Georgia is not interesting to any Western player

It should start with the understanding that any elections, revolutions, and societal changes occur in the presence of six factors: a leader, an idea (ideology), structures, money, time, and international support (or lack thereof). I elaborated on this in my books 'Politicians Don’t Lie' and 'How to Destroy the Russian World.' Therefore, when analyzing any situation, it is essential to take a comprehensive look at all these issues.

I won't focus on Chechnya, as the text would become too lengthy, so I will concentrate only on Georgia.

Let’s start with the leader. Unfortunately, for pro-Western Georgia, it was not so much Ivanishvili who played a negative role, but rather Saakashvili. Why? He lost the elections for several reasons, but the main one, in my opinion, is that he became too much for society, and people grew tired of him.

Tiredness is fundamentally a basic factor in life, and in elections, as well as in making the most unexpected decisions, it is indispensable. This was compounded by promises of a better life and the fear of the repetition of war.

We should also highlight the factor of a lack of novelty: people became accustomed to living with electricity for eight years and believed that the police would not take bribes after Saakashvili (and, by the way, they were not mistaken).

In short, he lost due to many factors. Then Saakashvili made a colossal mistake: he didn’t just come to Ukraine; he became a citizen and even led one of Ukraine's regions. Simply put, he ceased to be Georgian. Furthermore, he gave countless reasons for Georgians to view him as a symbol of destructiveness. His return to Georgia completely disrupted the opposition's game in the previous elections. The opposition could not create another strong leader; rather, they all remained in the destructive shadow of Mikheil.

The opposition's idea was not the best either. 

European integration always loses money if there is no consolidation of the elites regarding the immutability of the state's course. The people were given an alternative: small but regular handouts plus a promise that there would be no war. The opposition responded by offering a bright future, forgetting that people like to be bought.

In all uncertain situations, people generally choose money and stability (I discussed this in detail in my book Politicians Don’t Lie). Only a new grand idea that, among other things, promises future financial benefits can make money secondary. In one election, understanding that he would lose, Ivanishvili took an unprecedented step: he paid off debts. No European idea on its own can overcome this narrative.

In the recent elections, in addition to money, there was another significant idea: Ivanishvili proposed his decree for peace, supported by a very social budget. All funds from the influx of Russians were redirected to social programs.

You may ask: “How can you vote for a pro-Russian party?” Just like in 2012, central Ukraine voted for the Party of Regions. Orwell called it doublethink, and all nations of the world have it. Only a strong elite can resist it. People on their own - almost never.

The structure involves not only party human resources, but also power resources. And the power resource is not only the security forces, but also those who are ready to confront the security forces. The opposition's protest potential lasted for more than 10 years. And this is really a lot. Is it exhausted? No, it is not. Can the situation turn in the other direction in the future? Yes.

I won't discuss time and money here, as the opposition had both resources and time, and they tried to manage them properly. However, the first two points overshadowed everything.

Regarding international support, Saakashvili traces its loss back to the moment he announced his desire to withdraw from the IMF. I personally heard him directly link his defeat to this statement. I won't go into details now, but Georgia, despite its geographic potential, is of little interest to any Western players. Unlike Moldova and Ukraine, Georgia is not appealing to the West, even geographically. Saakashvili sold the U.S. a relatively expensive showcase. Ivanishvili played the 'give us money' game with the West, while the Georgian opposition, for objective reasons, simply could not sell a European Georgia to Europeans under such circumstances.

That's a brief description of Georgia. But all of these things are necessary so that we don't just engage in unfounded complaints: how did this happen? We also need to look at ourselves a little differently.

Source

About the author: Vadym Denysenko, political scientist.

The editors do not always share the opinions expressed by the blog authors.