Will Russia secure unimpeded withdrawal of its troops from Syria? Serhiy Zgurets’ column

Evacuation of Russian troops from Syria

The conflict in Syria is intensifying, raising concerns for Russia about the integrity of its bases and military assets in the country. The Israeli Army is conducting airstrikes across Syria aimed at destroying all weapons and ammunition that could fall into the hands of Syrian rebels after the fall of Bashar Assad’s regime.

Israeli Air Force strikes are targeting armored vehicles, air defense systems, aircraft, missile stocks, and even naval vessels stationed in Tartus, where the Russian naval base is located. Although the Russian fleet has not yet left, it appears that the Israelis have issued a warning to the Russians, and now several Russian ships are anchored a few kilometers away from Tartus port.

Meanwhile, Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate reported yesterday, December 10, that Russians are preparing what they call a new Syrian express, meaning routes and options for evacuating their military and equipment from Syria. They are now dismantling assets at their bases in Hmeimim and Tartus, and two large landing ships from the Northern Fleet have already been sent to the Mediterranean Sea for this purpose. Additionally, one landing ship from the Baltic Fleet and cargo vessels from the Russian Ministry of Defense’s logistics company, “Oboronlogistika,” are also preparing to depart.

In addition, according to Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate, equipment and assets are being prepared for transport using aircraft like the Antonov An-124 and Il-76, which will deliver Russian assets from the Hmeimim base to Russian airfields of Ulyanovsk, Chkalovsky, and Privolzhsky. Intelligence suggests that Russia may be negotiating with anti-government forces for an unimpeded exit from Syria. But what next?

On Defense Express, we published an assessment of the feasibility of such an evacuation. It appears that the sea route for Russia’s evacuation from Syria is limited to the Baltic Sea because Turkey keeps the Bosporus closed to military ships. Therefore, Libya, Sudan, or Algeria are considered the only alternatives for Russia.

Regarding the organization of an air bridge, it seems unlikely for the Russians due to their experiences when deploying to Syria in 2015. During that time, they conducted at least 300 flights over a two-week period, and that was before expanding their base. Now, this air evacuation would require hundreds of flights for Il-76 and An-124 aircraft.

Moreover, for an air corridor, the new Syrian government must grant permission to use the airspace, which makes operating this base impossible without it. However, there were reports two days ago from CNN Turkey stating that Russia has approached Ankara for assistance in relocating its troops to areas controlled by Turkish forces, from where they could then be flown to Russia. Russia remains interested in maintaining two bases in Tartus and Hmeimim because they serve as platforms for influence in the Middle East and Africa.

However, it’s uncertain whether Ankara, to which Russia is currently appealing, will have enough influence to convince the rebels to agree. More likely, Russia will attempt to offer certain incentives to the new Syrian government – weapons, mercenaries, and others. But it’s difficult to predict whether the Syrians will agree to this, especially considering they likely remember how the Russians attacked them with both bombs and missiles.

So the situation is evolving. It’s also interesting that there has been no comment from Russia’s leader, Vladimir Putin, on the topic of a potential withdrawal from Syria.

Russia-Ukraine frontline situation

Now let’s move to the Ukrainian-Russian front line, where the situation is extremely challenging on many fronts.

The military expert from the Center for Defense Strategies, Colonel Viktor Kevlyuk, reported that positional battles continue in the Kharkiv, Lyman, Siversk, and Orikhiv sectors. Neither side is achieving success; both are trying to improve their tactical positions. In the Prydniprovskyi sector, the Russian army is attempting to capture positions on the islands to expand its control zone and create favorable conditions for shelling the right bank of the Kherson region. In the Kupyansk sector, Russia is making efforts to eliminate the northern part of the Ukrainian foothold on the eastern bank of the Oskil River – in the area between Dvorichna and Kupyansk.

In the Lyman and Kramatorsk sectors, and partially in the Toretsk sector, Russian forces are creating conditions for capturing the defensive belts around Siversk, Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk, and Kostiantynivka. The situation is quite challenging. The Ukrainian defense forces are managing to hold off Russian troops, but this is costly for both sides.

In Chasiv Yar, fierce battles are ongoing. If the Defense Forces of Ukraine were to leave their positions at the refractory materials plant, it could mean the loss of Chasiv Yar within a few days.

In the Kramatorsk sector, Russians are making efforts to reach the line of Novotroitske - Bohatyr - Rozdolne, thus eliminating the Ukrainian foothold near Kurakhove. If successful, there is a threat of encirclement for Ukrainian units currently defending near Hannivka. The situation is extremely complex. Overall, the Kurakhove and Vremivka directions are currently the hottest areas on the front line.

A retired colonel with the Ukrainian Armed Forces noted that Ukrainian troops in the Kursk region have shifted from an offensive to a defensive operation. Ukrainian forces have tied down up to 50,000 Russian troops, including the 106th Airborne Brigade and two Marine Infantry brigades, several airborne regiments from different divisions, and the 22nd Special Forces Brigade – all part of the most mobile and combat-capable Russian forces. If this grouping appeared on any other front, the balance of power would clearly tip in Russia’s favor. However, the Russians are now forced to fight on their own territory. Therefore, the potential of the Kursk foothold is far from exhausted. Moreover, Ukrainian forces have created depth in defense for the forces operating in Sumy, Chernihiv, and partially Kharkiv regions – providing potential for future Ukrainian offensives as well as logistical capabilities. Thus, the Kursk foothold still has significant potential.

The expert from the Center for Defense Strategies added that the Ukrainian military needs to restore the combat readiness of brigades engaged at the front line, stabilize defenses, and reinforce reserves. The military command knows how to do this and has done so in the past. However, there is a lack of air superiority, firepower, capable reserves, an effective air defense system, consistent logistics, and improvements are needed in coordination between troops operating in different operational zones.

A military analyst continued by stating that strategic and operational headquarters should reduce micromanagement – there’s no need to control each strongpoint manually. Trust in the personnel at brigade and battalion command posts should be restored from both top-down and bottom-up perspectives. These are competent officers who know what to do, so there’s no need to interfere. Brigades that have lost their combat effectiveness should be replaced and take up defensive positions. It’s time to consolidate the operational-tactical groupings defending the Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vremivka sectors into a unified force, as Russia’s objective here is the occupation of the southern part of the Donetsk region.

Colonel Kevlyuk commented on the recent personnel changes, including the appointments of brigade commanders to positions of Commander of the Ground Forces, Deputy Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and Deputy Head of the Presidential Office. He noted that these appointments appear to undermine the actions of the Supreme Commander, who has violated his own decree No. 1153 regarding the procedures for military service in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which clearly outlines who should be appointed where and in what manner. These appointments ultimately disrupt Ukraine's efforts to establish NATO standards in military and personnel management, which were already lacking in transparency and logic. These appointments have also eroded the motivation of officials for whom these positions were stepping stones in their careers. Consequently, trust in the strategic management tier has been undermined, where decisions can be made unilaterally by the Supreme Commander. Despite all due respect, these newly appointed officers lack management experience and have gaps in knowledge regarding both operational and strategic management. Regarding the appointment of the Commander of the Ground Forces, there is hope that Mykhailo Drapatyi, upon accepting this position, was aware of the responsibilities for failures in staffing the military and for the lack of combat-ready reserves.

Summarizing Viktor Kevlyuk’s words, I emphasize that the Center for Defense Strategies is closely monitoring the dynamics on the frontline, so I recommend familiarizing oneself with the daily reports from this analytical center.