Culmination of war

Russian missiles are targeting children with cancer, and air bombs are blowing up residential buildings and bus stops.

Russia tells tales of blowing up the Kyiv and Kaniv hydroelectric power plants.

The agent network reveals itself and, risking life in prison, sets fire to the cars of the recruitment centers.

The Russians suffer unprecedented losses in this century, but advance step by step near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.

The Kremlin's "diplomatic courier" Orban is running around the world, asking "to stop shooting at once."

He is echoed by a whole chorus of "Ukrainian" bloggers and public opinion leaders. "Let's surrender for the sake of our children." "There is no defense against a crowbar, Russia is huge, its resources are unlimited, we will not win anyway, so the main thing is that they stop killing us..."

And amid the lack of electricity, daily anxiety, lack of positive news from the front, and fatigue from the third year of the most difficult war of the 21st century, these voices are no longer as clearly cut off by society as they would have been a year or two ago.

“We are really all very tired. We all dream that it will all be over - no lights, no sirens, no certainty about tomorrow, not even about today, and most importantly, no deaths and funerals. There is nothing more legitimate and justified than this dream.”

But this state distorts the perception of reality. The filter of fatigue and pain prevents us from rising above emotions and soberly assessing what is really happening, what to expect, what is expected of us, what will be the consequences of Ukrainian decisions and actions?

Meanwhile, a sober assessment of all this is vital. Because the price of wrong emotional decisions can be the loss of the war, and given the stakes in this war, our very existence as a country.

In fact, as paradoxical and even terrifying as it may sound, everything mentioned in the first paragraphs is not only not proof of our imminent defeat, but, on the contrary, a reason for optimism. And it is very important to see and understand this.

There is nothing worse than killing children in hospitals. And even our enemies do not do it just for fun or pleasure. Even for them, this is one of the means of forcing us to surrender, which is used not immediately (because there are "disadvantages", first of all, in the international position of the Russian Federation), but when everything else has failed. Yes, the Russians' idea of war includes such terror as one of the "permitted" methods of influence, but even they did not immediately resort to it, and for some reason only now.

Agents behind enemy lines are needed for a long time. Making it a one-time act for the sake of terrorist attacks against ordinary soldiers is also a very unusual step. This is an act of desperation, another sign of the beginning of agony and a feverish search for a way out of a losing situation.

The offensive in Donbas is costing the Russians a lot, even by their standards, but they keep giving orders to attack, and demanding that the soldiers make at least the slightest advance every day.

An elementary calculation shows that at this rate, Donbass alone would take years to take, all of Ukraine would take decades, and no amount of Russian population would be enough to sustain such losses.

“But the point is not whether Russia is really capable of continuing its creeping offensive for years and gradually occupying the whole of Ukraine step by step (spoiler alert: no, it is not).”

The Kremlin's goal is quite different: to create the illusion at any cost that Russia is capable of years of such advancement, to make us and our allies believe this bluff. And this is where they really have a chance of success - if we fall for it.

It is very important to know the strengths and weaknesses of your enemy. The strong point of Putin has always been the ability to keep a "poker face" and bluff confidently even when playing very badly. For decades, the West has been calling his bluff. It is this "superpower" that he is trying to use now.

Culmination of war is taking place

It lasts not for days or weeks, but for many months - yes, in a war that has lasted for several years, even the culminating "moment" counts for months.

At the moment, there is something akin to a terrible parity of the parties. The invaders are still able to advance, but more and more slowly, and only in one direction at a time. We are still retreating in certain areas, but the further we go, the stronger we are in defense, sometimes successfully counterattacking, but still very far from being able to launch a successful counteroffensive.

The most important words in this picture are "still" and "already".

The situation is not at all static, as it might seem when looking at a map from the couch. The intensity of the fighting is extremely high, even by the standards of this war, and the casualties are just as high on both sides, but they are disproportionately higher on the Russian side.

War is not about moving arrows and lines on a map.

It is about who killed how many enemies over the next day, and how many of their own lost during the same time.

It's also about how many replacements for today's losses were recruited in the rear, put in uniforms, and sent to learn how to fight and survive on their own.

It is about the tanks burned, the gun barrels worn out, the ammunition used up - and the possibility of replacing them.

