Russia's spring offensive. Where and when?

All of these questions are being actively discussed in the media, and the range of versions varies from ideas about a repeat of 2022 to the thesis that "the offensive is already underway" and that Russia does not have the resources to increase pressure.

This text is an attempt to look at the processes, to model possible algorithms based on the resources accumulated by the Russian Federation and the logic of already made management decisions. As well as processes in key sectors of the economy and processes within the society of the aggressor country.

Problems with materials and technologies

The key problems for the Russian Federation in 2022 were "technological" and "resource" hunger. The shortage of a number of technological goods, the inability to replace them with affordable analogues or to produce them independently, significantly limits Russia's ability to produce modern military equipment and weapons systems that are superior in terms of their characteristics to those in service with Ukraine.

The situation is getting worse as the Ukrainian Armed Forces are gradually being saturated with modern models of Western equipment. However, it is not yet possible to speak of Ukraine's full technological superiority. This moment may come only in late 2023 or early 2024.

The key problems faced by the Russian military industry include the following:

• A very acute shortage of semiconductor products. The shortage of chips limits Russia's ability to produce modern electronic components for aviation, missile weapons, UAVs, automated control systems, electronic warfare, communication systems, and even sighting systems for armored vehicles. The problem was partially solved by "parallel imports," ordering finished products (UAVs, optical systems) abroad, and switching to the use of civilian chips. In the medium term (summer-autumn 2023), the Russian Federation may launch (and is currently building) new lines at at least three large enterprises and is trying to gain control over Belarusian defense companies. In particular, Integral and Planar (manufacturers of electronic systems and lithographic equipment).
• Metallurgy - the technological process and the lack of a number of components for the production of alloys required for the production of weapons and equipment. This is not just about aviation or modern models. For example, at the end of 2022, Russian troops were experiencing a shortage of artillery barrels, as the industry was unable to produce enough of them to meet quality requirements. A short-term solution is to actively use old equipment in storage as a "donor". The medium-term solution (the effect will come no earlier than May 2023) is to modernize existing enterprises.
• Shortage of raw materials. The most acute problem for the Russian military-industrial complex is the inability to import sufficient quantities of titanium compounds (and ore) and lithium. Russia associates its solution with the intensification of relations with African states that have relevant reserves and are beginning to commercialize them. Lavrov's recent trips to the region were limited to such countries. Russian PMCs are mainly operating (and strengthening their presence) there.

However, by September 2022, several peculiarities of the Russian military-industrial complex's work in the conditions of a limited resource base became apparent.

1. Replacement of some equipment with simpler (or older) analogs. For example, old Soviet night vision sights have been installed on T-90M tanks instead of modern ones, the mass production of which is impossible at this stage. Or the switch from imported engines for APCs and MT-LBs to YaMZ engines.

2. Increased funding and active search for workers. The Russian military-industrial complex is facing a shortage of skilled workers, which it is trying to overcome by recruiting personnel even from distant regions, offering new employees high salaries and housing. A program for restoring specialized vocational education should be in place for the next 2-3 years, as the budgets of the relevant educational institutions have at least doubled (2023).

3. Search for new types of weapons that cannot be mass-produced in Russia in the short term. At the same time, looking for options for localizing production. A typical, but so far isolated, example is the UAV from Iran.

4. Relocation of the repair base (and modernization processes) of armored vehicles and artillery to regions closer to the theater of operations. For example, Rostec and Uralvagonzavod are starting to build additional facilities in Kamensk-Shakhtinsky, cooperating with a number of enterprises in Luhansk, and attempting to revive the bankrupt Spetsremont JSC (Bryansk).

As a result, by October 2022, the key plants of the Russian defense industry were already operating steadily. Uralvagonzavod ships about 10 new and modernized units of military equipment (T-90 and T-72B3) every day. Related enterprises also restore a certain amount of equipment (after storage or after damage in combat). Since December 2022, the production of cruise missiles (primarily aircraft) has stabilized at up to 20-30 per week (as evidenced by the markings of those shot down over Ukraine).

The samples being produced are inferior to modern Western weapons, but the latter are not yet the mainstay of the Armed Forces. If we look at the modernized Soviet models (including those modernized in Eastern Europe) in service in Ukraine, we can unfortunately speak of the superiority of Russian equipment in a number of areas. When the situation changes (in light of the supply of weapons to Ukraine from Western partners), the Russian Federation expects to achieve parity of forces through quantitative superiority in equipment.

