U.S. likely to reassess position on Ukraine's NATO membership — diplomat Bryza

The major event this week is North Korea's direct involvement in the war against Ukraine. This goes beyond simply providing artillery ammunition - it now includes supplying troops. It's evident that Russia has established a new security agreement with North Korea, and this should prompt a strong, unified military response from the Euro-Atlantic community, given the immense mobilization potential of North Korea's armed forces.

Additionally, this development signifies that a coalition of so-called "axis of evil" states is actively opposing Ukraine. What might the response of the United States and NATO look like in this scenario?

Yes, as some American observers have warned, the entry of North Korean troops alongside Russian forces into the war against Ukraine is a geostrategically concerning development. It could indicate that North Korea may find itself in conflict with other nations. China has expressed concern about this development, as it worries about the West’s - particularly the United States’ reaction to North Korea joining Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Beijing fears that this may lead the U.S. and its East Asian allies to consolidate further and respond with even stronger political and economic measures against North Korea.

However, the bottom line is that it is somewhat humiliating for President Putin to rely on North Korea, one of the world's poorest countries and often on the brink of famine, for both artillery and manpower. This reliance highlights issues within Russia regarding both supplies and available personnel. While Russia does have substantial human resources, there is a threshold, a limit to how many people can be sent to the frontlines, especially as Putin has already been deploying them as cannon fodder.

As troubling as North Korea’s entry into the war in Ukraine may be, it also suggests a sign of weakness on Putin's part, which could eventually present an opportunity to push toward negotiations.

This is deliberate, demonstrative behavior. It likely would not have occurred without China's tacit approval, as China has long supported and shielded the North Korean regime. This move signals a serious possibility of further aggression, not only against Ukraine but potentially more broadly.

How likely is a strong military response involving strikes on Russian military targets? Such action would align with a broader strategy of deterring Russia, but it will require significant political resolve. In just a few days, President Joe Biden will be in full authority, though with the backdrop of an impending election. Following the campaign, there is hope that Biden will issue clear authorizations to hold the aggressors, Russia and North Korea, accountable.

As I suggested a few moments ago, I disagree with the premise of the question. I believe that Beijing is quite uncomfortable with what Pyongyang is doing by sending weapons and, now, soldiers to fight alongside Russia in Ukraine. For reasons I mentioned earlier, I think China is indeed comfortable partnering with Russia in a geostrategic sense to undermine the so-called rules-based international system and to create challenges for the United States and its allies. China feels that the price of partnering with Russia to achieve these aims is to offer some level of support. However, China does not want to see the war expand.

Russia’s war against Ukraine has certainly made it clear that China does not want the conflict to reach a nuclear level, and China has expressed support for the restoration of Ukraine's territorial integrity. Additionally, China is uncomfortable with North Korea's involvement in Ukraine alongside Russia, as this could energize the United States and its allies in East Asia, especially Japan, South Korea, and Australia, to take more assertive actions to counter China’s ambitions in the region. I would also include the Philippines in this group.

Therefore, it is not the fear of North Korea and China entering Russia's invasion of Ukraine that will push the U.S. and its allies to permit Ukraine to use Western-supplied weapons for deeper strikes into Russian territory. I believe that permission will likely come, but not before the U.S. election. If Donald Trump wins, it’s unclear if such permission would be granted. However, if Kamala Harris were to win, I believe permission could come, as she has spoken clearly about the need for a lethal U.S. military and the need to defeat Putin in Ukraine. But I am speculating here.

Ultimately, I think that permission for Ukraine to use Western missiles for deeper strikes into Russian territory will emerge from an ongoing negotiation, which I am sure we will discuss shortly in relation to President Zelensky’s recently unveiled Victory Plan, presented both in Washington and Europe.

President Zelensky has unveiled his Victory Plan in the United States and Europe. Naturally, certain elements remain classified, accessible only to top officials. The central theme is Ukraine’s readiness to integrate with the Euro-Atlantic community in return for concrete security guarantees along the way. A crucial part of this victory strategy is ensuring access to essential military resources.