“The Russian army has already passed the peak of its power, which was approximately this fall and winter. Then every day this army is getting worse and weaker, and this trend is now irresistible, unless some bad miracle happens. The arsenal of non-magical ways to strengthen Russia's military power is almost exhausted.”

The monster that Russia was able to create in the fall of 2022 and winter of 2024 is very large, clumsy, heavy, and still has a significant margin of safety. Like an accelerated asphalt skating rink, it is capable of ramming itself through a lot of things due to its weight and speed, but the momentum that the initial movement gave it has already been exhausted.

The expression "Russians are slow to harness, but they go fast" is not the least in the arsenal of Russian fakes. This is a typical lie; in reality, the opposite happened - the Russians harnessed very quickly, when neither we nor our allies had even a horse in the barn.

They mobilized in the fall of '22, while we are only now slowly trying to establish it (and not only not at the maximum possible level, but on the contrary - only last month we took the first noticeable steps).

Their economy has been operating in wartime mode for the past 23 years, and we may switch it to such a mode next year (and that is not yet a fact).

Their defense industry is working in three shifts and has reached its maximum capacity.

Yes, this maximum capability was enough for a breakthrough increase in the production of missiles - enough to completely destroy our entire non-nuclear power generation, and now enough for children's hospitals (and, unfortunately, will be enough for a long time, so the dispersal of our medical institutions, unfortunately, is becoming an extremely important task, no matter how difficult it is to do).

This maximum was also enough to set up the production of planning bombs in such numbers that the limiting factor in their use is now the number of flights, not the availability of ammunition.

But this maximum is sorely lacking to cover the losses of hardware on the front line.

The number of tanks burned by Ukrainian defenders every month is at least twice as high as the number of tanks produced and removed from storage warehouses, and this difference in "debit and credit" is growing every month. The Russian situation with all other "armor" is even worse than with tanks. For example, in the Russian offensive in the Kharkiv region in May this year, many times more soldiers were involved than were involved in the "Special war operation" - and ten (!) times less armored vehicles.

Monitoring of the storage warehouses shows that the bottoms of the "bottomless reserves" are already showing through. The Russians have enough iron for a year, or at most a year and a half of a war of the intensity we are currently experiencing. And this is assuming that all the equipment in the warehouses can at least potentially be delivered to the front, which is a deliberately unrealistic assumption.

The situation with the Russian guns is simply egregious right now, and there is no question of a year or a year and a half. Already, 130mm cannons from the 1940s, which the Soviets stopped using back in the 1970s, are playing an important role at the front, and we had to ask comrade In for ammunition because no one else uses these antiques. However, Un is able to add more shells, but he is not able to replace worn-out barrels - North Korea itself still holds on to artillery systems donated by Comrade Stalin.

“Air defense is a separate story. We are currently experiencing an extremely painful shortage of air defense equipment. But we didn't have them to begin with, and each new supply from our allies improves the situation at least a little.”

At the same time, Russian air defense is barely enough to cover Moscow, the front line and the Crimean bridge (not even the entire peninsula anymore), and the latter is a kind of "air defense Chornobaivka" where S-300s, S-400s, and now S-500s are regularly disposed of... Meanwhile, the Arctic and the Far East are already exposed (which was impossible to imagine under the scoop), and most importantly, all defense plants, airfields and oil and gas facilities deep in Russian territory remain uncovered... The trend is obvious, and it is as inexorable as at the front.

In contrast, after Trump's 7-month blockade, only since May has the flow of American aid gradually been restored, which is guaranteed to last until next spring.

Yes, this flow will most likely stop at the "second coming" of the "Trumpushka" as the Russians affectionately call him. But this time, it will not be a surprise, and our European allies and ourselves have time to prepare for it and have an adequate replacement.

“Europe has woken up from three decades of lethargic sleep and is feverishly rebuilding its defense industry. Unlike Russia, which is already at the peak of its capabilities and has nowhere to go, European defense is at the very start and takeoff.”

Yes, it takes time to get up to speed - it turned out that it was not the Soviets, but Europe that was "slow to get up to speed." Instead, we can judge the speed we have gained by the Czech supply of shells, and most importantly, by the way our enemies assess the prospects.

