in spring and the same number at the end of a year. The Russian army can get a maximum of 300,000 people per year. If the mobilization lasts for one to two months, then their system would not be able to digest 300,000 potential recruits. Personnel training is also important. We see that the training system that exists in Russia today is not able to train military personnel with enough skills to be able to conduct modern combat operations. Roughly speaking, they can shoot three to six rounds, throw a grenade, get the opportunity to climb into a trench so that a tank passes over a soldier, but no more. Therefore, the personnel training system itself is also an important factor that will strongly influence the character of the military and the ability to perform the tasks of those who will be mobilized in the next wave.
The state of the military-industrial complex of the Russian Federation
The military economy in the Russian Federation is gradually changing to fulfill military needs. They are trying to bring the defense industry into order so that it can work systematically in the context of repairing military equipment, creating new models and modernizing the existing ones. Russians face problems with imported components and operation of the machine tool park, because the machines need to be constantly repaired, updated, some things need to be replaced, but the replacements are also imported. The key problem of Russia’s defense industry is managing to operate in the current conditions independently , without imported components. It is very difficult. I am convinced that Russia will not be able to do this in the near future. They understand the problems, they are trying to increase funding. This is evidenced by British intelligence and standard indicators in the budget of the Russian Federation. Russia's defense budget will grow to almost USD 80 billion in 2023. Last year, it amounted to slightly more than USD 45 billion. They are trying to increase their budget, realizing that military operations are underway and that more money must be spent on the war. However, if there are funds, but it is not possible to purchase individual components abroad, then the money may go to waste. Part will be spent on personnel training, clothing, equipment, and small arms. But high-tech weapons, which require additional finances and access to foreign technological solutions, create a gap here, which they most likely will not be able to overcome.
Russia has been working in the state defense procurement system for a long time. They carry out a three-year plan: they plan how much of this or that weapon they will purchase in 2023, 2024 and 2025. If the state defense order is accepted, Russia plans to purchase the necessary components. They have already purchased part of the components abroad and are creating cruise missiles and other high-precision weapons at the expense of the stocks they had before. They do not buy the entire set of microcircuits at once, because microcircuits are scarce in the world. Russia is in a queue, so it will not be able to immediately buy everything it needs for the following three years. If at the beginning of the year or at the end of last year they could say that they were producing 30 missiles per month, this does not mean that today they will be able to produce the same number of missiles over November or December. If there were 30 missiles produced last December, there may be 5 or 6 today. This means that terrorist attacks using cruise missiles may continue, but the number of missiles will decrease each time. They are already drawing them from that untouched reserve, but they are preparing for a NATO war and have to keep some in stock. I hope they continue running out of missiles. Instead, the number of air defense in Ukraine grows. We will create an echeloned air defense system of various levels, which will provide, in particular, protection against ‘kamikaze’ drones.
Supplying Iranian ballistic missiles to Russia
Various experts note that Iran has given no clear answer regarding ballistic missiles, which it can supply or sell to the Russian Federation. It is difficult to say how it will turn out. We see that Iran says one thing and does something completely different. Iran said that they do not supply drones and these are old contracts, yet still supplies them to Russia. That means there are risks these missiles may end up in the Russian Federation. Of course, this will create certain difficulties, because these are not cruise missiles, but ballistic. They are very difficult to shoot down, because the ballistic missiles reach quite a high speed in the last part of the route when they fly towards the target. Our existing air defense systems cannot provide the same effectiveness as they do against cruise missiles or drones. Better anti-missile defense systems are needed here, Patriots, for instance. It is advisable to get them the earlier, the better.
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