It is unclear if Ukraine has officially requested Tomahawk missiles, but even without them, a boost in the supply of systems like the Atacms, armored vehicles, and other assets could create serious challenges for the enemy. However, we have not yet seen this shift materialize. Just a few weeks ago, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin made a discreet, unannounced visit to Kyiv, and it is uncertain what message he intended to convey.

What are your thoughts on the current state of the Victory Plan’s implementation?

I have no idea what Secretary of Defense Austin discussed in Kyiv, and I do not know what additional weapons the U.S. may currently be considering for Ukraine. I understand that the Biden administration aims to allocate as much of the $60+ billion recently approved by the U.S. Congress, following a six-month delay, before President Trump would potentially take office if he wins the upcoming election.

President Zelensky's Victory Plan received a mixed response in both Washington and Europe. The new NATO Secretary General, Mark Rutte, made polite remarks, acknowledging that it is an “interesting plan” but stated he does not agree with all of it. I believe his reservations may include two of the plan’s five points. The first is the extension of Ukrainian missile strike range into Russian territory, which the U.S. still opposes. The second is the security guarantee in the form of NATO membership, which both the U.S. and Germany currently oppose, and Rutte is well aware of this.

In the past week, however, there have been signs of a potential revival of the August discussions on a mutually agreed pause between Kyiv and Moscow regarding attacks on each other’s energy infrastructure. President Zelensky even mentioned about a week ago that, if reached, such an agreement could pave the way for broader peace talks with Russia.

Additionally, there have been reports and discussions in European media regarding the potential merits of a “land for peace” deal between Ukraine and Russia. This deal would involve a certain degree of ambiguity about the territories Russia currently occupies, leaving open the question of their sovereignty to be addressed in the future. Meanwhile, Ukraine would need solid security guarantees, and, in this scenario, NATO membership could become a more viable option for Ukraine, possibly under a model similar to West Germany’s NATO membership during the Cold War. At that time, West Germany joined NATO even while East Germany was occupied by Soviet forces, with an understanding that the border between West and East Germany was provisional and would be resolved later.

This idea has been advocated by former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen since 2019, and former Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, along with my old colleagues and mentors Dan Fried and Kurt Volker, have also discussed it. It seems increasingly plausible that the U.S. might reconsider its position on NATO membership for Ukraine as part of a broader negotiation framework, especially if Putin decides it is time to limit Russia’s losses and secure the best possible agreement.

Finally, this security guarantee is essential for President Zelensky because he fears that, without NATO membership following a peace agreement, Putin could simply use the pause to rearm and attack Ukraine again in the future.

The Euro-Atlantic community must act quickly, much faster than Putin. Unfortunately, we are seeing the opposite: Putin has already organized a BRICS summit in Kazan, openly defying and challenging the West by inviting North Korean soldiers to join the fight against Ukraine. He is now actively consulting with India and China, although India’s stance differs from China’s.

Turkish President Erdogan also attended in Kazan, but the key point is that Putin managed to bring together influential leaders, including United Nations Secretary-General Guterres. This suggests that Putin’s diplomatic and military proposal could soon surface, whether openly or behind closed doors. It is clear he aims to settle the conflict at Ukraine’s expense.

Xi Jinping has stated he opposes any further escalation, yet Putin has proceeded to deploy North Korean soldiers. So, what does this imply for the "no escalation" stance? Are we witnessing the start of Putin’s strategic proposal? There are already signs pointing in that direction.

First of all, I believe that the UN Secretary General’s participation in the BRICS Summit is absolutely appalling, reckless, and completely undermines his credibility as a fair and objective mediator. He often speaks about peace, yet he did not attend Ukraine’s Peace Summit in June in Switzerland. However, he goes to Putin’s summit, which is utterly shameful, a gigantic strategic mistake, and disgraceful. He should resign as Secretary General of the United Nations, though he likely will not. His actions are reckless and only add more fuel to the fire of war.