Attempts to assassinate industrialists in the middle of Germany are another manifestation of panic and agony. If such "red lines" are being crossed (and this greatly affects the Kremlin's ability to find and use "useful idiots" in European politics, and greatly narrows the field for the Kremlin's agreements with Europe), it means that the Russian military has highly appreciated the potential of our allies' defense industry and is asking its intelligence services to disrupt production at any cost. They are well aware of the consequences when these products finally reach us.

And somewhere in the shadows of the United States and Europe is our own defense industry, which has also proven to be capable of many things, and is now only slowly being "unwound."

Unfortunately, it is slower than it should be due to the lack of proper state policy and the lack of funds in the budget for the purchase of domestic products. This is another story about who is actually "slow to the draw" - and it is again not Russia.

“Even in the face of unreasonably slow "harnessing", Ukrainian defense is providing the frontline with drones of all types and ranges, successfully repairing an unprecedentedly diverse "zoo" of weapons and equipment originating from dozens of countries, and producing artillery at a pace that would be the envy of many Western companies. And, most importantly, it is establishing the production of ammunition.”

We can only imagine how fast we will "go" when (if) we finally recognize that the economy must be put on a war footing! The potential for growth is many times, if not orders of magnitude, greater, and the actions required for this are not that complicated.

Therefore, the picture in terms of "iron" is obvious and inexorable - the occupying army's gradual depletion, and the more threatening the pace, with the option of complete depletion of stocks in a number of critical positions within the next calendar year.

And at the same time, our capabilities are growing just as gradually and inexorably, both through supplies from our allies and our own industry.

In terms of people, the situation is a little better for the enemy, but in general it is also disappointing for them.

They have recruited a huge number of people at the same time that we have been failing to mobilize for a year and a half. The created manpower advantage became their main "superpower" during 2023-24 and is still maintained.

However, given the loss ratio we achieved last year and have maintained since (to remind you, when we are on the defense, the ratio is no less than 1 to 5-6, and sometimes even 1 to 8-10-12; when we are on the offense, it's still in our favor, but 1 to 2-3), even achieving temporary parity would actually mean a significant advantage for us over the enemy. It’s easy to calculate that if at some point we deploy one of our soldiers against each occupier, with such loss ratios, the Russian army will begin to "melt before our eyes."

Such parity is a completely achievable goal. Paradoxically, we are also "slow to harness" here, which has allowed us to preserve a significant potential for growth. Our mobilization resources are almost untouched, while the enemy is already using theirs to the maximum.

The previous statement shouldn’t be taken to mean that the enemy is running out of conscripts or even contract soldiers. Unfortunately, Russia still has plenty of manpower if we consider numbers alone, without accounting for the quality of these forces.

However, the quality is already deteriorating catastrophically. With each subsequent draft, the deficit of sergeants and officers grows, and the "cannon fodder" of the latest drafts is reminiscent of the joke about "fifth-category dog meat, which is ground up with the kennel."

This decline in quality was one of the key reasons for the failure of the Russian offensive in the Kharkiv region. Ukrainian defenders faced "green" untrained recruits with equally inexperienced commanders; predictably, for most of them, the first battle was their last.

“So the overall picture is quite clear. We held our ground this winter when the invading army was at the peak of its capabilities. Currently, our enemies have exhausted their potential for growth, and even maintaining the current level of combat readiness seems like an unrealistic task.”

Time is working against our enemy - of course, provided that the enemy is not given a break and continues to suffer at least the same losses as now.

In contrast, we are seeing the opposite trend - after the worst conditions for us this winter, we are building up our strength, both in terms of equipment and ammunition, and in terms of a very slow, still insufficient, but breakthrough mobilization process compared to the recent past.

Time has begun to work in our favor—provided that we do not relax but instead, despite fatigue, gather our strength and continue to press the enemy.

“To achieve this turning point, from a technical standpoint, two additional conditions are necessary compared to the current situation: eliminating the Russian's absolute air superiority and achieving at least approximate parity in personnel.”

Under these two conditions, our advantage becomes irreversible, and we return to a position similar to the victorious fall of 2022 - of course, with the caveat that this is not a circle but a spiral, where each new turn requires exponentially more effort and resources from both sides than the previous one.

The first condition should be met by F-16s, while the second requires our mobilization.

