Envisioning the present and future for Ukrainian-Polish relations 

Mykola Knyazhytsky's speech at the conference "Polish-Ukrainian history and its modern interpretation", organized by the Juliusz Mieroszewski Dialogue Center and the Ukrainian Free University (Munich) with the assistance and support of the Consulate General of Poland in Munich.

How can we maintain strong Polish-Ukrainian relations after the war? What steps can we take to ensure their longevity?

Firstly, I would like to express my gratitude to the millions of Poles, the President, the government, local self-government bodies, public organizations, and churches who have provided much-needed support to Ukraine and Ukrainians. Poland's decisive position during the war was a pleasant surprise for Ukraine and captured the hearts of Ukrainians, as well as being an unpleasant surprise for Russia and its way of waging war.

All public opinion polls in Ukraine show that Poland and the Polish people occupy the first place in the list of countries and peoples who are friendly to Ukrainians. President Andrzej Duda shares the first place with US President Joe Biden on the list of world leaders who have been most helpful to Ukraine.

Poland's solidarity surprised democratic nations because no one expected it. The paintings from the Ukrainian-Polish border, Polish cities, and villages inspired other countries and peoples, uniting the world with common values - the need to oppose authoritarianism, misanthropic ideology, and the genocidal goals of imperial Russia.

Undoubtedly, one of Moscow's goals in its aggression against Ukraine was the destabilization of the European Union due to the influx of millions of Ukrainian refugees. I am sure that it was the solidarity of Poles and Poland, along with other peoples and states of the free world, that destroyed such a Kremlin scenario. This solidarity will continue to be a key factor in our victory in the war, alongside the heroism of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the entire Ukrainian people.

I believe in the reality of prospects for maintaining strong Ukrainian-Polish relations based on the factors listed above. Any political visions, programs, and projects must have a solid public foundation. Without it, everything we talk about and declare will be like building sand castles.

The most important thing is that Polish-Ukrainian cooperation, solidarity, and understanding of the commonality of our fate and future become an experience for the young generation. The older and middle generations already know and understand that imperial Russia is an existential threat to Ukraine and Poland. For young Ukrainians and Poles, this is something new that needs to be rethought so that the acquired experience becomes formative for national and social identity, as well as the way of thinking about the politics of their own state and the entire community of democratic countries of the world.

However, I would like to emphasize that the threat and fear associated with it are insufficient to ensure the longevity of our good neighborly relations. We must focus on positive goals such as ensuring Ukraine's membership in NATO and the European Union and defending European and national values and interests. This will create broad conditions for close political and economic cooperation, as well as the strengthening of bilateral governmental and non-governmental institutions.

What factors could disrupt or even reverse the current positive trend in the relationship between Poland and Ukraine? 

The main element of risk is politics, specifically the growing support for anti-Ukrainian forces in Poland due to "war fatigue." Although the first symptoms of this phenomenon are currently marginal and do not affect state policy, representatives of the Polish authorities are aware of the issue and monitoring its progress in an attempt to neutralize the threat.

The situation in Ukraine is different since there is nowhere to retreat. The only available and reasonable option for national policy is to join the Euro-Atlantic and European security, political, and economic communities.

The second risk factor is the interests of the Polish economy, particularly farmers, and their attempts to address issues to the detriment of the Ukrainian economy and Poland's membership in the EU. While it is understandable that solving the price crisis in the Polish agro-industrial sector is necessary, we must also realize that Ukrainians are fighting for their lives and the existence of their own state. All problems that weaken this struggle must be solved with this understanding.

During his speech in the Diet on Wednesday, May 9, I am grateful that the Minister of Agriculture dispelled the fakes about the seemingly catastrophic impact of imports from Ukraine on the situation of Polish agriculture. However, the residue from the campaign to intimidate the Poles with grain from Ukraine still lingers. 

We need to talk about this openly and honestly since we have difficult negotiations ahead about the conditions on which the Ukrainian agricultural sector will be integrated into the common market of agricultural products of the EU. The opposition Polish Peasant Party in the European Parliament voted against the extension of the duty-free regime for Ukrainian food, openly declaring that there is no need to rush Ukraine's accession to the EU, as it is against the interests of Polish farmers and agricultural producers.

The third factor of concern is the potential growth of non-acceptance of Ukraine and Ukrainians in Polish society. Although there was a fear of a decline in sympathy for Ukrainians after the wave of unprecedented aid from last year, this did not happen on a threatening scale. However, this does not mean that tension in the relationship cannot arise. 