That said, regardless of President Putin’s ambitions to transform BRICS into a military alliance, I do not think there is a single BRICS member that would support such a move. I am currently in Turkey, and I have absolutely no doubt that President Erdoğan views BRICS as a way to create economic options for Turkey. He is able to engage with Putin precisely because Turkey’s commitment to NATO is strong and unquestionable. Turkey’s military value to NATO is second only to that of the United States in terms of the size and capacity of its overall military.

When it comes to China, it has no interest in participating in BRICS as a military organization. The new members, such as the UAE, Egypt, and Kenya, are also not interested, nor is South Korea. Therefore, Putin’s ambitions to turn BRICS into a military alliance will fail. Likewise, his aim to transform BRICS into a bloc that can counter Western pressure on Russia, specifically pressure like Russia's exclusion from the SWIFT system and the use of the dollar’s power via sanctions, will not lead to an alternative international payment system or a swift alternative to the dollar as the global trade currency. Perhaps eventually this shift may occur, but it would take decades for world trade to significantly move away from the dollar.

Such a shift would impose significant short-term risks on companies and countries, as they would lose access to the U.S. banking system, making it incredibly difficult to conduct business. However, if the U.S. continues to overuse sanctions as a tool or weapon, there may eventually be a growing movement among countries worldwide to say, “Enough; we’ve had enough of the U.S. dollar.” But the world is far from reaching that point.

Ultimately, Putin’s only real success at BRICS was rhetorical and political, showing that he is not entirely isolated. And it was politically significant, if disappointing, to have Secretary General Guterres appear so shamefully at the summit.

It is evident that Guterres holds a ceremonial role, while the real decisions will come from key capitals: Washington, Brussels, Berlin, possibly London, and certainly Beijing. Everyone is closely watching for the results of the United States elections. Meanwhile, Putin is taking advantage of this waiting period, aiming to advance his offensive and secure as much territory as possible, constantly citing conditions on the frontline.

In just a few days, however, the landscape in the United States could shift dramatically. It is uncertain who will emerge as the winner or how the opposing side might react if the election results are contested, which could lead to a highly complex situation. Any such instability in America typically prompts an aggressive response from Russia on both military and diplomatic fronts.

Guterres, first of all, is largely a ceremonial figure, but his importance on the world stage lies in his moral authority, which he has now completely undermined. Regarding the U.S. election, this is likely the closest election in modern American history, with the outcome hinging on a small number of decisive states. Based on our political system, this year it comes down to seven battleground states. The polls in these states, as well as nationwide, have never been so close or unpredictable, making it impossible to forecast the winner accurately. Depending on the day, Harris might appear slightly ahead or behind Trump in these critical states, but no clear trend has emerged.

If Harris wins, I think we will see a continuation of current U.S. policy toward Ukraine, with the possibility that she may adopt a less timid, less self-deterring approach than President Biden has shown concerning Ukraine's use of U.S. and NATO missiles for strikes deeper into Russian territory. But this is just speculation on my part. If Trump wins, he has claimed he will end Russia’s war in Ukraine “within a day,” which is, of course, impossible. His statement underscores his 100% transactional approach, treating everything like a business. In his view, the U.S. has no friends, only business partners to exchange benefits with.

This stance might open up some negotiating space for Ukraine and Russia to consider what they can offer the United States in return. It is unlikely to be anything NATO-related, but there could be some transactional benefit to the U.S., perhaps in the area of trade with Ukraine. Trump is pragmatic and practical and may, if elected, look for a deal that benefits the U.S., though not necessarily by abandoning Ukraine outright. He likely understands that Ukraine cannot simply be “left to Russia,” especially considering potential instability in the region.

If Trump wins, I expect that Harris would recognize the results, unless there is a very narrow margin and allegations of impropriety. However, if Trump loses, he is highly unlikely to acknowledge defeat. He will likely do what he did previously, claiming that the election was not just unfair but stolen.

