Russia preparing massive cruise missile strikes on Ukraine. Serhiy Zgurets' column

Air attacks by the Russian army

On November 11, Russia once again attacked Ukraine and its capital with drones. There was also a high probability of the use of Kh-101 cruise missiles and Kinzhals, as Russia had raised Tu-95 bombers (8 units) and MiG-31s during the night. These bombers were on a combat course, positioned along the line from which they typically launch missiles.

Ukrainian Air Force reported an air raid alert, because all the formal procedures for launching such a missile attack were in place, but there were no launches. However, this means that the Russian army is now preparing for the massive use of the accumulated cruise missiles in tandem with the Kinzhals. The invader has used this practice many times before. The pause has now lasted for over a month.

However, Russia has become increasingly active in using Shaheds and other drones. Recently, there have been several prolonged air alerts across Ukraine, starting at night. Statistics on the downing of Shaheds and other drones are still being compiled. On November 10, the largest attack occurred, with 145 drones launched, 65 of which were shot down, and 67 were lost.

A video has emerged showing drones called "Parody," which do not have a combat payload but instead create a strain on Ukraine's air defense system. These drones fly as long as their fuel and engine last, and then they crash. Following this, the Air Force reports that these drones have been lost.

The body of such a drone features a ball made using a 3D printer and partially covered with foil. This design reflects radar signals, creating a signal on monitoring systems that is hard to distinguish from that of a Shahed drone. As a result, air defense and mobile units are forced to track these drones, highlighting the need to find an effective solution to counter this tactic.

Yesterday, there was a meeting of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, where Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that it had been decided to increase the number of mobile fire groups hunting for Shaheds or drones. The issue of improving their equipment was also raised.

By the way, Ukraine has quite a few mobile groups. Recently, the U.S. Embassy announced that it had provided equipment for 800 mobile fire groups in the National Guard and the State Border Guard Service. These 800 groups have already shot down more than 200 drones. Similar groups also operate within the Ukrainian Armed Forces. While the number of such groups is substantial, it is clear that more effective options need to be explored. These solutions go beyond just relying on mobile groups.

In the near future, Ukraine's military will be checking proposals from Estonia, which offers new small missiles with a range of up to 2 km. Ukraine has also signed an agreement with a Belgian company to use their missiles to equip mobile groups to minimize the burden on air defense systems.

Situation at the frontline

The most difficult situation is observed in the Kurakhove and Pokrovsk sectors. At the meeting of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's Staff, it was announced that a decision had been made to significantly reinforce these most difficult areas, which is likely to involve the deployment of reserves to these particular frontline areas. First of all, we are talking about Kurakhove.

Russian forces are currently implementing plans to surround Kurakhove from several directions. For Russia, the capture or encirclement of Kurakhove is a basic prerequisite for further advancement to Pokrovsk.

Russia is attacking Kurakhove from the north, east and south, trying to reach the logistics routes that provide supplies to the town. The main logistical route is the Kurakhove-Zaporizhzhia road. Russian forces are trying to advance from Yasna Polyana, Maksymivka and Trudove to Kostiantynopil. It is about 11 km from Yasna Poliana to Kostiantynopil.

The paradox is that there are no fortifications in the area of Yasnaya Polyana. At least two weeks ago, an analysis of satellite images presented by French analysts suggested that there were almost no fortifications from Shakhtarsk and Yasna Polyana further north, which, of course, makes defense in this area difficult.

A little further east, Russia is trying to break through to Uspenivka. There is also a transport hub there that supplies part of Ukraine's grouping in Kurakhove. And the most dangerous dynamics regarding Kurakhove's flank encirclement is from the north.

Russia is currently advancing toward Sontsivka, a village located to the north of Kurakhove, upstream of the Kurakhove reservoir. Russian forces are entering the village, using their familiar tactics—accumulating small groups before attempting to advance from the north toward the Zaporizhzhia-Kurakhove road.

Yesterday, it was reported that a dam near the village of Stari Terny was blown up, causing water to spread westward toward the villages of Andriivka and Kostiantynopil. The Kurakhove reservoir, which has several dams, had one of its dams blown up a few months ago, significantly reducing the water level and making it impossible for either Russian or Ukrainian forces to cross it. Now, another dam blocking the Kurakhove reservoir, which stretches about 40 kilometers, has been destroyed. This area is crucial as it impacts the logistics route further east.

Another section of the frontline around Kurakhove is located to the east of the town, where Russian forces have been conducting frontal attacks for an extended period. Kurakhove is currently held by several Ukrainian brigades. Russian troops have now entered the eastern part of the town, attempting to amass forces in the area and push deeper into the town. Ukrainian soldiers are holding off the invaders, but it is understood that these frontal attacks from the east are aimed at restraining and tying down Ukrainian forces in this area. This strategy is intended to complicate counteractions on the flanking directions around Kurakhove.

Training of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Reserves

The issue of forces, means and reserves is becoming an urgent need for the Ukrainian army, although this issue has always been relevant. So let's turn to the topic of training these reserves on the territory of Ukraine's partner countries.

Recently, we made a large publication on the Defense Express portal, where we analyzed the training of Ukrainian military in Europe. This publication was based on the analysis of American and Polish experts.

We know that the EU has a program for training Ukrainian military in Poland. This is a European program that has trained 62,000 Ukrainian servicemen since 2022. In 2023, 10,500 soldiers will be trained. This year, Ukraine plans to train 12,000 servicemen at Polish training grounds under the European program for training reserves for the Ukrainian Defense Forces.

Let's see what problems exist and what conclusions foreign experts have drawn to improve military training. First of all, we are talking about the very short time allocated for training those groups that are sent to Poland. Most courses last only a month or a little longer, but this is actually three times shorter than standard courses in NATO countries. It turns out that the training of a platoon, squad or company lasts for one week, which is extremely short.

Battalions are trained in the same way at these training grounds. However, foreign experts, based on our experience, conclude that this method is ineffective. When battalions trained in Poland are later divided into companies, it undermines the effectiveness of the training at this level.

Another problem involves the differences in governance between NATO countries and Ukraine. We have long emphasized that a high level of tactical awareness enables the military to understand the mission of a combat operation and reduces the need for overly detailed task-setting by commanders. This is typical for military personnel with a solid level of tactical training. However, mobilized soldiers who later train at European training grounds often lack this level of training, which necessitates spending additional time to help them understand NATO procedures and decision-making processes.

One more important issue is that some of Ukraine's military personnel are trained as instructors at these foreign training grounds, with the intention that they will return to Ukraine and pass on their experience to other soldiers at Ukrainian training centers. However, practice shows that the majority of these instructors end up serving as fighters in assault units. As a result, the purpose of training these instructors at foreign training grounds is undermined, as they do not have the opportunity to share their knowledge and experience with others.

All of these risks and challenges are created by the fact that Ukraine is now forced to train a much larger number of troops in a short period of time than previously planned. This probably affects the nature of the training itself, which is now being carried out at European training grounds.

And the main conclusion that can be drawn from this situation is that both Ukraine's partners and military leadership must improve the processes of this training so that such programs have maximum effect on the front line. We need trained units, and here the assistance of the Europeans should be integrated so that their training grounds, experience, and technical facilities are used as effectively as possible to strengthen Ukraine's Security and Defense Forces.