Counteroffensive: on trends and good news

The world did not buy the Russian version of the "counteroffensive.” All the "peace initiatives" from China and its satellites look extremely unconvincing to Western governments, and to the part of the public that supports Ukraine. 

Our partners are rationally responding to the news from the frontline and are ready to promptly supply Ukraine with new tanks and armored vehicles, ammunition, drones, and air defense systems. They are replenishing the natural losses associated with offensive operations. In other words, they assess the actions of the Ukrainian side as adequate, appropriate, and effective enough.

The Russians have turned on a delusion generator in the information field. They have finished demilitarization (because now Ukraine is fighting with Western equipment, not Soviet), and "40,000 Ukrainians were killed in three days" (Lukashenko, TM), and "Ukraine has no success." Russia cannot confirm its "successes" (fictitious) with visual evidence, so it has to invent them. 

Putin looks extremely unconvincing even to his own people and proves that he learns about the war from Konashenkov's reports. In his speeches, he was extremely unconvincing even to his own "military commanders." As soon as the Ukrainian actions have noticeable successful physical dimensions, the Russian army will receive another torpedo to its own combat capability and morale. And the same goes for the Russian regime as a whole.

“The Ukrainian public has adjusted its reactions to align with reality. Initially, there was a somewhat intense response to the counteroffensive not materializing within 15 minutes. However, over time, expectations are returning to a more realistic perspective. And those individuals seeking sensational news are focused on Facebook feuds.”

And what about the "counteroffensive" itself, or rather, the Ukrainian Armed Forces' campaign in the summer of 2023? We are working systematically. 

It is important to understand that in order to minimize losses (especially of people, because they are the most valuable) and achieve maximum results, the Ukrainian Armed Forces act gradually and cautiously. Because our offensive actions need to be covered by air defense, supported by artillery, and, if possible, by aviation. 

That is why all these stories about a "quick breakthrough" through several defense lines, which were supposed to happen (no one promised this) at the first stage of the offensive, are unrealistic and (most importantly) unnecessary. The Russian defense line and their logistics will be "dismantled" methodically and without fuss. As it was in the Kherson region. Until the necessary advantage is created or until the Russians feel that the time has come for "difficult decisions" and "gestures of goodwill."

“What we all see in the reports of the General Staff and in the messages from our soldiers is the gradual destruction of the Russian defense’s foundation, which will sooner or later lead to the collapse of the entire building in selected areas of the front. And with it, the combat capability of the Russian army as a whole.” 

No one can say exactly when and where this will happen. Because pressure and strikes are carried out at different points. And where exactly it will crack first is difficult to predict without access to 100% of the information (and no one has this). But when the actions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces erode Russia's combat capability sufficiently, all interested observers will see a fairly rapid movement. 

And finally. About the popular "we were waiting for some original plan, but we are attacking where we expected.” I've read it from many people. Here are two comments:

1. Our front is quite clear, the terrain is clear, and the logistics routes are also well known. Therefore, it is not the direction of the main strike(s) that decides, but

• the ability to maneuver quickly, respond to changes, and act in a more professional and coordinated manner;

• availability of more modern and reliable equipment, as well as the necessary means of destruction. 

2. There are still a few surprises in store for the Russians at the operational and even strategic level, but that will come later. When the stage of "erosion of the foundation" is over and additional weaknesses in the Russian front and the Russian rear are exposed.

Source

About the author. Yuriy Bohdanov, publicist, specialist in strategic communications in business, public administration and politics.

The editorial staff do not always share the opinions expressed by the blog authors.