Prigozhin was removed demonstratively: if system kills, it is afraid of recurrence

If Putin wanted to look strong in this whole story, he had two ways:

1. To drown Prigozhin's rebellion in blood, and kill him. Back then. In June.

2. To arrest, try, and demonstratively organize a show trial. Back when the conflict between Prigozhin and Shoigu was obvious, but it did not come to a riot.

"For the first scenario, Putin did not have the determination, so he decided to use cunning. For the second, either he had no information or he really believed that it was all bullshit and the conflict would not go beyond information warfare."

There was also a light option to preserve his reputation. After the "agreements" on Prigozhin's safety, it was easy to corner him with criminal cases and put him in prison for 20 years. Just like Navalny.

What happened is that Putin does not trust his system very much. And that's why Prigozhin was demonstratively liquidated. If the system, instead of punishing for show, kills, it is afraid of a recurrence.

He was removed in order to intimidate possible successors on the path of opposition to Putin in his inner circle. And this circle is getting narrower and narrower.

After Prigozhin's rebellion, two very marker events occurred: the resignation of General Popov, who complained about the lack of men and equipment in repelling the counteroffensive (he was exiled to Syria) and the arrest of Girkin, who criticized the government for the objective problems of the Russian army from a right-wing perspective. Even Surovikin's resignation is not such a marker.

"So, these two events showed that the core of the regime would not accept criticism even from like-minded people on the issue of war, that the main criterion for approaching Putin would be exclusive loyalty, and that politically and apparatus-wise, Putin had moved into the stage of defense in a besieged fortress."

This is despite the fact that the dynamics of events at the front and the need for mobilization have already forced Putin to significantly strengthen the power of governors and regional elites, making them de facto satraps in the classical sense of the word. That is, they can already form their own de facto private armies.

Therefore, the murder of Prigozhin and his associates is, first of all, a narrowing of the tools from complex (trial, damaging reputation, deprivation of influence) to primitive. When you just kill some people and intimidate others. In the hope that it won't explode. And at the same time, you radicalize all possible future rebellions, and additionally create "bookmarks" for them.

That is why the logic of "today you die, and tomorrow I will" continues to dominate Putin's strategic plans. And this is a good sign.

Source

About the author. Yuriy Bohdanov, publicist and strategic communications specialist in business, public administration and politics.

The editors don't always share the opinions expressed by the authors of the blogs.