“The first issue is already resolved; we just need to wait, and it won’t be long. The second is entirely in our hands and requires our collective effort. There’s nothing unrealistic about it.”

The third year of the war will be decisive, though not the last. The war could continue into a fourth or fifth year, but with a more or less defined outcome, with a clear understanding of who is merely "still resisting" and who is "pressing towards victory."

We have every chance to be the ones who are "pressing towards victory." The necessary conditions are in place; we just need to put in the effort.

Perhaps even extraordinary effort—but entirely within the realm of possibility. We have achieved the seemingly impossible before.

Does the Kremlin understand this? Unfortunately, yes.

And that’s why we see intensified "meat assaults," attacks on recruitment offices, bombs raining on cities, and rockets deliberately targeting hospitals.

They are trying to break our Ukrainian home front before an irreversible turning point occurs on the battlefield.

“This is the enemies' last chance, and we - our fatigue, fears, and emotions - are the Kremlin's final resource in this war. Of course, this is only if we allow ourselves to be used in such a role.”

The Russian army has exhausted its potential, though it still continues its relentless advance due to inertia.

The Ukrainian army at the front has barely felt any relief - even the first wave of new mobilization soldiers is still undergoing training, while most are still waiting for summonses and medical evaluations.

The longing-for turning point is ahead - provided that in the remaining months, our home front does not collapse or demand "peace at any cost."

“We must understand that no one will give us peace. There is no price at which Russia would be willing to let us go. Until Russia faces complete military defeat, they will continue to kill us - perhaps taking a pause only to kill even more afterward.”

A temporary ceasefire (for six months to a year) to avoid military defeat, address the issues described above, and ultimately crush us is precisely what the Kremlin critically needs. This is what it is trying to extract from us.

The Kremlin urgently needs time to accumulate weapons and ammunition, recruit and train personnel, and prepare for a new offensive campaign. Without this pause, the prospect of Russia's complete military defeat is gradually becoming visible on the horizon - slowly but relentlessly.

It is equally critical for us to deny the enemy this pause.

Such a pause would not only halt enemy losses but also allow for the buildup of their forces.

Simultaneously, it would be a pause during which Trump could come to power. Europe would breathe a sigh of relief on the first day of the ceasefire and stop spending taxpayer money on us - after all, "the shooting has stopped there."

“During this very pause, we would lift martial law, open the borders, demobilize, and halt mobilization. We would also dive into our favorite pastime - elections.”

The scenario where we maintain wartime laws, keep the borders closed, continue mobilizing and training, dig trenches, and accumulate weapons and ammunition throughout the ceasefire simply doesn't exist in reality—such measures are not possible in democracies.

Therefore, Russia will use the break to prepare the next act of our tragedy, while we will catch a bit of peaceful life and freedom, only to lose them forever afterward.

Putin has already succeeded with this scenario in Chechnya, and he aims to repeat it with us.

The army won’t fall for this, so his "target audience" is us, the Ukrainian home front.

All the "peacekeeping" calls from various Orbans and the tearful "pro-peace" posts from "Ukrainian" pro-Russian figures are directed at us.

And so, we are targeted with missiles at thermal power stations, hydroelectric plants, and Okhmatdyt. We must be prepared for many more to come. We need to be ready both physically (considering medical facilities among the most likely targets of future attacks and taking appropriate measures) and, most importantly, mentally.

• The only healthy reaction to the attack on Okhmatdyt is anger, gritted teeth, and hatred toward the enemy. 
• Hatred that transforms into registration in Reserves+ and searching for vacancies on the Ukrainian Armed Forces recruitment site.
• Anger that materializes into donations.
• Gritted teeth that turn into a tired smile after hours of volunteer work.

This is how we must respond to the enemy's attempt to press us further.

Remember: the current horrors are the death throes, the beginning of the end for the Russian army, and the Kremlin’s desperate attempts to delay this end by using our own hands.

We - our fatigue, emotions, and weaknesses - are the Kremlin’s last chance in this war, and it is our right and duty to ensure that this chance does not come to fruition.

Yes, the climax is always difficult. But it is our behavior in such moments that determines the course of History. The history of our country and the personal histories of millions of us.

I hope we will write our histories correctly.

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About the Author: Yevhen Dykyi, scholar and military professional.

The editorial board does not always share the opinions expressed by blog authors.