What kind of Ukraine does Putin need?

Actually, this intention to "make Ukraine join Russia" is allegedly directly indicated by the ideological and propaganda support of the campaign, such as Putin's articles about one single nation, the occupiers' expectation of flowers from "liberated" Ukrainians, "missiles of kindness", etc. This maniacal intention is evidenced by such strange symptoms as the statement of the so-called State Duma deputy from the so-called "Republic of Crimea" Mikhail Sheremet (who has a Ukrainian surname, of course), who advised Ukraine to prepare to become part of Russia amid the defeats of the Russian troops.

But how is this declarative intention of the aggressor combined with his real behavior and the real goals of the Putin regime?

Moscow's decisive actions, which can be considered the beginning of the plan implementation of "capturing Ukraine", fall at the end of 2013 - the beginning of 2014. And this first stage can be described as a project of internal destabilization.

Russia did very little, or practically nothing, to save Yanukovych's regime, but in every possible way contributed to the fact that the internal political conflict necessarily entered the power phase with as many victims as possible. Putin gave Yanukovych stun grenades but did not give money to pay salaries for security forces and diplomats. Why did Putin decide to "merge" Yanukovych's regime, loyal to him, and why was it a priority for him to sow chaos and uncontrolled violence in Ukraine?

To answer this question, it is necessary to understand the context in which the Euromaidan phenomenon arose. As of the end of 2013, the penetration of Russian business into the Ukrainian economy was at its maximum, national-patriotic and pro-Western forces lost their political initiative, power structures and the army were taken under the control of Russian agents. Russians bought housing in the central districts of Kyiv. Domestic show business, including the Kvartal-95 studio, focused on Russia and its market. Kyiv, which was visited by many Russian tourists during the Eurocup 2012, made the best possible impression on our neighbors. "Here they live in a European way, eat in a Ukrainian way, and speak Russian."  This is roughly what heaven looks like for the Russian middle class.

Putin decided to act in advance since Ukraine could suddenly "leave Russia" forever. But it should be recognized that the Association Agreement with the EU, endless, hopeless negotiations with NATO are not at all the "red lines" that could force Putin to urgently "save the situation".

It seems that it was the diffusion between the Ukrainian and Russian cultural, social and political space that posed a problem for the Putin regime. First, the Chekists might not have liked the fact that the money was taken out of Russia to a foreign jurisdiction, where it became much more difficult to control it (the case of Max Kurochkin, who was shot dead in the courtyard of the Ukrainian court, is quite illustrative). But for Putin, the political risk was more significant: the constant contact of Russians with Ukraine eroded the imperial identity, threatened the penetration of liberal ideas and democratic social practices.

But the most important thing is that "soft" integration in relations with Ukraine contradicted the course of self-isolation and anti-Western patriotic mobilization, which at that time had already been adopted as a basic strategy.

The real policy of the Kremlin is primarily focused on domestic political tasks. And this is obvious to anyone who follows the evolution of Russian foreign policy and the rhetoric of Putin himself, as well as analyzes his personality type.

Collective Putin, who rules today in the Russian Federation, does not want any "new Union".  He needs an isolated, militarized Russia behind an iron fence, in which there is no competitive politics, free thought and free speech, in which economic resources are controlled by the authorities, and the authorities are in the hands of a narrow corporation of security forces.

Therefore, Putin deliberately escalated the internal political conflict in Ukraine and sacrificed Yanukovych. Moreover, Moscow purposefully pushed the ruling regime to bloodshed, its loss of legitimacy, and, as a result, a crisis of statehood in Ukraine.

But Putin wanted not only to destroy Ukraine but also to turn Ukrainianness into a convenient adversary for a new breed of Russians, whose upbringing was devoted to the cult of victory, the revival of "tradition" and other military-fundamentalist delusions. For the consolidation of fanatics, it is necessary to have an external enemy. Hence, the frantic promotion by the Russian mass media of Ukrainian "nationalists" in general and the "Right Sector" in particular, is completely disproportionate to their real political weight in Ukraine at the time and the scale of participation in Euromaidan (at least in its beginnings).

That is, Putin did things that were aimed at a result directly opposite to the one he declared.  At the same time, it seemed that he was acting illogically, or even senselessly. Until the annexation of Crimea took place and an unprecedented patriotic mobilization of the pro-Putin majority in Russia began against this background.

The destabilization of Donbas looked like a cover operation at first, but then it got its own functional load as a pressure tool. The goal remained the same: discrediting Ukraine and Ukrainianness in the eyes of the Russians, as well as weakening Ukrainian statehood, restraining its political, economic, and cultural development.

The bleeding wound of Donbas did not allow the country to fully live, and the threat of a new armed conflict suspended our plans for the future. But even this was not enough for Moscow.  In 2022, Putin decides on a full-scale military invasion of Ukraine with the aim of overthrowing the current government and, most likely, territorial dismemberment of the state.

The attack was completely unprovoked. His ideological cover was meaningless. Not only were there no signs of "Nazism" in Ukraine, but there was a Russian-speaking and Russian-cultured president in power, who was supported by 73% of the voters, and who tried to stop the hostilities in Donbas.

