Most necessary things to be done for Ukraine front

What I see as the tasks and the need for the state to change the situation in order to reduce losses and improve the situation, which, unfortunately, is deteriorating.

From my experience and from the words of many colleagues from other units, I can safely describe the following range of problems:

1. Counter-battery combat. There is a critical lack of ammunition. Sorry, but one mine is not enough to stop the action. Reconnaissance means, counter-battery radars are also needed. Accordingly, to increase the effectiveness of fire damage and reduce the amount of shots fired, we need adjustment means that are resistant to electronic warfare. The concept of area damage does not work in conditions of ammunition shortage. To be effective in conditions of ammunition shortage, we must be accurate. And this, in addition to the trained calculations, requires adjustments by all possible means on the ground and in the sky, which does not always happen.

2. In the new conditions of modern warfare, tactical strike drones have begun to play an extremely important role.

We need millions of drones. Not thousands, millions. The Russians use one FPV attack drone against one fighter, not even against a tank.

One commander I know secured 700 meters of gray zone by dropping "wedding drones" - Mavics. One UAV operator was given the condition of 30 drops per day. They are dropped not only on the detected enemy, but also in every hole and bush where the enemy may be - this is in a positional war.

The problem with drones is not only their shortage, but also the lack of operators who know how to fly and are ready to do so in combat conditions.

Nowadays, there are good volunteer UAV schools, and the best military one, i.e. the state one, is in the city of N, but there should be more such programs, and they should all work in coordination and share their experience, and this experience should be summarized by the relevant officials in the General Staff and submitted to the troops and changes should be made to the charters and orders.

3. EW — electronic warfare. We suffer heavy losses from Russian drones. And I'm not talking about Shahed drones. We are impressed by FPV, as I said, the Russians do not shy away from using 1 FPV against one fighter. We are looking for Russian equipment to use FPV drones. Currently, a separate position on Ukraine's side can be held by 4-2 people. This is justified to avoid crowding. However, if the Russian fighter detects such a position, it will be lost with a 99% probability, and it may take a dozen more soldiers' lives to restore it. And such positions are hit not only by hostile artillery, but also by FPV. There are still no reliable means against Lancet attack drones and reconnaissance Orlan.

We must build echeloned defense and airspace protection against drones not at the level of brigades, but at the level of battalions and companies. Radar equipment for detecting UAVs should be in companies, platoons, and divisions. This means a complete change in the concept of using such equipment.

Some units are already purchasing 12-16 caliber hunting rifles to shoot down drones with drops and FPVs with special ammunition, as other means are not available or not enough. At the same time, technical solutions exist, but they are not multiplied by the state and are not supplied to the troops en masse.

4. Fortifications. Russians are already building a fourth line of defense in the occupied territories. Kilometers of wood-lined and concrete-filled dugouts, trenches, places for personnel, command posts etc. This is the Hamas "subway" in Gaza. Civilian construction companies from Russia are used for this purpose.

We do not have a fourth line of defense. It is clear with the first line, the soldier digs day and night alone, under fire, while some positions and trenches are covered with dead bodies, so he has to move aside because there is no way to remove them.

The second line cannot be built everywhere, like the Russian subway, because of hostile fire. The third and fourth lines of Ukrainian defense, filled with concrete and covered with wood, equipped and protected, do not exist. We need to build classic pillboxes and earth-and-timber emplacements.

5. The next issue is the deployment of personnel. The personnel of a brigade of several thousand people, with headquarters, command and control center, depots, are deployed in the brigade's area, dispersed in villages, towns, and cities. There can be many such brigades in a direction. These are thousands of people. The problems are not even with housing, but with protected premises for work and deployment of services, rocket and artillery weapons storage facilities, etc.

You won't find a vacant basement or semi-basement in any frontline city because they are occupied by someone. Moreover, due to the shortage of premises, some brigades, even when they go out for reconstruction or move to another direction, leave fighters to keep the area occupied in case they return. Some fighters guard such premises for months outside the brigade, not even allowing local authorities to enter. As a result, the new brigades are unable to quickly set up their services, even if they have all the contacts in the military administrations and other bodies. I'm not even talking about resettlement, because rents in frontline areas can be higher than in the capital or in resorts, even without water, electricity, and heating.

From my communication with some local authorities, it became clear that not a single penny was allocated at the central level and not a single command was given to organize the construction of underground fortified premises to house the headquarters of the Operational and Tactical Group, brigades, etc. In two years, a lot of such bunkers could have been built, which would have relieved the burden on civilian and critical infrastructure.

Conclusion: Unfortunately, if we do not change our approaches to organization and provide the means to solve the problems described above, we will suffer greater losses, economic and human, with understandable consequences.

Source.

About the author. Myroslav Hai, actor, volunteer, soldier of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, head of the charitable organization Mir & Co Foundation.

The editors do not always share the opinions expressed by the authors of the blogs.