Manpower

Russia is suffering considerable losses at the front. Even the number of verified casualties by name (according to funerals in Russia) exceeds the Soviet losses in Afghanistan for all the years of the war. According to the General Staff of Ukraine, more than 144,000 Russian soldiers and members of militant groups were killed. This is despite the fact that the size of the group that attacked Ukraine in February 2022 is estimated at 170-180 thousand people.

Approximately the same number of groups at the front is supported by Russia today. But it is not enough for active offensive actions on several fronts.

At the same time, the Russian Federation has taken a number of measures to create strike groups to organize offensive actions. First, it is worthwhile to estimate the number of troops that the Kremlin can use for its offensive.

The total grouping of Russian forces along the front line as of October was estimated at over 300,000 people. Not all of them were members of the Russian Armed Forces. Rosgvardiya soldiers, consolidated riot police units, units of the country's combat army reserve (BARS) (24 motorized rifle and 3 tank battalions), and the Army Corps of the so-called LDPR and PMС (not just Wagner) took part in the fighting.

On the other hand, there were several solutions that allowed to replace losses and create reserves for a future offensive. In particular:

• Putin's decision to increase the size of the Russian Armed Forces by 137,000 people. This made it possible to actively recruit for contract service in August and October. The process, with less intensity, continues now.
• Additional (autumn) mobilization in the LDNR, which allowed up to 20,000 people to join the "army corps."
• Recruiting prisoners, who were recruited mainly by the Wagner PMC. It allowed to recruit up to 40-45 thousand people in the fall of 2022.
• Formation of "volunteer" battalions in the occupied territories. This process was not successful and today there is information about 4 such formations. That is, a maximum of 2 thousand fighters
• And finally, the actual mobilization conducted in Russia.

Theoretically, Russia can engage in offensive actions with a maximum strength of about 300-352 thousand people (some fighters remain in their locations for various reasons). This data is provided by the intelligence services of Ukraine and European countries.

Conscripts can be mentioned as the closest available reserve that has not been used at the front before. In the spring of 2022, 134.5 thousand people were called up for military service. In the fall, 120. In case of a delay in demobilization (or the beginning of the demobilization of those called up in the spring of 2022), the total available reserve of trained soldiers is about 234 thousand people.

Equipment

In recent months, the Russian Federation has been actively stockpiling ammunition and supplying new and re-equipped army units with machinery. The leader of the Wagner PMC is not lying when he talks about the stocks of ammunition and equipment in the rear (which is not transferred to the fighters). Based on the dynamics of the production of new equipment, from October 2022 to February 2023, the troops received at least 900 new (and modernized) tanks, 800-900 armored personnel carriers, and the same number of artillery systems. This number can be added to the restored and decommissioned equipment. But it was spent both on equipping new units and replenishing losses at the front.

It is worth noting that since December 2022, Russia has been using PMC fighters, BARS units, and the so-called LDPR "people's militia" to a greater extent at the front. Personnel units (with the equipment provided to them) were withdrawn from the contact line and used to a lesser extent in assault operations on the Bakhmut and Lyman directions.

Thus, it can be stated that Russia has increased the stock of equipment available for use at the front. In particular:

• to at least 900 tanks. That is, from about 700-750 to about 1600-1650
• light armored vehicles (armored personnel carriers, armored cars, etc.) from 2000-2300 to about 3500-4000
• artillery systems and MLRS - at least twice as many

Most likely, a stockpile of cruise missiles is also being created.

This estimate generally agrees with the figures published citing intelligence from Ukraine or its partners.

At the same time, given the increase in production, Russia, unlike in the spring of 2022, can compensate for daily losses in equipment (we give the maximum possible figures):

* tanks - from 10 units. But this pace is impossible if the fighting drags on, unless Russia solves the problem of manufacturing new hulls for the T-90. The stocks of T-72s for modernization are exhausted, and since October 2022, Uralvagonzavod has received only about 200 new hulls.

* AFV - from 14-15 units of all types

* Artillery systems - from 10 units of barrel artillery (there are still difficulties with the production of new barrels)

* MLRS - from 3-4 units.