Therefore, we must oppose any attempts to campaign, especially on social networks, that aim to quarrel our peoples, including those specially deployed by the Russian enemy, since anything that weakens us automatically works for the enemy.

Are issues of the past and identity such factors, or will security prevail?

I believe that the formulation of the question, pitting the past and identity against security, is incorrect. Failing to understand the past could result in its recurrence as a significant problem, including in the realm of security.

In the long term, we must not forget about how the Russian Federation uses the past as a propaganda tool to justify aggression against Ukraine. Similarly, we should be mindful of Russia's use of history against Poland. A recent example is Dmitrii Medvedev's misconception that the Principality of Warsaw or the Kingdom of Poland was part of the Russian Empire.

The common Ukrainian-Polish past comprises both positive and negative events, phenomena, and surnames, which could impact the future of our countries, including with destructive potential, as we witnessed in the second decade of the current century.

It is evident that our states have deviated from the reconciliation model promoted by Pope John Paul II. Recently, President Andrzej Duda, Archbishop Stanisław Gądecki, president of the Polish Episcopal Conference of the Catholic Church in Poland, and Patriarch Svyatoslav Shevchuk, the head of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, reiterated this call.

Let us hope that during the 80th anniversary of the Volyn tragedy, the presidents of our states will express their support for this reconciliation model.

Additionally, we should leverage the legacy of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, a state that our people built together over several centuries. We must uphold the tradition of the joint victory in the Battle of Warsaw in 1920, where the Army of the Ukrainian People's Republic fought alongside the Polish Army.

Finally, we should remember the tradition of the Polish democratic opposition in the second half of the 20th century, the Ukrainian dissident movement, the Solidarity movement, the People's Movement of Ukraine, the Orange Revolution, and the Revolution of Dignity.

What positive or negative role can the West, including Germany, France, and the USA, play in shaping relations between Ukraine and Poland? 

The West's role can be undoubtedly positive. During the formation of the international coalition in support of Ukraine, the leadership of the USA played a significant role in helping the country withstand the difficult time of aggression and open a new chapter in Ukrainian-Polish relations. Without it, it would be infinitely more difficult for us. Although, of course, it was not the Americans who organized unprecedented assistance to Ukrainian refugees in Poland. The Americans expressed their admiration!

We hope that this assistance will continue until the final victory, which is the restoration of Ukraine's territorial integrity within the 1991 borders, irrespective of the results of the upcoming presidential elections in the USA.

Following February 24, 2022, Germany and France admitted their mistakes in their policy towards Russia, albeit belatedly. They acknowledged their errors after external prodding, mainly from our states and leaders. Nonetheless, the mistakes were acknowledged. 

Germany has given up entirely on Russian gas and oil, which seemed an unattainable goal. Both states provide significant military, humanitarian, and financial aid to Ukraine. They support the USA loyally in implementing a tough policy towards Russia and Putin.

As of today, I do not see any elements of negative influence from the three named states in the development of Ukrainian-Polish relations. Instead, Washington is trying to foster the closest possible cooperation between our countries.

The West's negative impact may arise if the USA, Germany, or France start promoting "peace plans" that would conflict with Ukraine's basic interests: its independence, territorial integrity, membership in NATO and the EU.

Can Poland and Ukraine, either together or in coalition with other Central and Eastern European countries, challenge the traditional dominance of Western Europe and shift the balance of power on the continent?

In the realm of security and military affairs, the Russian-Ukrainian war has already moved the center of Europe from the west to the east, specifically to Poland. President Biden has visited Poland twice, but not Germany, and Poland has become a significant hub for providing comprehensive assistance to Ukraine, serving as an effective rear guard for our front lines.

Due to the direct and obvious threat posed by Russia's war against Ukraine to NATO and the EU, the significance of the eastern flank of the North Atlantic Alliance for the security of the entire Euro-Atlantic community and democratic countries worldwide has increased significantly and will continue to do so.

It's not just about Russia's confrontation in its war with Ukraine and Moscow's aggressive intentions towards states in Central-Eastern and Northern Europe, as well as the Black Sea region. A new challenge is the issue of Russia's and China's ambitions regarding the Northern Sea Route, which opens up in the Arctic.

The armies of Ukraine and Poland have already become the strongest in our region and soon have every chance of becoming the most potent land and air forces in Europe. Ukraine's membership in the European Union will inevitably alter the distribution of power and potential among member states. This won't happen immediately, as our country will require time to rebuild from the destruction - in the broadest sense of the term - wrought by the Russian war aimed at destroying the Ukrainian state and committing genocide against the Ukrainian people. Nonetheless, I am utterly convinced that we will overcome this challenge.