The "geopolitical" motivation of the Kremlin also cannot withstand any criticism. In the case of an inertial development of the situation, neither NATO nor Ukraine posed any threat to Russia and could not pose in the future. At that time, America had learned a very painful lesson in Iraq and Afghanistan, had major problems in relations with European allies and was focused on domestic political and economic problems, in particular, related to the consequences of the coronavirus epidemic.

That is, the war against Ukraine was definitely not a forced step, Russia just waited for a convenient moment to launch it.

I do not question Putin's intention to seize control of Ukraine, that is, to enter Kyiv with tanks.  The documents and testimonies that are being revealed show the 2022 plan. But this plan is very short-term. The overthrow of the government, the purge of patriots, the establishment of a puppet regime. But the question arises, what next?

Russia cannot keep an occupation army and gendarmerie in Ukraine, which it simply does not have in sufficient numbers and qualifications.

Russia does not have enough resources to properly control and secure its own territory and feed its existing vassals, from Lukashenko and Kadyrov to the enclaves of the "Russian world" in Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. Moreover, Russia is not able to "feed" a large European country with a destroyed economy, which Ukraine would become in the event of Russian occupation. Even the European Union, which took care of Ukraine, is not capable of this without American help. And Russia, in the conditions of inevitable sanctions, could not afford it even more so.

The Kremlin knew this very well. Therefore, the plan was obviously different. The goal of the attack is to eliminate the "Ukrainian threat" through the dismantling of Ukrainian statehood, territorial division and a long period of decline for the entire country as a form of "retribution for Nazism."

Open sources available today show that in future Ukraine was assigned the role of a failed state and a gray zone of instability, in which Moscow would have carte blanche to protect the power of its "legitimate" puppets, but would be free from obligations to the local population.  Such a state could not be stable, but political upheavals, new revolutions and even a civil war on this territory would suit Moscow as a long-term scenario of destabilization.

A limitrophe, yes a limitrophe, as geopoliticians there would say. This, by the way, would be an unnecessary argument in favor of the need to lift Western sanctions: they say, you see what these Ukrainians are like, they themselves are to blame.

A similar situation arose as a result of Russian intervention in Syria. Ironically, in its current paralyzed state, with an illegitimate government and the distribution of spheres of foreign occupation, Syria is perfectly fine with all the major players in the region. Iran and Israel, Russia and the USA, Turkey and Saudi Arabia have accepted the existing status quo, which is a guarantee of the Assad regime's preservation for the indefinite future.

And again, as in 2014, Putin is doing everything possible to push Ukraine away from Russia, to sow between the 2 peoples, not just mistrust or hostility, but open and incurable hatred that has not healed for decades.

Actually, in the possible "joining" of Ukraine and Russia, it is noticeable that starting from 2014, even in the rhetoric of the Kremlin, there is no trace of any attempt to entice, but there is only a clear articulation of the intention to rape. Do you remember the "Whether you like it or not" speech?

It is noteworthy that Putin repeats the thesis about the one "Russian" people as a mantra.  That is, in his state concept, the idea of "three brotherly nations" no longer exists, although the nations were recognized as separate even in the official doctrine of the Romanov empire. Not to mention the last hundred years, when the existence of the Ukrainian people and their right to statehood were at least declaratively recognized by the very fact of the existence of the Ukrainian SSR as part of the Soviet Union, and then were not questioned by official Moscow after Ukraine gained independence more than 30 years ago. And now suddenly such a rigid stance.

This shows that there is no place for Ukraine as an integral country in Putin's Russia.  Instead, Ukraine should be a clear example of "what not to do" for Russians. To not have democracy, not to be friends with America, not to develop national culture and self-awareness. In Putin's model of the "Russian world", Ukraine is assigned the role of the personification of "evil" that Western civilization carries with it (in the terminology of Russian propaganda "Nazism").

Putin's strategic intent does include "collecting lands," but only those lands that will be 100 percent loyal to his regime. And preferably, they will even become its support, as, at one time, the Don and Kuban Cossacks were for the Romanov dynasty. A similar human extract was, to a certain extent, formed in Crimea and Donbas during 8 years of confrontation. In 2022, it was planned to expand to the borders of Novorossiya. But these were supposed to be newly converted "Russians", not rebellious "Ukraine" demonized by Russian propaganda.

The shift to the "single nation" reflects the strategic goal of a collective Putin, i.e. the creation of a single identity for the citizens of the empire when the definition of "Russian" (not even Yeltsin's "Russian") will equally apply to Buryats, Bashkirs, and Ukrainians. At the same time, it is clear that it is easier for a Ukrainian to become a "Russian" than for many other "foreigners" while getting rid of any visible signs of otherness. Therefore, Putin's imperial project opens only the prospect of full assimilation for those Ukrainians who have decided to join him.

Moscow is no longer counting on a new "union of fraternal nations". Putin does not want to repeat the "mistake" of Lenin, who allegedly "created" Ukrainian statehood. Rather, he seeks a strict version of the separation of the "Russian world" from Western civilization, in which Ukraine is assigned the role of a "gray zone", on the territory of which an endless border war is waged.