Trump’s team is already filing lawsuits on issues related to voter registration and early voting procedures, alleging inaccuracies and leaving open the possibility of challenging the election’s validity. He has a substantial legal team preparing even more challenges. When repeatedly asked if he would accept the election results if he loses, he has said he would, as long as the election is “fair”, a similar stance to what he held in 2020. He is, therefore, laying the groundwork to claim the election was unfair and contest it.

Because U.S. elections are not centrally administered but instead managed at the county and state levels, it would be nearly impossible to “buy” an election. However, it will take some time to certify the vote count. Official certification of the election results, as we know, takes place on January 6th, the date when Trump supporters stormed the Capitol in 2021. I do not expect a similar incident to occur this time. By January 20th, 2025, I believe the election outcome will be fully resolved.

During the interim, I doubt that Putin will engage in any highly escalatory actions, as he likely hopes Trump will win and would not want to do anything that could alienate him. If Harris is declared the winner, Putin also would not want to undermine Trump’s claims about election unfairness. So, in short, I am not worried about Putin taking aggressive actions before the inauguration of the next U.S. president. I expect he will act cautiously during that period.

The main refrain we often hear is "pray and fight," but this is not a sufficient strategic outlook. In Ukraine, we need a clear view of our path to victory, perhaps within the next year. However, this is hard to envision given the challenges with resources. Russia’s economy has not buckled, and conditions within Russia remain largely stable.

This raises concerns that if President Trump replaces Joseph Biden, he might declare that he intends to reset everything the previous administration put in place and begin his own "peacemaker" strategy from scratch.

Under such circumstances, very different scenarios are possible. In your view, what would be the best actions for us? Russia seems to be hardly constrained by resources. If we gain authorization, we could step up operations on Russian territory to target and dismantle their military assets. At present, however, it is evident that Putin is counting on winter, on depriving us of energy and electricity and wearing down an already exhausted and traumatized population. His aim appears to be to break Ukrainian morale and then present, or not present, some sort of resolution that might come from Beijing, Trump, or another source, at our expense.

Well, as I was saying before, I'm not as pessimistic as I was previously, Mr. Borkovskyi, and certainly not as pessimistic as the last time we spoke. In recent weeks, there’s been some evidence that Putin may want to find a way to begin de-escalating. Yes, Russia's economy is large, but it’s weakening. It hasn’t collapsed, as many had hoped the sanctions would cause, but at the same time, it’s significantly impaired, having been completely restructured to focus on military production.

Before Putin decided to invade Ukraine for the second time, his economic strategy and goals were to attract technology and investment from abroad to modernize Russia’s economy. That goal has since failed, as the economy is now solely focused on the war effort. He realizes that the war can’t go on indefinitely – Russia’s population and resources are not unlimited.

Historically, Russia has withdrawn from conflicts, like in Afghanistan and the First Chechen War. So, there’s always a breaking point for any country when the price of conflict becomes too high. Putin knows he’ll eventually need to end the war to get Russia’s economy back on track. The economy will contract significantly once the war is over and Russia is again exposed to the international market pressures and restrictions.

At this point, I don’t believe Trump would necessarily cut off all U.S. aid to Ukraine immediately if elected. When he previously urged Republicans in the House not to approve aid for Ukraine, I think he was mainly trying to complicate things for President Biden as the election campaign approached. Trump, as a transactional businessman, albeit one with a history of bankruptcies, understands that a successful deal usually requires both sides to gain something. So, even though he may talk about ending aid, I doubt he would completely abandon Ukraine if he really intends to help broker peace.

What should Ukraine do? Its leadership should consider how they might offer something meaningful to the U.S. within the context of any negotiations involving Russia to end the war. I don’t know exactly what that could be, but it’s worth exploring. Additionally, Ukraine should maintain its resolve, continue its efforts on the battlefield, and keep pushing all of us in the West to support its cause. Ultimately, I believe the outcome of this war will be determined either by a negotiated settlement that a U.S. president could help facilitate, or by which side’s resolve falters first – Ukraine and its allies in the West, or Russia and its supporters, including North Korea and Iran.