Management

The most dramatic change was in the command and control system of the Russian military grouping in Ukraine. In addition to the creation of a single command center, the "special military operation" - a unified command of the joint force grouping, the entire command vertical was transformed. Operational groups were created or strengthened:

* "West", which included former "Bryansk", "Kursk", "Belgorod" and "Zapad" operational groups

* "South", which included former "Luhansk" and "Donetsk" operational groups

* "Center" (operates in the area of Vuhledar)

* "Center" and "East" operate in the occupied parts of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions.

It is also worth noting the formal decision to strengthen the "Joint Forces Grouping" in Belarus. However, it currently has no strike capability and serves to train Russian mobilized soldiers who will later be sent to the territory of the Russian Federation or the occupied part of Ukraine.

Thus, from the command structure, we can assume that Russia is preparing for a possible new expansion of the theater of operations.

The logic of actions

Russia has already created a strike force grouping of troops, which mainly consists of personnel units armed with equipment and ammunition for active offensive operations. Moreover, given the nature of the confrontation on the front line, using it for frontal strikes in a relatively small area seems inappropriate. Moreover, the leadership of the Russian group has had bad experience with the development of the offensive through Izium, the storming of Sievierodonetsk and Bakhmut. The system of command and control of the troops also provides for a wider theater of operations.

The size of the newly created group is at least 1.5 times larger than the size of the group deployed in February 2022. However, given the development of the Armed Forces' capabilities, the forces and resources Russia has gathered are not enough to organize strikes in more than 2-3 directions.

Based on the above and the Russian military leadership's commitment (fully confirmed by the history of the 2022 hostilities) to "enveloping strikes," it is logical to assume that Russia will try to encircle (or create a threat of encirclement) a fairly large grouping of Ukraine's defense forces. For example, in the Donetsk region.

However, the options for encircling Sloviansk-Kramatorsk proved unsuccessful at the preliminary stages. The withdrawal of a troop grouping from Kherson made it impossible to plan an advance along the right bank of the Dnipro. Accordingly, in such circumstances, it is most logical for the Russian Federation (taking into account the accumulated resources) to try again to act with broad, encompassing strikes. But in narrower areas, a simultaneous attack on Kyiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv is unlikely.

At the same time, given the foreign policy situation, the Russian leadership wants a large-scale operation that would compensate for the autumn failures in Kharkiv and Kherson regions.

Therefore, the most likely areas of attack would be from the territory of the Russian Federation through Kharkiv and Sumy regions and from Zaporizhzhia region along the Dnipro River. Poltava or the east of the Poltava region could be a possible target.

A strike in the direction of Kyiv is unlikely given the current capabilities of the Russian grouping. It will be possible only if the first phase is successful, i.e., the defeat (or encirclement) of the Ukrainian group of troops in the Donetsk region. At the same time, the "second phase" is possible only if additional mobilization in Russia is carried out, because even the use of 240-250 thousand conscripts will only compensate for the losses of the Russian group in the event of 3-5 weeks of offensive operations.

Time

Russia has already created a strike force. But the climatic conditions in the south and east of Ukraine will make it difficult to launch an offensive between the end of March and the end of April.

In addition, according to publicly available information, Ukraine is manning and training at least 10-12 new brigades. Some of them will be armed with Western, more modern weapons.

Thus, Russia has two possible timelines for launching a strike.

1. The beginning of the operation no later than March 10-12. In this case, the most logical would be attempts to implement the above scheme of covering the Donetsk grouping of the Ukrainian defense forces. At the same time, the remnants of PMCs and "people's militias" of the so-called LDPR will be used for distracting strikes along the existing front line. This offensive may be accompanied (or rather, will be accompanied) by massive missile strikes. However, in contrast to the logic of the fall-winter, the choice of priority targets will change. In the event of an offensive in early spring, the railroad infrastructure may again become one of these priorities.

2. Launch of the operation in May-June. In this case, Russia will not be limited by weather conditions, but Ukraine will have formed its own striking fist by then. Therefore, it is logical that in this scenario, the Kremlin will launch another wave of mobilization no later than mid-March. The offensive itself will also be accompanied by missile attacks, but in this case, in addition to the priority targets of railway infrastructure, we can expect attempts to strike bridges across the Dnipro.

Source.

About the author: Vadym Denysenko, political scientist.

Espreso TV does not always share the opinions expressed by the authors of the blogs.