Victory Plan is just good half

"Great minds discuss ideas, average minds discuss events, small minds discuss people," said Eleanor Roosevelt. A significant part of the public reacted to the Victory Plan without delving into its essence: for some, everything Zelenskyy does is inherently bad; for others, everything Zelenskyy does is inherently good. Between these two extremes, there is a considerable number of people who want to understand the details.

This text is written for those who want to understand, and I strongly urge everyone else to stop reading right now and scroll further. (By the way, after my previous text, I was simultaneously labeled both a "hardcore Poroshenko supporter" and a "pro-government Zelenskyy apologist," which, in a way, says more about the readers than the text itself.)

Let me begin by reminding you how major wars usually end:

1. A vision of the post-war world is created.
2. A coalition of winners is formed around this vision—those who share it and are willing to invest in it.
3. The coalition of winners develops a strategy for victory as a way to implement this vision and allocates resources accordingly.
4. The coalition of winners executes the strategy and achieves victory (this coalition needs to be strong enough; otherwise, it could fail).
5. The coalition of winners becomes the foundation of the post-war world order and rewrites the rules of international security for the next period—until the next major war, when someone again challenges the world order.

From this perspective, the Victory Plan we’ve seen is the first step of the process outlined above. Its intended audience is Western partners, who currently do not fully understand how the post-war world can be organized, what to do with Russia, how to unite Europe, how to stop China, and so on.

"The undeniable advantage of the Plan is that Ukraine is positioned as part of the solution, not the problem. The strength of the plan lies in its focus on benefits and costs, rather than emotions and moral obligations."

Does the Plan have drawbacks? Let those who had access to and have read all the appendices be the judges.

This is exactly the kind of plan needed for discussions with the West. The fact that it’s not being embraced can be explained by their reluctance to abandon their own stereotypes and their inability to listen to 'unimportant' nations (both reasons are explained in the aforementioned article), with a third reason explained a bit later.

Ukrainians are not the target audience for this Plan. It was shown to us only so that, in discussions with the West, they could refer to the support of Ukrainian society and parliament.

And this is where the problems begin.

Because for Ukrainian society and parliament, this is not enough. It doesn't look like a victory plan for the Ukrainian public because it doesn’t answer the key questions. Moreover, the plan largely avoids addressing internal issues, placing the full responsibility on external partners. At best, this makes people think that society and parliament are once again playing the role of silent bystanders, and at worst, it creates a sense of manipulation among some citizens: soon they’ll be told that the West didn’t accept the plan, so prepare for capitulation.

And we do have internal issues.

1. There’s the actual loss of state governance due to the concentration of power, micromanagement, the rollback of decentralization, the diminishing role of parliament, the rejection of expert support, and the increasing reliance on a narrow circle of people managing a large country during its most challenging times.
2. The war requires not just weapons but people. The issue of mobilization cannot be resolved without addressing the issue of exemptions, which is based on fairness. And fairness cannot be achieved without solving the issue of rotation, which in turn requires changes to the military command system. And so on. There is a huge set of problems that specialists could explain better than I can. And all of this requires quality communication, instead of the current failed approach.
3. Raising taxes and general mobilization essentially signify a shift in the social contract. More is being asked of citizens and taxpayers, so the question arises: what will they receive in return? If the answer is nothing, it is unfair. Citizens and taxpayers must see real progress in combating corruption (clear rules, not just the occasional scapegoat), steps toward the rule of law, and a reduction in unnecessary budget expenditures.

These are just three key issues, but there are many more. I’m not even mentioning a host of other pressing matters where I don’t feel informed enough.

None of these issues were addressed in the Victory Plan. This means we haven’t seen a full Victory Plan, but only half of it—the part meant for external audiences.

So where is the other half, the one meant for us?

It’s unlikely it’s hidden in the confidential appendices.

No joke, even if the West fully agrees to the presented plan, it’s still not enough for victory. And this is being said not only by Ukrainians but also by Western partners (this is the third reason why the West has reacted coolly to the document).

“One of the key principles of strategy is internal control locus. Personal responsibility. The answers to all the main questions must be sought within, not outside. A Victory Plan cannot place all the tasks on others. Yes, we cannot succeed without them, but the first steps must be about internal changes.”

At this point, people usually ask: what do you propose?

Here’s my suggestion for the missing half of the Victory Plan. This addresses the three aforementioned challenges, and you could add solutions to other issues that I haven't covered due to a lack of expertise.

1. Create a parliamentary coalition to replace the dismantled single-party majority.
2. Have this coalition form a national salvation government.
3. Restore decentralization to the extent that it doesn’t conflict with martial law requirements.
4. Address the set of human capital issues for the Ukrainian Armed Forces: transparent exemptions, fair (regionally and socially balanced) mobilization, clear rotation, etc.
5. Cut all unnecessary wartime expenses.
6. Untangle the knots holding back the domestic defense industry: long-term contracts, preferential lending, controlled exports.
7. Increase funding for Ukrainian diplomacy and immediately appoint ambassadors to key countries where they are currently missing.
8. Immediate reform of tax and customs legislation and administrative practices towards transparency, clarity, and the presumption of innocence.
9. Introduce personal responsibility for law enforcement officers and judges for unlawful interference in business activities (as determined by court decisions) – starting with defense industry enterprises.

This is not a plan, but merely a sketch of its beginning. Much more can be written, but this is a good starting point. There’s nothing technically impossible or unconstitutional on this list. This process could be launched in three months and produce results within six months.

Then we will have a full Victory Plan, not just a good half.

So, I fully support the President's Victory Plan, but I consider it only half a plan. The second half is absolutely necessary and urgent. Because it is impossible to win the war without the support of your own society.

(Bots from every political camp can now throw tomatoes at me for both supporting and criticizing the victory plan. After all, bots cannot deal with ideas; they are triggered by names. To this, I have a response: I asked them not to read, to stop right at the beginning).

Finally, the last question: do we have a Plan B if the West decides not to help?

We have two plans. I wrote about them at the end of the aforementioned article.

Plan F: a besieged fortress. Evacuate the population from cities we cannot defend. Allow all those who wish to leave the country to do so. Hold as much land as those who want to stay can defend. Negotiate a short-term peace. Hold elections where those who remain will choose leaders to guide them to the next war. Transition the entire country to a wartime regime. Prepare with all might for war (including dealing with those who refuse to leave occupied territories and will be mobilized by Russia for the next war with Ukraine). Fight back until Russia collapses. Then, over a couple of generations, regain what future generations will want to reclaim.

Plan Z: acknowledging defeat. This scenario played out in our history over a century ago and is now being implemented in Kadyrov’s Chechnya. Surrender not just a part, but everything. Accept a puppet government. Be mobilized and go conquer Poland and the Baltics under the Russian tricolor. Except for those on the lists – for them, black plastic bags. And except for those who will resist in the Carpathian forests. That’s when we’ll regret not taking better care of those forests. Then, wait two or three generations for the next window of opportunity.

Source

About the author. Valerii Pekar, lecturer at the Kyiv Mohyla Academy.

The editors don't always share the opinions expressed by the authors of the blogs.